SOCIAL PROTECTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO MIGRATION?

An assessment of the role of social protection in reducing push factors for migration in different country contexts
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The study was jointly conducted by the Bonn-Rhein-Sieg University of Applied Sciences, and the Institute for Political Science and Sociology at the University of Bonn. The German Social Accident Insurance (Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung e.V., DGUV) has funded the study.

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SOCIAL PROTECTION
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An assessment of the role of social protection in reducing push factors for migration in different country contexts

GVG Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissenschaft und -gestaltung e.V. (Hrsg.)
The relevance of flight, migration and integration has moved to the top of the political agenda as a result of the immigration of refugees in recent years. Social protection can play an important role in managing migration flows, stabilizing societies and encouraging economic development. These promising functions have, however, received surprisingly little attention from governments, academia or practitioners as strategies for reducing push factors for migration.

To review the concept of social protection and its potential to influence migration and refugee flows the Bonn-Rhein-Sieg University of Applied Sciences and the Institute for Political Science and Sociology at the University of Bonn have jointly conducted this study, “Social Protection as an Alternative to Migration? An assessment of the role of social protection in reducing push factors for migration in different country contexts”.

The authors of the study present in detail a conceptual framework for the link between social protection and migration and further provide an in-depth analysis of four countries: Albania, Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan. Finally, the study particularly highlights German strategies for combating the causes of flight and migration.

If governments and international institutions were to direct their attention to social protection as a sustainable long term strategy, it would make a significant contribution to reducing (future) migration pressures. Effective measures include the institutional reform of social protection systems, enhancing the accountability and reliability of social services, expanding social protection coverage and improving targeting mechanisms, especially in countries with high levels of poverty and corruption.
Furthermore, migrants who are considering returning to their home countries would have a much greater likelihood of doing so if a functional social protection system were in place and the portability of social security benefits was secured.

For its potential to be fully exploited, social protection needs to be recognized as a stand-alone sector that brings about sustainable long-term development and has great potential for counteracting the causes of flight and migration. Social protection should therefore be strategically integrated into development policies as a main component of interventions.

Dr. Joachim Breuer, Director General German Social Accident Insurance – DGUV, Chairman Association for Social Security Policy and Research – GVG;
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This study has been a collaborative effort. Although the main partners were the Bonn-Rhein-Sieg University of Applied Sciences and the Institute for Political Science and Sociology at the University of Bonn, it would not have been possible without the involvement of many other institutions. The authors would first of all like to thank the German Social Accident Insurance (Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung e.V., DGUV) for their financial contributions to this study and Dr. Gregor Kemper (DGUV) for his initiative to advance a topic of growing importance. Special thanks also go to the GVG for their input and efforts to ensure that the study and topic receive the appropriate attention.

We are furthermore greatly indebted to all the many interview partners who were willing to share their time and experiences with us. We would particularly like to extend our thanks to all those migrants who were willing to tell us their own personal story and enabled us to obtain a much better understanding of how social protection could play a role in migration decisions. We would also like to thank the GIZ Sector Initiative on Social Protection Systems for facilitating contacts to important interview partners and for reviewing the study.

Responsibility for the information and views set out in this study lies entirely with the authors.
This study aims to highlight the significance of social protection for migration policies and research. It recommends a shift of focus from short-term measures – such as border controls and stricter immigration rules – to comprehensive long-term strategies on migration. The study was jointly conducted by the Hochschule Bonn-Rhein-Sieg, University of Applied Sciences, and the Institute for Political Science and Sociology at the University of Bonn. The Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung e.V. (DGUV) both funded and contributed to the study, and the GVG Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissenschaft und -gestaltung e.V. provided further input and has been responsible for its publication and distribution.

The study reviews the concept of social protection and its potential to influence migration and refugee flows. Evidence indicates that social protection can facilitate as well as impede migration, and the extent to which it influences migration decisions largely depends on the conditions and the predominant motives for emigration and flight in the countries of origin. How social protection systems are designed and how well they are implemented in countries of origin determines and differentiates the effect it can have on the decision to migrate. The adequacy, frequency and reliability of benefits influences, whether individuals and households consider migration amongst other options.

To take full account of the relevance of contexts, four countries were selected for in-depth analysis: Albania, Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan. If the German government were to direct its attention to social protection in these countries, it would make a significant contribution to reducing (future) migration pressures. Measures where German support could be particularly effective in this respect include the institutional reform of social protection systems, enhancing the accountability and reliability
of social services, expanding social protection coverage and improving targeting mechanisms, especially in countries with high levels of poverty and corruption. Migrants who consider returning to their home countries have a much greater likelihood to go back if a functional social protection system is in place and the portability of social security benefits is secured.

The study concludes that social protection needs to be recognized as a stand-alone field that fosters and enhances links and collaboration with other fields. As such, it can bring about sustainable long-term development and has great potential for counteracting the causes of flight and migration. Therefore, social protection should be strategically integrated into development policies, as a main component of interventions. Today, this is too seldom the case. The study therefore calls for approaches to migration which combine short-, medium- and long-term strategies. Other policy recommendations presented include increasing social expenditure and investment in social protection, improving financial assistance and reintegration support for migrants wishing to return, and concerted efforts by all countries to reduce migration pressure and to fight the causes of flight.

**A conceptual framework for social protection and migration**

The study presents a conceptual framework for the link between social protection and migration. Its main argument in favor of social protection goes beyond social protection’s established effect of reducing poverty and inequality by pointing out its direct and indirect impact on the factors which push migration. Social protection can have direct effects on either impeding or facilitating migration by increasing household income, reducing poverty and increasing individual’s capacity to cope with life-cycle risks. Ensuring basic living standards and providing perspectives in the country of origin can prevent emigration under conditions that the study outlines.
Indirect effects of social protection, in contrast enable households to manage future risks, accrue savings and plan future investments. Reliable and continuous delivery of social protection benefits has the added advantage of strengthening ties between citizens and the state. Hence, social protection with a high degree of accessibility and quality can build and/or restore trust in public institutions. It prevents the emergence of structural tensions which threaten social concord and it has a positive effect on state-citizen relations. Thus, the indirect effects of social protection also serve to neutralize the causes of emigration and flight.

The adequacy and reliability of social protection schemes in the countries of origin play an important role. In many cases, the minimum benefit level fails to “provide beneficiaries with the means to a life in dignity” (ILO, 2012); in others, transfers are unreliable or unpunctual. This creates mistrust in state and government officials and can end up boosting emigration. The access to social protection services, social protection coverage and related state expenditures are closely linked to emigration rates as well. The study shows that the lack of access to decent healthcare services or of fair employment conditions can nudge potential migrants towards leaving their country. Moreover the capacities of a state including its physical and financial infrastructure as well as external shocks like droughts or floods, influence the efficiency and quality of social protection programs and hence the migration decisions of the population. However, there are cases where these effects do not apply. For example, employees holding decent jobs in their countries of origin are usually more likely to find a decent workplace abroad.

Yet evidence demonstrates that social protection has a significant impact not only on those factors which determine the decision to emigrate but also on those which affect the decision to return. Again, the impact is associated with the design, quality and accessibility of social protection and with the portability of social transfers. There is,
however, no generally accepted understanding of when or how social protection either fosters or prevents migration, and this explains the need to examine the linkage contextually.

**Case Studies**

The study empirically examines the interplay of social protection and various causes of migration and flight. It assesses how social protection can both influence individual decisions to migrate and to return to their countries of origin. The study focuses on four countries, Albania, Iraq, Nigeria, and Pakistan, which represent the range of structural differences underlying the causes of flight and migration to Germany.

**Albania**

The number of Albanian asylum seekers in Germany reached its peak during the 2015 refugee crisis, but has since drastically decreased due to low acceptance rates. High youth unemployment and poverty are the primary factors driving emigration. Other important causes are economic concerns as well as the persecution of, and discrimination against, minorities (especially Sinti and Roma). Social protection coverage in Albania is among the lowest in Europe, with significant gaps in the fields of education, housing, and social assistance. Access to social benefits is severely impeded by corruption, which has led to immense distrust of public institutions. The failure of social protection systems to cover the poorest citizens hinders social and economic development, providing further motivation for migration. The study suggests first steps should entail tackling corruption and promoting transparency by supporting institutional reform and enhancing accountability. These measures could extend from the involvement of civil society in political decision-making and the training of government employees. The Albanian social protection system should then focus on increasing coverage and benefit levels directed to vulnerable groups. Such measures would contribute to alleviating poverty and thus reduce incentives for emigration.
Iraq
The main push factors for people leaving Iraq originate in the country’s deteriorating social and political situation. Terrorist attacks and persecution in the context of religious and ethnic conflicts are the main factors driving Iraqis to flee. In such tense and fragile situations, social protection takes on a more humanitarian role and is mostly needed to provide immediate access to basic services and maintain a minimum standard of living. Although social protection is a minor factor for migration decisions today, it is likely to lay the foundation for improving future living conditions by for example providing potential recruits of extremist groups with alternative perspectives.

Nigeria
Economic despondency, extreme poverty, malnutrition, infectious diseases and inequalities between the country’s regions are push factors for migration in Nigeria. In the future, population growth will only reinforce these push factors, especially for the young, who represent a large proportion of the population. Social protection in Nigeria is characterized by a substantial lack of coverage, poor financing and administration, corruption, and consequently a lack of trust in government. Supporting economic growth, expanding social protection and providing financial assistance to deprived areas are first steps towards tackling these challenges and towards reducing migration pressures.

Pakistan
Many Pakistanis are threatened by extreme climate conditions and particularly religious minorities by persecution. These dangers constitute the major causes of migration and flight. Implementing social protection in Pakistan is challenging because the realization of such schemes lies in the responsibility of a variety of different stakeholders. Moreover, social protection is confined to Pakistanis who are formally employed. If social protection and its influence on migration are to be enhanced, priority must therefore be given to closing the social security gap by increasing coverage, including
workers of the informal economy and tackling climate-related risks. In addition, the budgetary commitment for social protection as a total percentage of GDP needs to be raised and the capacities of all relevant stakeholders in the field of social protection expanded.

**Implications for migration policies in Germany**

Within this international context, the study particularly highlights German strategies for combating the causes of flight and migration. Germany is of unique interest due to the high proportion of migrants in the country’s population and the large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in the last three years. To reduce migration pressure, Germany has implemented special initiatives to fight hunger, poverty and destabilization. In addition, Germany provides bilateral support in dealing with migrants and refugees both to countries of origin and countries of destination through measures at the political, economic and military levels.

Although social protection is an important instrument at the domestic level, it plays only a minor role in German development policy. Nevertheless, Germany has made some efforts to assist countries with a systematic approach to implementing social protection for vulnerable groups. These measures have been promoted through policy dialogue, technical assistance, financial support, professional consultancy and training. However, only a few bilateral programs and partner countries have included social protection as a significant component.

Overall, social protection is not regarded as an independent field within the development sector and as such is mostly included as a subordinate topic within broader frameworks and programs of economic development, good governance, health and rural development. Under these circumstances, its promising function and potential as a beneficial and sustainable element of development policy is not yet fully acknowledged.
To more prominently place and position the role of social protection in German development policy, the study sheds light on how social protection is linked to the field of migration. Currently, there are three governmental strategies for mitigating the causes of displacement and migration. The first strategy addresses both acute and structural causes of migration and flight through improved access to basic social services, education, and employment. For example, cash-for-work programs have been established as part of this strategy. The second strategy aims to strengthen host communities in third countries and to provide immediate humanitarian aid without addressing long-term needs. The third strategy promotes the integration or reintegration of migrants and refugees, by supporting return options and giving migrants a future perspective in their home country (Bundesregierung, 2016).

Reviewing all three strategies, the study concludes that the focus up to now has been too often on short-term measures and single interventions and fails to strategically combine short-, medium- and long-term measures. The recent focus on cash-for-work programs may be deceiving, since it mainly fulfills short-, and medium-term needs, while only limited evidence exists on its long-term effects on sustainable employment and improved living conditions. Creating linkages between short-, medium- and long-term interventions is therefore essential to reduce poverty, enhance productivity and foster economic growth in the long run.

Since little research has been conducted in the field of return migration and reintegration, the study recommends the development of effective and evidence-based approaches to research in this field, with increased monitoring and evaluation.
INTRODUCTION
Walls can neither completely stop nor prevent migration. It requires more sophisticated approaches to manage migration flows. One central element in any strategy is providing potential migrants with prospects and opportunities in their home country. This might be more difficult in contexts dominated by war and conflict but is not completely impossible in countries where corruption, poverty and limited opportunities push people into migration. Providing such prospects requires multi-level interventions that go beyond educational opportunities and functioning labor markets alone. Citizens also need protection in unproductive phases of their lives. They need to be in a position to manage common life-cycle risks, to know that a work accident will not result in a debilitating economic setback for their family, and to have the guarantee that their standard of living cannot fall below a certain minimum. They also need to be able to trust the institutions of their home country to deliver on this promise. That social protection can play an important role in this regard is amply evidenced by the experience of Germany over the past century.

Investing in social protection means investing in people so as to reduce poverty and inequality. Social protection can provide for basic needs and certain of its instruments can pave the way for more sustainable livelihoods, giving people a choice when it comes to migration decisions. Evidence suggests that if basic needs are met, people are less inclined to put themselves in the situations of danger and uncertainty they must face when taking on a strenuous journey.

The role of social protection as a strategy to reduce push factors for migration has, however, received surprisingly little attention among academics and practitioners. Many have placed more emphasis on reducing migration by focusing on factors with immediate and short-
term effects such as border controls and stricter immigration rules. Yet as Germany has committed itself not only to controlling immigration and better integrating refugees but also to tackling the causes of migration, it is important to explore all options that look promising and potentially sustainable. More medium-term schemes such as cash-for-work have been gaining recognition, but long-term approaches which have direct and indirect effects on the causes of migration have received little recognition and have rarely been implemented. Social protection is a case in point, as its impact goes beyond its immediate effects of reducing poverty and inequality. Ultimately, it can influence push factors in migration decisions by giving individuals and households prospects in their home countries. In this sense, social protection can provide an alternative to migration, while also facilitating it where necessary.

This study therefore assesses conceptually and empirically how social protection can influence refugees’ migration decisions and how it can ease the return of refugees to their country of origin. Needless to say, the influence of social protection will vary widely from country to country as people flee or migrate for very different reasons. In order to take into account this variety in push factors and the characteristics of the migrants themselves, this study looks at four different country contexts: Albania, Nigeria, Iraq and Pakistan. While they are all among the countries from which the most refugees and migrants flee to Germany, they differ in terms of their geographical context, the level of insecurity and conflict, the extent of poverty and the responsiveness of state institutions.

In their examination of the current and future role of social protection in migration decisions, the authors conducted an extensive literature review to assess which links between social protection and migration decisions can be empirically substantiated. In addition to statistics on migration, country characteristics and the social protection system in each country, the study has relied on qualitative interviews with institutions responsible for migration issues and social protection in
Germany as well as refugees both in the Bonn-Rhein-Sieg area in Germany and in the four countries in the case studies to obtain a better understanding of migration, return decisions, and the potential of social protection to alter them. Altogether, 34 interviews were carried out with 19 refugees and migrants, 6 representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 9 government representatives and experts.

The study begins in Chapter 2 with a short historical account of migration policy in Germany. It introduces the present political discourse, outlines the current challenges that the government is grappling with and presents current statistics on migration to Germany. A conceptual framework for the links between social protection and migration is then developed in Chapter 3, which also discusses the driving factors underlying those links along with the current evidence base. On the basis of this framework, an analysis of country-specific flight causes and qualitative interviews with migrants and refugees from Albania, Nigeria, Iraq and Pakistan was carried out, Chapter 4 assesses in greater detail how higher investments in social protection might change future migration decisions. It also outlines the current state of social protection in each country and the challenges it faces. The following chapter then considers the degree of importance social protection has been accorded, both in Germany and abroad, as a strategy for reducing push factors in migration. Chapter 5 also reviews concrete programming by different actors in Germany in this area. The study concludes in Chapter 6 with concrete policy recommendations for a more strategic use of social protection in the future.
MIGRATION IN GERMANY
Any thorough analysis of contemporary political challenges requires a good understanding of historical developments. To assess the significance of migration in Germany in its wider context, the following chapter will first provide a concise historical overview of (West) Germany’s migration and integration policies. Building on this, the specific conditions, context, and consequences of the large-scale influx of refugees since 2014 will be examined before the latest statistical data and research findings on migration in Germany are presented.

2.1 Historical introduction

Integration of expellees after World War II
The first migrants to arrive in Germany in the aftermath of World War II were those Germans who had fled or been expelled from the eastern parts of the former German Reich. In 1952, in an effort to facilitate the assimilation of these migrants, the government introduced the Lastenausgleichsgesetz (Equalization of Burdens Act), legislation that financially compensated Germans who had incurred financial losses or otherwise been negatively affected by the war (Schwarz, 1981, p. 166ff.). From today’s vantage point, the legislation can only be seen as politically exceptionally successful. During the critical early years of the nascent republic, the law helped foster a sense of reconciliation and acceptance of the new form of government among the expelled in particular and nudged them towards resolving their grievances on a parliamentary path that complied with the new political system. The

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1 In order to understand the historical background of migration policy in Germany today, the developments in Western Germany are crucial. Understanding developments in the former German Democratic Republic are less important to understand current politics.
1950s saw the introduction of various legal, administrative and welfare measures (for example, emergency relief, public housing programs, accommodation and support for the relatives of public sector employees) that achieved, within the decade, the successful resolution of the challenges posed by the integration of expellees. However, this integration would in all likelihood not have succeeded had it been based solely on political and administrative measures. The country’s remarkable economic recovery certainly played a significant role in helping the country face and meet this daunting undertaking. Of similar importance was the fundamental attitude of the expellees themselves. In most cases, both at the individual and at the collective level, they helped one another. Finally, because these migrants were fellow Germans, neither a language barrier nor cultural differences obscured the discourse concerning integration assimilation policies.

**Recruitment policies**

While the “economic miracle” expedited the assimilation of refugees after World War II, it simultaneously laid the foundations for the next major challenge the young federal republic was to face. Rising private consumption and economic growth increased the demand for mainly un- or semi-skilled workers that could not be sufficiently met by the existing domestic labor supply. As a result, during the 1950s and 60s a number of recruitment agreements were signed with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. Recruitment policies sought to offset labor shortages within certain sectors of Germany’s post-war economy through temporary immigration on the basis of a so-called rotation principle: workers were expected to stay temporarily and then return to their home country. This principle served as a buffer for the German labor market. The primarily young male workers who were recruited tended to live without any other members of their family in different forms of collective accommodation. The jobs they filled were primarily in the industrial sector, required few skills, and had largely been vacated by the native population (Butterwegge, 2005). These workers usually held jobs liable to social security contributions, albeit at low rates, meaning that they contributed
to the country’s welfare and pension funds. Agreements with other members of the then European Community concerning the social security of migrant workers were in place already. Social security agreements with third countries were signed quite early on, for example in 1965 with Turkey and in 1969 with Yugoslavia. Between 1955 and 1961, the foreign population rose by around 200,000. While foreigners made up just 1.3 percent of the working population in 1960, by 1973 this share had risen to 11.9 percent (Steinert, 1995, p. 281).

The rotation principle soon proved to be economically inefficient. Companies had no interest in losing their newly-trained employees after only one year. Politicians soon conceded to their demands and progressively extended the length of residence permits while also allowing family members to join their relatives in Germany – without ever broaching the question of the inherent social consequences (Butterwegge, 2005). Pursuit of integration schemes for the so-called “guest-worker migration”, akin to what had been implemented for the

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expellees of the immediate post-war era, remained completely off the political agenda – not least because the stay of these workers had originally been viewed as temporary. Successive federal governments of the era saw no need to initiate any integration measures beyond the recruitment agreements themselves. Swiss author Max Frisch was one of the first to recognize the dawning socio-political imbalance that would emerge from attempts to clearly distinguish between integration into a system and into a society. It was Frisch who famously quipped, “We called workers – and human beings came.” (Seiler, 1965, p. preface). The fact that his comment has since become a staple of virtually all discussions related to migration policies in Germany makes it no less relevant today.

As a result of the moderate economic downturn of the late 1960s, the number of foreign workers in Germany decreased by a third, to 0.9 million, between 1966 and 1969. In 1973, the newly re-elected coalition government introduced a so-called “recruitment stop”, which put an end to state-organized labor migration. This recruitment stop encouraged many foreign workers to pursue an extended stay in Germany. Family reunification was the only possible form of immigration during that period. Due to the recruitment stop, foreign workers could no longer return home on a temporary basis and still resume their work in Germany, so an increasing number of family members joined their relatives in Germany.

**A rising number of asylum seekers, a constitutional compromise**

Partly because of a rise in the number of refugees (e.g. persecuted Kurds from Turkey), in the 1980s ideologically-driven debates around “foreigner-related policies” and “political asylum” took center stage. Helmut Kohl’s federal government placed a substantial emphasis on matters related to foreigners and migration and in 1983 introduced the Rückkehrförderungsgesetz (Repatriation Sponsorship Act), which provided migrants with financial incentives to return to their homelands. Workers from Turkey, Portugal, Tunisia, Morocco and Yugoslavia received 10,500 deutschmarks, plus an additional 1,500 deutschmarks
for every child, to leave Germany. Their contributions to Germany’s welfare and pension funds were also reimbursed. Around half a million people accepted the offer, most of whom had planned to leave Germany anyway. The provisions of the Act expired in 1984, their sole surviving remnant being an offer of counseling to potential returnees. Meanwhile, the government’s policies relating to foreigners focused on restrictions on new immigrants and the assimilation of those who had already settled in Germany (Ohlert, 2015, p. 582).

At the same time, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 brought about a rapid rise in immigrants from the former Soviet Union (Seifert, 2012). This development, coinciding with a rise in the number of asylum seekers, led to numerous troubling incidents in cities such as Rostock-Lichtenhagen, Mölln, Solingen and Hoyerswerda, names which have since become synonymous with far-right violence and racist riots in the minds of many Germans. After weeks of heated debates, on December 6th in 1992 the Christian Democrats, Free Democrats and Social Democrats agreed to what was known as the “asylum compromise”. This introduced the “third country statute”, an amendment according to which asylum is not granted to anyone entering Germany from a safe third country. Many observers consider this alteration to seriously curtail the original Article 16 of the country’s Grundgesetz, or constitution, which stated without any reservations that “[p]ersons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of asylum” (today’s article 16a, paragraph 1). In subsequent years the number of applications for asylum decreased dramatically (Bade & Oltmer, 2005).

Immigration policies in the 1990s were guided by a pragmatic slogan insisting that “Germany is not an immigration country”, political rhetoric running counter to what had already been established as an empirical fact by that time. Among other things, the constant refusal to accept social realities – particularly by members of the government and even as late as the 1998 election campaign – resulted in a decades-long delay in introducing measures necessary for the assimilation of migrants living in Germany. This failure – for which governments of
various stripes bear the responsibility – has had long-term negative social consequences. The unemployment rate among second and third generation immigrants has remained disproportionately high and their level of education disproportionately low – a legacy of the failed social integration of the so-called “guest workers” and their families. In 2014 the unemployment rate among those with a migration background was almost twice as high (6.7 %) as among those without (4.1 %), a difference primarily explained by the high levels of unemployment among those with roots in the guest-worker recruitment countries (7.1 %) and in third states (8.3 %). Standing at 27 % in 2014, the at-risk-of-poverty rate among the population with a migration background was more than twice as high as the rate among those without (12 %). In 2013 young people with a migration background were also more than twice as likely as those without to lack professional or vocational qualifications (37 % compared to 17 %) (Statistisches Bundesamt/Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 2016, 228ff.). At the close of the 20th century, Germany therefore presented itself as a country of immigration that nonetheless continued to reject the label (Kielmansegg, 2000).

Reform policies

The election victory of the Social Democratic Party (SPD)-Green Party alliance in 1998 constituted a paradigm shift – both in terms of actual policies and from a political-psychological perspective. The 1999 citizenship reform introduced birthright citizenship (jus soli) to Germany in addition to the principle of inherited citizenship (jus sanguinis). The basic notion of citizenship solely defined by one’s ancestry was thus discarded in favor of the principle applied by traditional immigration countries such as Canada and the United States. In 2001, the final report of an immigration commission established by the federal government put forward an extensive proposal calling on the government not only to react to these changes but to actively manage migration and integration as a resource for Germany’s economy, culture and society. This was a breakthrough in German migration history (Kommission “Zuwanderung”, 2001; Kronenberg, 2005, p. 169–178).
An immigration reform bill drafted on the basis of the commission’s findings failed to clear Germany’s upper house (Bundesrat) in 2002. The state of Brandenburg did not cast its vote as an unit, resulting in the constitutional court declaring the entire vote invalid (Büchner, 2002). These processes reflect the partisan polarization on the matter of migration policies prevalent during those years. In 2004, after lengthy discussions that combined some of the more liberal aspects of the initial bill with a tightening in other areas of the country’s law on aliens, both parliamentary chambers agreed on a compromise and on January 1st, 2005, the “Act to control and restrict immigration and to regulate the residence and integration of EU citizens and foreigners” came into force.

In retrospect, the Immigration Reform Act did not constitute a profound break with the past but nonetheless represented a substantial course alteration on the issue of migration. For the first time a single act regulated all central aspects of immigration policy. Reforms in the areas of right of residence, migration geared towards the needs of the labor market, humanitarian migration and the integration of foreigners can be regarded as the cornerstones of the act (Butterwegge, 2007).

The immigration act simplified the previously rather complex system of residence permits. The act reduced the different types of residence permit for foreigners in Germany (along with visas, the permanent EU residence permit and the EU’s blue card) to just two: temporary and permanent. This simplification by no means represented a complete volte-face on the so-called “recruitment stop” for foreigners for the German labor market as only highly skilled occupations were to be exempt. However, for these groups restrictions on entry to the labor market were lowered substantially (Schneider, 2007). From a humanitarian viewpoint, the act improved the conditions for refugees entitled to subsidiary protection. For the first time it bestowed this kind of protection on the victims of persecution at the hands of non-state actors as well as governments (§60). The act also gave registration
offices for foreigners the authority to issue tolerated refugees with a residence permit in order to avoid a long-term state of legal uncertainty (Meier-Braun, 2015).

**Integration policies**

Finally, the immigration act explicitly called for the promotion of the integration of migrants “into the economic, cultural and social life of the federal republic” (§43). Under an “assist and require” premise, all permanent foreign residents in Germany are entitled to a place in so-called “integration courses”, while certain groups are obligated to attend them under the threat of penalties. Along with German language lessons, the curriculum for the courses drawn up by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) is intended to impart an understanding of Germany’s legal system, its culture and history. The courses aim to ensure that participants gain a sufficient understanding of “the way of life in the federal territory to enable them to act independently in all aspects of daily life, without the assistance or mediation of third parties” (§43).

The migration and integration policy adjustments put in place by the SPD/Green coalition were affirmed by the grand coalition led by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) that took office in 2005. Since the inception of the immigration act, the active management and promotion of integration through language and integration classes has become a widely accepted tenet of the country’s migration policies, an approach continued under the auspices of Angela Merkel and exemplified by such formats as integration summits, the German Islam Conference, and the formulation of national action plans. In November 2005 a coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU (Christian Social Union), and SPD outlined the objectives of their joint migration policy. Integration could only succeed if migration was “managed and limited” (Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 2005). It was also understood that this undertaking required substantial administrative reform. Therefore, the federal government both extended the BAMF’s authority and elevated the office of the Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration
from that of an undersecretary to that of a minister of state within the chancellery.

Numerous studies have highlighted a variety of integration success stories from the period between 2005 and 2010, in particular among Muslims. A particular example is that of educational attainment, which forms the basis for a better integration into the labor market (Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2011, p. 8; Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen, 2010, p. 13; Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, 2011). That German integration discourse nonetheless remained on shaky ground was illustrated by the so-called “Sarrazin debate” surrounding a book published by the former SPD Berlin finance senator Thilo Sarrazin in 2010 (Sarrazin, 2010). In it, Sarrazin denied that migration had any positive effects on German society and its economy and instead portrayed the increasing proportion of Muslims within society as a grave threat. Migration policy debates were subsequently conducted in a notably more vitriolic manner.

Amid a general mood of agitation across society, the then federal president Christian Wulff made a pronouncement in a speech to mark the 2010 Day of German Unity that was to have a lasting impact on the integration debate: “Christianity is undoubtedly a part of Germany. Judaism is undoubtedly a part of Germany. That is our Judeo-Christian history. But nowadays, Islam is also a part of Germany.” (Wulff, 2010). While his words vexed some in society and within his own party at the time, they also marked a turning point towards a less emotional migration policy debate.

A study by the Berlin Institute has also revealed that public perception of the issues of integration and migration has changed: societal debates on these matters are now usually characterized by a high degree of pragmatism. The most vocal voices of the past — those strictly opposed to any and all immigration as well as those subscribing to a more rose-tinted interpretation of “multiculturalism” — have become significantly quieter (Berlin-Institut, 2014a). According to the
2016 “integration barometer” of the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration, the overwhelming majority of Germans both with and without a migrant background consider the attitude of the general public to be “mainly integration-friendly” (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen, 2016).

**Self-image**

For a long time, the Federal Republic of Germany did not conceive of itself as a destination and homeland for immigrants – even though it had de facto already become one. The underlying reason for this can be found in a conception of itself as a nation and a culture of debate on migration which differs fundamentally from those of such “classic” immigration nations as the United States, Canada and, to some extent, France as well. In Canada, multiculturalism has become a cornerstone of the country’s national identity and is as such a driving force behind the nation’s migration policies. An open culture that embraces diversity, constitutionally guaranteed minority protection and a points-based immigration system are the central pillars of the country’s modern immigration policy. The United States sees itself as a nation founded upon immigration, a view enshrined as a political objective by John F. Kennedy in his book “A Nation of Immigrants” (1964). France’s immigration culture is rooted in a postcolonial tradition, the “tradition d’accueil”, a tradition of responsibility that initially regarded accepting migration from the colonies to the “motherland” as a benevolent duty.

These classic immigration countries apply the territorial principle of birthright citizenship, jus soli, which confers citizenship on the basis of being born in the country (Scholz, 2012, p. 18). This is more than a mere legal nicety, it is a sign of belonging, inclusion and identification. Germany, whose self-image is rooted in a more exclusive understanding of culture, did not change its own conditions for citizenship from jus sanguinis (a principle based solely on descent) to jus soli until the year 2000 – and even then not without fervent debates about a German Leitkultur (defining culture). This illustrates the difficulty of reconciling societal facts with the self-conception of a nation. Germany is a reluctant
immigration country whose journey from rejecting foreign influences to the acceptance of multicultural realities has been a long one.

### 2.2 Challenges posed by the influx of refugees since 2014

Issues around refugees, migration and integration have once again moved to the top of the political agenda as a result of the influx of refugees in recent years. Experts had long been aware of the deficiencies of refugee policies at the European level. The so-called “Dublin system”, which places the responsibility for assessing asylum claims on the first European country a migrant sets foot in, placed a disproportionate burden on the Mediterranean countries of Greece, Italy and Malta in particular, although their problems have only recently become more widely apparent (Lehmann, 2015). Increasing numbers were already undertaking the perilous journey across the Mediterranean in 2013 and 2014. The following year saw another steep increase in the number of refugees risking their lives to come to Europe. In addition to the Mediterranean crossing, a rising number of refugees also opted for the so-called “Balkan route” from Turkey and Greece to the countries of central and northern Europe. Matters came to a head in the summer of 2015. Between June and August of that year, the Hungarian government erected a fence along its southern border with Serbia. During the first weekend of September, thousands of refugees gathered at Budapest’s Keleti railway station, unsure what would happen next. In light of an ever-increasing humanitarian emergency, the German government allowed these “stranded” refugees into Germany. This coincided with a decision to no longer apply the Dublin rules to refugees from Syria.

The subsequent steep increase in migrants entering the country found German states and municipalities, particularly but not only in the south, virtually unprepared. Without the massive assistance of volunteers, governmental agencies would likely have failed to meet this unprecedented challenge (Kronenberg, 2017). What stood out during the extended period during which the influx of refugees continued...
unabated was the strong sense of commitment to a common cause, the res publica, the community, and the decidedly liberal culture of helping “strangers” in need (Kronenberg, 2016).

Events on the ground, on the other hand, also reinforced an increasing dissatisfaction on the part of certain parts of society with the problem-solving capacity of representative democracy. A sense of politicians disregarding the interests of “the people” was fused with a general distrust of independent media coverage, leading to an increasing coarsening of the debating culture – both in the anonymous realm of the internet and on the streets. During the height of the refugee debate in late 2015, for example, around 15,000 demonstrators took part in protests organized by the newly established Islamophobic, right-wing populist, and in parts right-wing extremist PEGIDA movement (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West) in Dresden (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2015). An indignant, polarized mood present at the “heart” of society left its mark on the fringes as well. The number of attacks against refugees and other offenses committed by the far-right, for example, increased by an alarming rate in 2015 and early 2016 (BMI, 2017). At the political level, the recently founded (2013) “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) Party was able to exploit the challenge posed by the refugee crisis to make substantial gains.

These developments point to the necessity of explaining political decisions, obligations to act, and the dilemmas involved in weighing certain options to the public in a far clearer, more transparent and detailed manner than has recently been the case. The rise of the populist right reflects a failure to clarify the goals, pressures and limits political actors have to contend with as well as the lack of extensive parliamentary debate on the government’s major decisions related to the refugee crisis. At the time, Federal President Gauck put the fundamental sentiments felt among the wider public into these words: “our heart is large, but our capacities are finite”. The medium and long-term impact of the government’s refugee policies on both the German party system and the country’s political culture will therefore be
shaped substantially by the specific manner in which the political actors in charge handle the challenges at the various administrative levels (federal, state, and municipal).

Several “asylum packages” implemented by the government have established an important political framework for future integration policies. Essential fiscal foundations have also been laid. In July 2016 the federal and state governments came to an agreement on dividing up the costs of the intended measures. According to this arrangement, over the three-year period from 2016 to 2018 Germany’s 16 states will receive an additional seven billion euros from the federal government to shoulder the integration of refugees. In each of the three years, an annual lump sum of two billion euros will be paid out, but in 2017 and 2018 the federal government will transfer an additional 500 million euros per year to compensate the states for the cost of constructing additional housing. An arrangement for subsequent transfers to take into account the most recent developments is to be agreed upon by mid-2018. By its own estimate, in 2016 the federal government spent 21.7 billion euros on coping with the refugee crisis. An additional 21.3 billion euros has been included in the 2017 budget.

Last year 7.1 billion euros were spent by the federal government on combating the causes of migration. Among other things, Germany tripled the funds allocated to humanitarian aid in crisis regions to 1.4 billion euros. Initial housing along with the subsequent accommodation and registration of asylum seekers cost the federal government 1.4 billion euros. Other integration measures absorbed an additional 2.1 billion euros. Federal welfare payments following asylum procedures cost another 1.7 billion euros. In addition, the federal government provided both states and municipalities with 9.3 billion euros to provide immediate financial relief. Asylum seekers who were still waiting for a ruling on their applications cost the federal government 5.5 billion euros while 400 million euros were spent on funding accommodation for asylum seekers and 350 million euros went towards the care of unaccompanied minors (Bundesfinanzministerium, 2017).
Nonetheless, money alone will not solve the challenges posed by the issue of integration. Over the coming years, additional measures will have to supplement those steps which have already been initiated. Despite initial difficulties, the processing, housing and medium-term care of refugees has thus far worked rather well, though the challenges of social inclusion and long-term integration remain unresolved. Undoubtedly central to this task is integration into the labor market, an undertaking inextricably linked to the educational and language assistance programs for refugees that require continued governmental support. The treatment of refugees, on the one hand, and of economic migrants, on the other, need to be seen as separate immigration policy spheres. This applies particularly to integration measures and the fundamentally different motives for accepting these two distinct groups. The paramount importance of both education and participation in the labor market for the integration of refugees is nowadays widely accepted across party lines. Additional obstacles to the entry of refugees into the labor market were accordingly removed by the government’s integration act.

Broadly speaking, the challenges surrounding the integration of refugees into the labor force can be divided into three problem areas: access to the labor market, which is highly dependent on the kind of residence permit held; access to assessment and recognition of skills and credentials; and access to language courses. The countrywide “Netzwerk IQ” counselling project sponsored by the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs together with the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Federal Employment Agency helps to prepare refugees for an appropriate line of work.

Different projections regarding the impact the influx of refugees will have on the German educational system – both financially and in terms of personnel – have been issued. In the fall of 2015 – at the very height of the refugee crisis – the conference of Germany’s state education ministers estimated on the basis of numbers released by the BAMF that
around 20 to 30 percent of all refugees were school-age children and teenagers. Including refugees already attending German schools in 2014, states estimated that there was an increase in the number of students of around 325,000, requiring additional funds of at least 2.3 billion euros annually. The German Education and Science Workers’ Union (GEW) came up with a similar number. They calculated that there were in Germany around 300,000 additional students that had fled their homelands unaccompanied or with their parents. The union’s president, Marlis Tepe, stated that “[i]n order to offer these children and teenagers a decent education, a further 8,000 teachers for every 100,000 students are necessary.” This would require the hiring of some 24,000 additional teachers. The GEW also projected a sharp increase in the number of refugee children attending kindergartens and daycare facilities, estimating that around 100,000 children would need to be provided with a place in a daycare center.

In view of the present challenges and their cost implications, the question arises as to whether the current policy-mix can be improved.

2.3 Current data and research findings on migration in Germany

Immigration is a sensitive policy area where the perceived reality is often more extreme than the facts. The following section therefore presents the latest data and facts on immigration to Germany. While a general trend of rising asylum applications from non-EU countries has been observable at the European level since 2006, asylum claims have seen a particularly stark increase since 2012. From around 300,000 in 2012, they had already risen to roughly 430,000 by 2013 and stood at approximately 600,000 a year later. In 2015, in a single year, the numbers doubled to 1,322,825, thus reaching a preliminary peak. Data from 2016 (1,259,955) indicate a slight reversal of the trend but asylum applications nonetheless remain at historically high levels (Eurostat, 2017).
Figure 2.2  First time applicants in the top 20 EU countries in September 2015 and 2016

Figure 2.3  First time applicants by citizenship in EU countries in September 2015 and 2016

With 722,300 registered first-time asylum applicants, Germany handled around 60% of all first-time applications within the EU in 2016. The next highest number of applications were dealt with by Italy (121,200 or 10%), followed by France (76,000 or 6%), Greece (49,000 or 4%), Austria (39,900 or 3%), and the United Kingdom (38,000 or 3%).

Taking into account the population size of each EU member state, in 2016 the number of first-time asylum applicants was highest in Germany (8,789 first-time applications per million head of population), followed by Greece (4,625), Austria (4,587), Malta (3,989), Luxembourg (3,582) and Cyprus (3,350). At the other end of the scale, the lowest numbers were to be found in Slovakia (18 applicants per million head of population), Portugal (69), Romania (94), the Czech Republic and Estonia (114 each). In 2016, the primary countries of origin of asylum applicants in Germany were Syria (37%) and Afghanistan (17%). In this ranking, the four countries assessed in this study occupy positions

Figure 2.4 First time asylum seekers in the EU Member States by country of citizenship, 2016 Percentage of EU total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Applications</th>
<th>Percentage of EU Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,204,280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>334,820</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>182,985</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>126,955</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>47,595</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>46,145</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>40,160</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>33,405</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>28,925</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>23,015</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>340,275</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ec.europa.eu/eurostat
three (Iraq, 13 %), six (Albania, 2.1 %), seven (Pakistan, 2 %) and eight (Nigeria, 1.8 %) (Eurostat, 2017).

The upsurge in asylum seekers at the European level since 2014 is reflected in the data from Germany. While in 2014, 202,834 asylum claims were registered in Germany, a similar figure had already been reached by the end of the second quarter of the following year. During the summer months of 2015, the number of asylum seekers entering the country saw such a momentous spike that by the end of the year, German authorities had registered 476,649 asylum claims, more than twice as many as the previous year. Yet the actual number of refugees crossing into the country was significantly higher, as the asylum system was overwhelmed by the sheer volume of applications, leading to substantial processing delays. Many of these refugees could not be formally registered by the BAMF’s system until 2016. This fact helps to explain why 2016 saw an all-time high of 745,545 asylum claims even though many of these refugees had entered the country in 2015. By the fall of 2016, the German government was estimating that around 1.1 million refugees had entered the country in 2015, although this number was later revised downward to 900,000. Data for 2017 indicate a substantial decline in applications. Between January and April, only 76,930 asylum applications were submitted, a decrease of around 70 percent compared to the same period of the previous year (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2017).
Figure 2.5 Development of the number of Asylum-seekers since 1953

Asylum-seekers
in total 1953 – 2016  5.3 Mio.
between 1953 – 1989  rd. 0.9 Mio. (18 %)
between 1990 – 2016  rd. 4.4 Mio. (82 %)

Year

1953
1.906
2.274
1.926
16.284
3.112
2.785
2.267
2.980
2.722
2.550
3.238
4.542
4.337
4.370
2.992
5.608
11.664
8.645
5.388
5.289
5.395
9.424
9.627
11.123
16.410
33.136
61.493
107.818

1958
19.737
35.278
73.812
99.650
57.379
103.076
121.315
193.063
256.112
322.599
438.191

1963
49.391
97.423

1968
19.737
35.278
73.812
99.650
57.379
103.076
121.315
193.063
256.112
322.599
438.191

1973
19.737
35.278
73.812
99.650
57.379
103.076
121.315
193.063
256.112
322.599
438.191

1978
33.136
61.493
107.818

1983
19.737
35.278
73.812
99.650
57.379
103.076
121.315
193.063
256.112
322.599
438.191

1988
19.737
35.278
73.812
99.650
57.379
103.076
121.315
193.063
256.112
322.599
438.191

1993
19.737
35.278
73.812
99.650
57.379
103.076
121.315
193.063
256.112
322.599
438.191

1998
19.737
35.278
73.812
99.650
57.379
103.076
121.315
193.063
256.112
322.599
438.191

2003
19.737
35.278
73.812
99.650
57.379
103.076
121.315
193.063
256.112
322.599
438.191

2008
19.737
35.278
73.812
99.650
57.379
103.076
121.315
193.063
256.112
322.599
438.191

2013
19.737
35.278
73.812
99.650
57.379
103.076
121.315
193.063
256.112
322.599
438.191

No. of Asylum-seekers

Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2017.
In addition to a quantitative review of the statistical material available, we believe it is essential to obtain a qualitative perspective from recent research on migration policy that incorporates estimates and conclusions. The findings of a variety of scientific analyses reveal that Germany has made up lost ground in its migration policy and is in a significantly better position internationally than it was at the beginning of the millennium. Researchers primarily attribute this to the “belated recognition [...] of being an immigration country finally making its way into policy and legislation” (Schiffauer, 2015). This can be seen, for example, in Germany’s labor market policies. According to the OECD, Germany’s steps to facilitate the recognition of professional qualifications and the introduction of the “EU Blue Card” have given the country one of the lowest restrictions for potential migrants in highly skilled occupations (OECD, 2013).

According to the government’s integration report, improvements are not limited to first-generation immigrants but have also been noted among members of the second generation, particularly in the fields of education and vocational training. Between 2005 and 2010 alone, the rate of secondary school dropouts among 18- to 24-year-olds with a migrant background decreased by 15 percent (Bundesregierung, 2011). Moreover, since 2014 children born to migrants in Germany after 1990 have been able to apply for (dual) German citizenship. The previous requirement that a single citizenship be chosen before an individual’s 23rd birthday had been seen by many experts as an obstacle to integration (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen, 2013), nevertheless the usefulness of dual citizenship has again provoked intense debate recently as a result of political developments in Turkey.

The Migrant Policy Index (MIPEX), a gauge of the integration policies of 38 industrial economies, also confirms the immense strides Germany has made in the integration of migrants. Germany has been among the benchmark index’s ten most integration-friendly countries since 2014 (Migrant Integration Policy Index 2014). The county’s growing religious diversity is also reflected institutionally, a development that, according
to the 2015 annual report of the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen, 2015), is particularly visible in the increasing legal standing enjoyed by Islam.

While Germany receives high marks in the field of labor market integration, the MIPEX nonetheless shows the German government to be a laggard concerning access to education, health care for migrants, and the prevention of structural discrimination (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2014). Similar conclusions have been reached by the government’s own integration indicators report, which also calls for action on questions of social participation. For instance, the share of people with a migration background that are engaged in some form of social activity, such as participation in sport clubs, religious groups, associations, is substantially lower than among people without (Bundesregierung, 2011). Moreover, a study by the Berlin Institute has also found disparities between relatively well-integrated first-generation immigrants and members of the second and third generations in terms of education and access to the labor market in particular (Berlin-Institut, 2014, p. 33). Such findings indicate that despite considerable progress, integration policies need to focus on more than just the recent arrivals.

An assessment of the handling of the refugee crisis shows that Germany has witnessed a paradigm shift at the domestic political level, with a focus on lowering barriers and promoting refugees’ structural and social integration – at least for those who have obtained legal resident status. Those with little prospect of receiving a residence permit are increasingly being persuaded to return home voluntarily with government offers of both counselling and financial incentives (BMI, 2017b). At the same time, plans have been made to execute deportations more resolutely. Up to now they have frequently been impeded by practical hurdles such as missing documents or the refusal of the country of origin to accept the deportee. For 2017 German policy makers are therefore relying on a joint strategy of integration and
restriction. This study explores whether a greater focus on social protection could be an additional component in Germany’s migration policy that renders severe restrictions either unnecessary or more attractive.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK – SOCIAL PROTECTION AND MIGRATION
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK – SOCIAL PROTECTION AND MIGRATION

This chapter elaborates on the different definitions of social protection, its constituent components and the variety of approaches taken. It explores the relevance and role of social protection in migration decisions conceptually and empirically, focusing both on the decision to migrate and the decision to return. In addition to highlighting factors that may shape the relationship between social protection and migration, the chapter offers a short digression on why more attention should in future be paid to fragile contexts and what social protection can offer.

3.1 Conceptions and definitions of social protection

There is widespread discussion of what constitutes social protection. This section will discuss evidence of social protection’s successes and summarizes the most widely accepted conceptions and definitions of social protection and its instruments.

3.1.1 The relevance of social protection

Although the conception and definition of social protection varies amongst institutions, it is commonly defined as:

“all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups” (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004, p. i).
This study therefore adopts a very comprehensive definition of social protection which is not limited to any particular instruments.

While social protection has a long history and firm institutional embedding in most European countries, it has gained increasing momentum in developing countries in the past 15 years. Across the globe, social protection programs have emerged as an important developmental policy instrument for addressing high levels of poverty and deprivation (Barrientos, 2010).

The demand for social protection increased dramatically during the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s and 2008–2009 (Barrientos, 2010; Norton, 2001; ILO, 2014). Social protection was also discovered to be a more sustainable approach than recurring emergency relief in countries with persistently high poverty levels. Equally, Europe had considerable success with the use of social protection schemes as economic stabilizers during the global crisis of 2008. Evidence from a study conducted by the European Parliament (2010) shows that social protection, “particularly unemployment benefits, minimum income support and progressive taxation, have significantly contributed to reducing the depth and the duration of the recession and stabilizing labor markets” (European Parliament, 2010, p. 16).

There has been further evidence from developing countries of similar positive effects. Impact evaluation studies on social protection interventions such as cash transfers indicate positive effects in areas such as food security, income security, poverty reduction, health, education and women’s empowerment. Cash transfers, for example, have been found to increase school attendance, dietary diversity and the use of health services. Studies have shown that individuals and

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2 In Germany, the most effective social protection tools were the short-time work and work time adjustment schemes. Despite a 5-percent decline in Germany’s GDP, these measures managed to keep unemployment stable in 2009 (European Parliament 2010: 111).
households are more likely to continue working and accrue savings with a social protection scheme in place (Bastagli et al., 2016; Samson et al., 2004; Barrientos, 2010; Niño-Zarazúa, 2011). In addition, social protection can also reduce inequality (Woolard et al., 2010; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009).

Due to the proven success of social protection, there has been a global commitment to its advancement. In 2012 the member states of the International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted Recommendation No. 202 on social protection floors, which guarantees social minima for the most essential life-cycle risks and complements existing ILO social protection standards. In 2015, the World Bank and the ILO released a joint statement in support of access to social protection for all as part of the Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 (World Bank & ILO, 2015). The World Social Protection Report boasts that “sustainable and equitable growth” is unachievable without the presence of “strong social protection policies which guarantee at least a basic level of social protection to all in need” (ILO, 2014, p. 2).

The growing evidence for support and recognition of the potential for social protection systems as appropriate responses to crises and shocks around the world have not yet, however, made social protection a reality around the world. Despite social protection being a human right, the proportion of the world population that enjoys adequate coverage is a mere 27 percent, (ILO, 2014). This leaves 73 percent of the world’s population, predominantly the poor, the working poor and those working in the informal sector, without sufficient access to social protection (ILO, 2014). The need for social protection is undoubtedly great and efforts to extend coverage to those in most need still have a long way to go.

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3 United Nations (2015), Goal 1, aims to “end poverty in all its forms everywhere” and Target 1.3. calls on members to “implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and vulnerable”.

4 See Box 1
3.1.2 Defining social protection and its core instruments

There is no international consensus amongst governments, international organizations and local actors on the definition of social protection. The debate centers around what constitutes social protection and which category of programs fall under it, as social protection interventions overlap with livelihoods, human capital and food security interventions (Harvey et al., 2007). This lack of consensus is a result of the varied objectives pursued by social protection interventions, such as the reduction of poverty and vulnerability, empowering women and responding to various crises and shocks. The form and function of social protection can be different; it is determined by the objective (Hanlon et al., 2010).
Box 1  Social protection as a human right

The World Social Protection Report 2014/15 asserts that “social protection policies play a crucial role in realizing the human right to social security for all”. The following mandates speak to the notion of social protection being a human right:

- 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 22, states that “everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to the realization, through national efforts and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each state, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.”
- The ILO’s Convention 102 of 1952 provided minimum standards of social security to include medical care, sickness benefit, unemployment benefit, old-age benefit, employment injury benefit, family benefit, maternity benefit, invalidity benefit, and survivors’ benefit.
- The ILO’s Social Protection Floors Recommendation 202 of 2012 confirms that social security is a human right and social protection floors represent a bottom-line that no one should be allowed to fall below. Included in this minimum are access to health care, security for children (e.g. access to nutrition and education), income security for those of working age (e.g. unemployment, sickness, and disability benefits) and basic income security for older persons.

The diagram below depicts the social protection staircase, which promotes basic coverage for all followed by progressively higher social protection coverage. The horizontal dimension aims to extend basic coverage, whilst the vertical aims to increase the scope of coverage, which includes the range and level of benefits.

Source: ILO (2014); ILO (2012); UN (2015)
For larger multilateral entities, such as the World Bank, UNICEF and the ILO, social protection is defined by the objectives that they themselves would set for such a program (Hinds, 2014; Browne, 2015). Despite this lack of consensus, these institutions and others do highlight key tenets of social protection. They all stress the importance of social protection reaching out to those who are vulnerable to shocks and poverty and make mention of three widely accepted social protection instruments: social assistance, social insurance and labor market interventions.5

Social assistance is a non-contributory scheme that reallocates resources to groups within a society “eligible” as a result of a deprived circumstances (Norton et al., 2001). In the form of cash transfers, social pensions, in-kind transfers, school feeding and public works programs (Browne, 2015, p. 6), social assistance helps the vulnerable cope with shocks and ensures that they don’t fall below a socially agreed minimum. Social insurance is a contributory scheme helping to mitigate socio-economic risks. It predominantly covers those in the formal labor market, although there are ongoing initiatives seeking to better integrate the informal sector (Browne, 2015, p. 6). Labor market interventions safeguard the “interests of fuller and more financially rewarding employment” (Norton et al., 2001, p. 52). They consist of both active labor market policies (e.g. job training, access to job centers and policies encouraging the development of small and medium-sized businesses) and passive labor market policies (e.g. maternity, unemployment and sickness benefits, and the establishment of minimum wages) (Browne, 2015). They are designed to promote efficient and fair practices in labor markets and equal employment opportunities, protecting workers and those wanting to access labor markets.

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5 It is worth noting that there are other types of social protection. These include channels used to assist the vulnerable, such as social support and subsidies for basic goods offered by the government and private sector (Browne 2015, p. 7). In addition, there are informal instruments established at the community level, such as insurance, savings accounts and other livelihood securities, which are regarded as forms of social protection.
The World Social Protection Report examines four areas where the use of these three main social protection instruments is most crucial: children and families, working age men and women, old age security, and health coverage (ILO, 2014). Each dimension employs social protection instruments differently depending on the nature and level of exposure to risks. Given that child poverty affects not only the child individually, but also the society, community and economy in which the child resides, the most commonly used instruments are family and child benefits. These take the form of social assistance comprising both universal and conditional cash transfers to allay poverty (ibid.).

**Box 2  Risks and responses related to income**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks related to income</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Replacement of income</td>
<td>Inadequate income level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g. unemployment, sickness, maternity or disability</td>
<td>e.g. in the event that income is not sufficient to escape the likelihood of falling into poverty and possibly being socially excluded</td>
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Authors’ own table, source: ILO 2014.

Labor market interventions are the primary social protection tool for easing these risks, but social assistance and social insurance, such as unemployment, injury and disability benefits, can also be appropriate measures (ILO, 2014).

Risks associated with old age and health issues are typically covered by social insurance and social assistance schemes. Long-term care is typically financed through social assistance, although some countries (i.e. Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and Taiwan) finance long-term care through social insurance (ILO, 2015). Depending on the risk, one specific social protection tool may be more appropriate than others, but they all nevertheless work together to ensure the proper functioning and effectiveness of social protection systems.
3.2 Interaction of approaches to social protection and migration

Though the role of migration in the context of social protection has increased in relevance over the last decade, it has been relatively neglected by academia. In practice, there appears to be a limited understanding of the connection between migration and social protection and what responses and interventions would be appropriate (Waidler et. al., 2016). However, various links have been established and analyses of social protection and migration conducted. This section will present these links within a holistic framework, reviewing the most recent studies and debates. The main focus is on highlighting how social protection can influence individual decisions to migrate or return while also generally throwing light on the role that social protection could have in stabilizing fragile contexts in the future.

3.2.1 A conceptual framework for the general links between social protection and migration

This section elaborates what role social protection plays in decisions to migrate from countries of origin and decisions to return from countries of destination. It also highlights how other factors, such as household characteristics, age and gender have an influence on individual decision-making.

The numerous links between migration and social protection are summarized in simplified form in Figure 3.1. The focus of this study is on the role of social protection as a driver of migration, influencing the decision either to migrate to a country of destination or to return to the country of origin.
Among the first authors to place the role of migration within the broader framework of social protection were Sabates-Wheeler and Waite (2003). They distinguished “between migration as a social protection strategy and migration as leading to vulnerabilities that require specific social protection instruments” (Sabates-Wheeler & Waite, 2003, p. 4). This understanding incorporates two aspects of the link between social protection and migration: firstly, social protection as an informal strategy for coping and reducing risk, as one of many options within the livelihoods framework; secondly, social protection as a need resulting from risks associated with the migration process. The second link can be examined in the relationship between public transfers and remittances. The focus of this study is on the third link pointed out in Figure 3.1, which considers social protection as a driver or enabler of migration, leading either to the decision to migrate or the decision to return. This aspect has so far received little attention, an oversight which the present study hopes to redress. Most research to date has concentrated on the fourth point in Figure 3.1, the right to, and need for, social protection for migrants in receiving countries. The last link, social protection for refugees, incorporates the fourth link to a certain extent, but deals more specifically with the question of how to provide social protection for refugees in the destination country.
and who is to provide it (Desingkar, Godfrey-Wood & Bené, 2015, Hagen-Zanker & Himmelstine, 2013). Bridging the gap between short-, medium- and long-term measures enables migrants and refugees to make productive future investments in the long run and has significant effects on enhancing livelihoods (Bastagli et al., 2016).

### 3.2.2 A conceptual framework for the links between social protection and the decision to migrate

To assess more precisely what bearing social protection can have on the decision to migrate, we need a better understanding of all the factors that motivate an individual to leave or return to his country.

*Decisive factors in migration decisions*

The decision to migrate is a personal choice and can depend on different parameters. The decision is taken within a broader political, economic, social and environmental context, influenced by situations in both the country of origin and the country of destination. It is undisputable that understanding these relations has important implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of social protection programs (OECD, 2017).

The most common framework applied is the “push-pull model” introduced by Everett Lee (de Haas, 2007; Hagen-Zanker, 2008), who pointed out that differences between the country of origin and the country of destination were a matter of perception. He argued that individuals’ decisions were influenced by the following factors:

- determinants in the country of origin
- determinants in the country of destination
- personal motivation

Criticism of the push-pull model has centered on its descriptive and arbitrary nature, and the failure to include different levels of scale with respect to the unit of analysis and the weighting of different factors (de Haas, 2007). The connection between these factors should not be understood as an isolated substance, but rather as a dynamic “stream”
(Lee, 1966, p. 54–55) which acknowledges the role of exchanges of experience between migrants and citizens of the country of origin. Figure 3.2 summarizes existing economic theories in migration decisions and illustrates the range of variables that have an influence on the decision-making process.

**Figure 3.2 Summary of Theories and factors in decision-making**

At the micro-level, the “new economics of migration decision theory” (Stark & Levhari, 1982, p. 191) integrates and highlights the interactions in individual decision-making. Specific emphasis is placed on the household level, which maintains a “contractual agreement” with the person intending to migrate (Massey et al., 1993). Further relevant factors in decision-making are personal motivations and individual characteristics such as age, gender and level of education. Finally, the level of income and poverty and the vulnerability to risks must be entered into the equation (Hagen-Zanker, 2008).

Aside from households, social networks and migration institutions at the meso-level can also exert influence on the decision-making process (Stark, 1991). Social relations, for example, can be preserved and enhanced through remittances sent by the migrating individual; the latter also have an impact on the establishment of social status. Social status can in turn be linked to relative poverty deprivation as opposed to absolute poverty. Higher levels of inequality and income differences also increase the likelihood of migration (ibid.).

At the macro-level, recent economic developments, employment prospects and migration policies and laws not only determine decision-making, but also have an influence on the choice of the destination country (Hagen-Zanker, 2008).

Considering the different levels of influence, as well as how individuals and households assess risk, can deepen the analysis of decision-making in migration (Faist, 1997, 2000; Hagen-Zanker, 2008).

The role of social protection

Figure 3.2 shows that the influence of social protection policies receives little attention. The main reason for this is the scarcity of evidence. In contrast to the concept of welfare migration, so far few studies have discussed how social protection policies in the country of origin shape the decision to migrate.
Figure 3.3 Influence of social protection on determining factors in migration decision-making

Migration

Micro level factors
- Labor conditions
- Structural & anomial tensions
- Risks
- Income differences
- Values
- Individual & household characteristics

Indirect effects

Meso level factors
- Relative deprivation
- Migration institutions
- Networks

Direct effects

Household level
Making migration decision
Benefits vs. costs of migration

Macro level factors
- Labour demand
- Migration laws
- (World) economic development

Social Protection

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK – SOCIAL PROTECTION AND MIGRATION
Yet it can be argued that social protection does indeed play a role in the decision-making process. In adapting Hagen-Zanker’s framework (2008), we can explicitly link the areas of social protection to influential factors in the decision-making process. Figure 3.3 illustrates how social protection can have a direct and indirect effect on several factors at the micro- and meso-levels.

**Direct effects of social protection on factors relevant to migration decisions**

At the micro-level, there is widespread evidence that, by increasing the household incomes of the poor, social protection has direct effects on income levels and income differences. Social protection influences the income level of a household and thus has the potential to either prevent migration, as it replaces the gains that migration would have brought, or to facilitate migration by increasing income levels which can then be used to finance the migration journey. Cash transfers can directly or indirectly influence the decision to migrate (Siddiqui, 2012; Hagen-Zanker, 2012). Public transfers can be rendered as a complement or an add-on to existing livelihood strategies, which can either facilitate or impede migration. Public transfers delivered in cash or in kind can potentially replace the private transfers that migration would bring for example in the form of remittances, thus obviating the need to migrate (Hagen-Zanker & Himmelstine, 2013). In this context, social protection can change the dynamics of migration patterns and countervail the decision to migrate as social benefits bring relief from existing social and economic constraints. Public transfers could, however, also complement private transfers, easing credit constraints and costs associated with the migration process. Thus, social protection can contribute to financing and facilitating migration, particularly in the case of poor households (Bastagli et al., 2016; Desingkar, Godfrey-Wood & Bené, 2015; Hagen-Zanker & Himmelstine, 2013).

In addition, social protection is a very important risk-management tool, especially in matters related to employment. Specific social protection measures cover different types of life-cycle risks, such as
those associated with sickness, maternity and work accidents. A key risk is that of un- or underemployment. Unemployment, informal and irregular employment are incentives to migrate to a country with better work, income and saving opportunities, especially among the young. Protection at work matters equally. How labor market policies incorporate social protection elements, such as good working conditions and access to accident and health insurance, for example, has an effect on labor outcomes. If employment conditions improve in the home country, this will impact on the individual's decision to seek work elsewhere. The type of employment is an influential factor in the decision-making process. Formal employment not only provides security but in most instances guarantees improved working conditions. These include adherence to labor standards, such as occupational safety and access to accident insurance. Satisfaction with work conditions, including social benefits, has a significant role to play in the decision to migrate. Contrasting decisions are made by individuals who already have a decent job in the country of origin and therefore can easily obtain a job abroad (OECD, 2017).

Social protection is also vital for reducing relative deprivation at the meso-level by increasing basic living standards in fields such as health, housing, education and employment.

*Indirect effects of social protection on factors relevant to migration decisions*

In addition to its direct effects, social protection also has indirect effects which particularly affect future migration decisions. One of these is the resilience of households which, with the help of social protection transfers and services, can better manage future risks and are therefore less likely to fall into destitution and hopelessness. The mitigation of risk reduces psychological stress and enables households to plan future investments and possibly accrue savings, especially if transfers are regular and predictable. This also strengthens households' resilience over time and reduces the urge to look for greener pastures.
Further, social protection contributes to reducing pressures on informal means of providing for family members, meaning that the potential migrant is not the only source of protection and therefore not under the same degree of pressure to migrate.

Social protection provided by the state often serves as a first point of contact between citizen and state. Over time this can contribute to (re-)building trust in public institutions (Barrientos, 2010, Grävingholt, Ziaja & Kreibaum, 2015; World Bank, 2015).

Furthermore, providing access to social protection services and benefits for all prevents the emergence of structural tensions. This, in turn, has a positive effect on peace-keeping and state-citizen relations. Unequal access to public resources, such as social protection, can fuel social inequalities within and between groups. Such inequalities take on particular relevance in situations of conflict (Stewart, 2002). This is of considerable importance in the context of migration, where the conceptions of non-traditional households and families can be a source of systemic discrimination (Faist, 2013).

However, further research is needed to establish the extent to which individuals weigh the decision to migrate against formal means of social protection (Hagen-Zanker, 2012). If an individual is forced to migrate in the aftermath of a shock, such a move cannot be considered a form of social protection as the individual does not deliberately weigh up the costs and benefits of migration and choose from among a pool of options. It is also debatable whether private cash transfers, such as remittances, can be a substitute for a public cash transfer (Waidler, 2016). This is an area on which the present study tries to throw further light by means of qualitative interviews with migrants and experts and by deliberately choosing different country contexts.
3.2.3 Evidence base

As previously discussed, the fact that the decision to migrate is based upon a range of different factors makes it difficult to assess the contribution of social protection to that decision. Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine (2013) conducted an empirical analysis of how access to social protection programs increased or decreased international and internal migration. Their analysis of 22 studies had a geographical bias towards Mexico and South Africa, where most studies are to be found. Other countries included were Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, India and Albania. They found that the results were mixed, with 10 studies concluding that access to social protection increased migration, 10 studies regarding it as decreasing migration and the remaining two studies showing no significant effect either way.

More recent studies confirm Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine’s (2013) finding that social protection has mixed effects on migration. South Africa and Mexico still appear to be the focus of research in this area, probably due to the availability of data in these countries. At the same time, the relevance of other factors, such as individual characteristics (level of education, age and gender) and the design and duration of a social protection program, continue to gain recognition.

It is also worthy of note that some social pensions, in Brazil and South Africa, for example, were partly designed to counteract the negative effects of family separation due to migration, specifically on left-behind elderly and children, and thus aimed to offset the consequences of a decision to migrate (Barrientos, 2008).

A case study on the link between social protection and the decision to migrate in Mexico revealed that an increase in absolute household income due to PROGRESA6 not only reduced poverty among poor households but also reduced migration incentives. The additional

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6 Now Prospera
benefits addressed social and economic constraints that would otherwise have provoked labor migration (Stecklov et al., 2003).

Other studies and reports that take social policies and social protection into account reveal that such measures do indeed contribute to individual decisions to migrate, yet in some cases rather indirectly. This influence is further associated with personal decisions, for example the search for a better quality of life (De Haas, 2011; Giulietti, 2012; Hagen-Zanker & Himmelstine, 2013; Schulzek, 2012). A study observing the decision-making of middle class Mexican immigrants to Australia, for example, illustrates how individual and personal aspirations serve as motives for migration (Figure 3.4).

Finally, social security systems are in general adapting to emerging global challenges. An extensive report by the International Social Security Association emphasizes how social security systems can assist in the response to challenges associated with youth employment, shocks and extreme events and a changing work environment with increasing numbers of migrant workers (2016). The innovative solutions described include the establishment of youth guarantee schemes in Europe, the design of flexible, scalable and rapidly responding systems in the Philippines, and the expansion of social security coverage in the Caribbean (ibid.). Further knowledge exchange and research and development can advance and refine existing approaches and help to improve our understanding of what factors have an influence on migration patterns.
Figure 3.4  Motivations to migrate by Mexican Migrants in Australia

- To enjoy a better quality of life
- To obtain international experience
- To give my children a better future
- To seek a new life/to do something different
- Concerns about personal security (e.g. violence) in Mexico
- To join my partner/spouse
- To improve my English
- To broaden my cultural & travel experience
- To secure a job
- To work in a specific field for which opportunities in Mexico are limited
- To avoid unemployment in Mexico
- To gain independence from my family
- To be with my family who migrated before me

3.2.4 Driving factors

An analysis of driving factors supports the assumption that various factors combine to influence the decision to migrate. Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine specifically highlight the key role in decision-making played by the characteristics of beneficiaries, for example their level of education, skillset and gender (Hagen-Zanker & Himmelstine, 2013).

Age

Age has a clear influence but can either increase or decrease migration. In South Africa, for example, a young man in a household containing a recipient of an old-age benefit is more likely to become a labor migrant than one from a household without such a benefit. In this sense, a household losing the old age pension can lead to the return of a younger member (Ardington et al., 2016). Case studies in Ethiopia and Tanzania, however, find links between receiving a benefit and young people deciding to migrate to be rather weak. In contrast to the results from South Africa where a social pension fostered migration, in certain cases older people receiving a pension in Ethiopia and Malawi decided not to, or did not want to migrate. There, the social pension rendered the decision to migrate unnecessary (Desingkar, Godfrey-Wood & Bené, 2015).

Gender

An analysis of cash transfers in South Africa indicates that women are more likely to migrate for work (within the country) on receipt of a social pension, whereas for men, the benefit seems to make no difference. Here the benefit assists women in financing migration (Plagerson & Ulrikson, 2015). An evaluation of the impact of Ethiopia’s PSNP public works program on household structures reveals a reduction in out-migration of young girls, which is possibly explained by the increase in household income as a result of participating in the program. Young girls in households not participating in the program were more likely to migrate for marriage or work. However, this explanation does not rule out the influence of other factors, such as
school attendance or a rejection of child marriage by heads of household (Mekasha & Hoddinott, 2017).

State-citizen relations
The quality of public institutions, including social institutions and their services, also have been found to be factored into migration decision-making (Bergh, Mikina & Nilsson, 2015). Ensuring that cash transfers are predictable can help to reestablish trust and reinforce the social contract between citizens and the state, especially in countries with weak institutions or with increased social tensions and conflict (Osofisan, 2011; World Bank, 2015).

Portability
Access and legal entitlement to social protection and the portability of benefits for migrants, and specifically migrant workers, can impact on both the decision to migrate and the decision to return. International and bilateral labor and social security agreements and the portability of pension benefits can allow migrants to better address the risks they face. Resolving tensions between the country of destination and the country of origin can then foster return migration. Portability of social pension or health care benefits, for example, can facilitate and ease the decision to migrate from the home country. This has a further positive impact on the remaining family in the country of origin (ILO, 2006; Hagen-Zanker, Mosler Vidal & Sturge, 2017; Van Ginneken, 2011, 2013, 2016; World Bank Group, 2016).

Combining the effect of age and the design of social protection is shown, on the one hand, to increase migration if benefits are portable and, on the other hand, to decrease migration and increase the number of those returning as well. For example, a study that examines the role of social protection for young people finds that:

“The non-portability of contributions and benefits can affect the decision to migrate elsewhere or return, which in turn impacts families in countries of origin. The lack of portability or the impossibility to
obtain social security benefits despite their contribution to social security schemes might also push migrants to work in the informal economy.” (Murphy, Winder & Taran, 2014, p. 12).

**Design & implementation**
How social protection systems are designed and implemented determines and differentiates the effect it can have on the decision to migrate. The effect of a cash transfer is assumed to differ depending on the level of the benefit, the timing and frequency of the payment, and the specific target group (Bastagli et al., 2016). Studies that find no significant effect of cash transfers on household expenditure and poverty can be explained by the design of the cash transfer. In most cases the lack of effect was attributed to the low level or irregular delivery of the benefit, such as was the case in Ghana, Kazakhstan and Indonesia (ibid.) ILO Recommendation No. 202 emphasises that a minimum benefit level is required to “provide beneficiaries with the means to a life in dignity.” (ILO, 2012). This also includes adjusting the benefit level to changing living conditions. If transfers are not reliable or not delivered on time, or only sporadically, this not only fails to provide citizens with the level of protection they need but can also create distrust of the state and government officials. In some countries, cash transfer programs are citizens' first point of contact with the state.

**Accessibility & quality**
On a broader scale, the accessibility and quality of social protection within a country can influence how individuals and households choose from among different livelihood sources (Hagen-Zanker, 2012). The OECD’s recent “Interrelations between Public Policies, Migration and Development” (IPPMD) project explored how the accessibility and the use of social services, as well as social protection coverage and expenditure were related to migration. They find, for example, that a lack of access to good health care services encourages people to migrate and has an effect on their decision to return. For example, people are less likely to return to their country of origin if they lose benefits accrued in the country of destination. Furthermore, the
project found that, with higher investments in social protection expenditure, people are less likely to migrate and more likely to return (Figure 3.5).

In addition, the project detected that not having a formal labor contract, possibly an indicator of quality of employment, had a positive effect on plans to migrate. In cases where such effects did not apply, the individuals had decent jobs in the country of origin and were also more likely to find a decent job abroad (OECD, 2017). The impact of formal employment may be further driven by the quality of employment, for example employment security through appropriate prevention and rehabilitation measures, adherence to working standards, and other social security benefits provided by the accident insurance. Interview partner 31 suggests a direct link can be drawn between occupational safety and economic development, especially in textile industries. In countries with major sectors experiencing poor working conditions, a shift towards the formal sector and the expansion of good quality, safe and reliable employment may be a reasonable factor in the decision to

Figure 3.5 Correlation between plans to migrate and public social expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of people planning to migrate in %</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
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</table>

Public social protection expenditure as a share of GDP in %

migrate. Such assumptions may partially explain the positive correlation between informal employment in the agricultural sector and the share of workers planning to migrate in Figure 3.6.

**Figure 3.6** Correlation between plans to migrate and formal employment in the agricultural sector

![Graph showing correlation between plans to migrate and formal employment in the agricultural sector.](image)


### 3.2.5 Social protection as a stabilizer in potentially fragile contexts

Since many migration patterns have their origin in fragile contexts, it is important to explore the potential role of social protection in such contexts. To what extent can social protection, amongst other interventions such as state-building and peace-keeping, contribute to mitigating risks and improving the situation of households who see migration as a way out of poverty? Understanding how social protection can step in, or be further developed, in countries where the possibility of out-migration can emerge as a result of deteriorating conditions, is important for global and national policy-making. To advance national and international efforts in fragile contexts, fragility needs to be defined and classified. This will make it possible to determine the appropriate choice of policy intervention. This section
therefore aims to give an overview of the concept of fragility and what social protection instruments have been used so far in fragile contexts.

**Concept of fragility**

There is a wide international consensus that state fragility impedes development objectives and undermines international and national achievements. However, there is less consensus regarding the meaning of the term itself. The emergence of the concept in 2005 originated in “a political response to an operational issue” in which donors needed to adapt interventions to changing environments and partners (Guillaumont & Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2009). Policy-makers in the field of international development will need more knowledge and evidence if they are to learn to deal with different forms of fragility and to make wise policy decisions (Grävingholt, Ziaja & Kreibaum, 2015; Ovadiya et al., 2015). Fragility is commonly associated with weak or dysfunctional relations between state and society, leading to very limited capacities to provide citizens with formal means of social protection (De Bruijne, 2017; World Bank Group, 2016). According to this understanding of fragility, a state’s shortcomings are categorized under its “authority”: its ability to control a certain territory; its “capacity”: its ability to perform essential functions and support citizens’ basic needs; and its “legitimacy”: citizens’ trust in the state’s exercise of power (Grävingholt, Ziaja & Kreibaum, 2015, Oxford Policy Management, 2016). Other institutions make the case for a more integrated approach, as described in the OECD Report on “States of Fragility” (2016). Here, fragility is understood as a dynamic and multi-dimensional concept, observable in both developing and developed countries, that takes social, cultural, economic, political and environmental factors into account (OECD, 2016).

Other approaches classify countries in clusters, assessing their fragility in terms of a country’s enabling political, economic and social environment and the state’s capacity to respond to shocks (see, for example, Ovadiya et al., 2015).
Social protection & fragility

Social protection can play a central role in fragile contexts because it has the potential to contribute to state building and legitimacy and to improve social cohesion, for example by reducing social inequalities and exclusion. It can further ensure a state’s stability by addressing vulnerabilities and by providing its citizens with a social contract. The various instruments of social protection especially benefit poor and vulnerable groups. They help to smooth consumption, promote livelihoods, mitigate life-cycle risks and allow individuals to make sustainable future investments (McConnell, 2010; Ovadiya et al., 2015). Yet it has become a commonplace that “the greater the need for social protection, the lower the capacity of the state to provide it” (Gentilini 2005, p. 143). Governments often lack resources and institutional capacity.

All these different concepts of fragility share the understanding that state capacity differs widely by country and region. Low coverage rates, high costs of programs, information asymmetry and weak administration further hamper national efforts, leading to poor access and service (Baird, 2010; Ovadiya et al., 2015). Various other factors undermine the successful implementation of social protection programs in fragile contexts and not all social protection tools and approaches operate effectively. Factors such as the physical and financial infrastructure, poverty and exclusion of vulnerable groups, and susceptibility to external shocks such as drought, floods and other extreme weather events, all influence the effectiveness and efficiency of social protection programs. Further, the effectiveness of social protection systems in fragile contexts is reduced in situations of violence and conflict, which in turn prompt a change in government priorities.
3.2.6 Social protection as an alternative for returnees

The various reasons for a migrant's decision to return to his homeland can reveal preferences and priorities and what a migrant values in both the country of destination and the country of origin. Immigration is well documented in national registries, whereas records of emigration, including return-migration, are less well established. An OECD report estimated that 20–50% of migrants left their destination country within five years of arrival, either returning to their country of origin or moving to a third country (OECD, 2008). These numbers highlight the relevance of incorporating an understanding of return migration and return migration strategies into the broader framework of development. As discussed in the previous section, social protection is an important factor in the process of making migration decisions. So how does social protection relate to the return migration process and how does it specifically address returnees? This section, firstly, gives a brief outline of the factors driving return migration, illustrated by a case study of asylum-seekers conducted in the United Kingdom, secondly, suggests what role policy interventions play in return migration and, thirdly, discusses the role of social protection in general and particularly in the context of reintegration in the country of origin.

Return migration is a relatively new area in migration studies, which may explain why it lacks a definition. Various typologies of return migration differentiate, for example, between the level of development in the country of origin, the duration until return in the country of origin, or simply a migrant's considering the option of returning (IOM, 2004). In practice, migration management commonly divides return migration into three categories: voluntary return without compulsion, voluntary return with compulsion and involuntary return (ibid.).

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7 Voluntary return without compulsion refers to the independent decision of migrants to return on their own terms, whereas voluntary return with compulsion refers to a return due to change or loss of legal status or the circumstantial inability to stay in the destination country (IOM, 2004).
Driving factors of return migration

The decision to return to the country of origin is presumably influenced by factors similar to those which affect the decision to migrate, such as the importance of family and social networks, the individual level of education, and a comparison of advantages, benefits and prospects in both the country of origin and the country of destination (Koser & Kuschminder, 2015; Wahba, 2015). Often the intention to return is embedded in the initial migration strategy, which may be to save earnings made abroad for later use in the country of origin, for example by setting up a business. In addition, many migrants aim to increase their productivity by acquiring in the country of destination a specific skillset that is in great demand in the country of origin. However, not all migrants are successful in achieving these aims in the country of destination. If their goal turns out not to be achievable, for instance due to restricting legal circumstances, unemployment or high living costs, or if the disadvantages in the country of destination outweigh the benefits, they may return to their country of origin (Kilic et al., 2007; Wahba, 2015).

Return migration can also induce indirect effects on social protection in the country of origin. Returnees experience different norms in the country of destination and may demand and desire similar norms in the country of origin, with regard to institutional transparency and accountability, for example, or the quality of health care and social services. Overall, Wahba finds that “unsuccessful immigrants are more likely to leave the host country than the average immigrant and are also more likely to return early in the migration cycle because of failure. Successful immigrants are also more likely to leave than the average immigrant, but they leave because they have achieved their target savings.” (Wahba, 2015, p. 5).

In general, the conditions in the country of origin are more relevant to the decision to emigrate than to the decision to return (Koser & Kuschminder, 2015). Figure 3.7 gives an overview of the different factors and levels of influence affecting the decision to return.
Few studies exist which analyze decision-making in return migration. One significant study conducted in the United Kingdom identifies the common factors driving return decisions, in this case, of asylum seekers and rejected asylum seekers. In this study, the legal status of an individual did not appear to have an impact on the decision to return. In addition to factors considered in the decision to migrate at the individual level, comparing living conditions in the country of destination and the country of origin is factored in at a structural level (Figure 3.7). Further, the study takes account of the influence of policy measures and the availability of information (Koser & Kuschminder, 2015), concluding that social protection can be influenced at both structural and policy levels.
The results of this research revealed that security in a broad sense was a determining factor for return migration. Employment opportunities and the location of family members were also important. With regard to individual characteristics, younger and single asylum-seekers were more likely to consider returning than older and married ones. Assistance programs did not appear to be a driving factor in return decisions. This was probably due to information asymmetry, as only half of those interviewed were aware of the availability of assisted return programs. Once they learnt about them, and especially about those that provide assistance through “employment, training and money”, they did appear to value them (Koser & Kuschminder, 2016, p. 13).

Most studies draw the same picture and find no significant positive relationship between the provision of return programs and individuals’ decision to return. Policy interventions therefore appear to play a minor role for those still in the decision-making process. For those intending or needing to return, however, policy interventions can facilitate reintegration in the country of origin. Assisted voluntary return programs are a key policy instrument in migration management as they can specifically support the return of vulnerable groups who face multiple economic and social constraints upon their return (IOM, 2004).

**The role of social protection in return decisions**

Social protection in both the country of origin and the country of destination can be seen as a factor either facilitating or impeding the decision to return. For instance, contributions made by working migrants to the social security system of the country of destination are seldom portable and therefore to a certain extent considered a future income loss. In this sense, the “(l)ack of portability of social rights could therefore undermine return migration and deprive origin countries — many of them developing countries — of important beneficial development effects.” (Avatto, Koetl & Sabates-Wheeler, 2009, p. 3). Conversely, if countries make benefits portable and assist reintegration through other simultaneous interventions, return migration can be encouraged (World Bank Group, 2016).
Policies that encourage and support the reintegration of returning nationals are to be found in certain countries in Latin America, for example, in the form of micro-credit schemes and employment programs specifically targeted towards vulnerable returnees. Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador and Peru, for instance, have specific returnee offices which inform returnees about the availability of social assistance and assist them in obtaining it (IOM, 2015a). Some countries in Europe combine national and international development activities by establishing state programs for “the periodic return of migrants” (Faist, 2013, p. 11). However, such programs are often politically motivated and developed with the aim of persuading migrants to return to their country of origin.

Table 3.1 Overview of factors influencing return migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors that prevent return migration</th>
<th>Factors that foster return migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If benefits paid in the country of destination are not portable to the country of origin</td>
<td>If migrants can accumulate savings abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma associated with return by family and friends if returnee is considered unsuccessful</td>
<td>Support systems (state programs, family and friends) in the country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If skills or education acquired in the country of destination is not recognized or not in demand in the country of origin</td>
<td>Acquiring a skillset which enhances job and income opportunities in country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of family in country of destination</td>
<td>Location of family in country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State instability and conflict in country of origin</td>
<td>State stability and security in country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of social protection system in country of origin</td>
<td>Social protection system in country of origin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Social protection can be understood as a prerequisite for effective and successful reintegration. It can lay the foundation for considerable success factors such as a stable social and economic environment and increased productivity and employment. Furthermore, it can directly affect effective reintegration by supporting the mitigation of risks and informal social protection mechanisms, and by providing financial support, which can enhance an individual’s livelihood strategy. (IOM, 2015a). A country’s legal framework, its international and bilateral agreements and how it socially protects vulnerable groups can be an important indicator of how inclined it is to provide support to returning nationals.

3.3 Concluding remarks

The above discussion of the concept of social protection and its links to migration, together with the determinants of decisions either to migrate or to return, makes clear that social protection can play an influential role in migration decision-making, while also being a significant policy instrument in the mitigation of risks, alleviation of poverty and promotion of livelihood strategies. Yet the exact role of social protection in migration decisions hinges on the country-specific context, particularly the exposure of households to risk, the design of social protection systems, and future economic opportunities.

Household and individual vulnerability determine the need for social protection. When households are more exposed to risks, social protection has more value and can provide support. In the absence or lack of social protection, the choice of livelihood strategies becomes increasingly limited, putting the household at greater risk. Often, this is where migration is considered a promising strategy.
The driving factors in social protection and migration decisions are associated with the design, quality and accessibility of social protection as well as the portability of social transfers. The adequacy of a benefit, for example the level of a cash transfer, has a positive effect on the value accorded to social protection and trust in government and a negative effect on migration decisions. Similar effects are achieved when benefits are predictable and delivered on time. Preventive and promotive measures, for example in the field of employment, may also influence whether migration is even considered as a potential means of improving income, especially if working conditions in the home country are safe and reliable. In contrast, if systems are designed to facilitate the portability of social benefits, this can encourage migration and increase the prospects of return.

To sum up, different studies have pointed out the direct and indirect effects of social protection on migration. Returning to Hagen-Zanker’s decision-making framework, the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that social protection affects significant factors that determine both the decision to migrate and the decision to return (see Figure 3.6). How social protection can either foster or prevent migration cannot be explained in general terms, but must be examined contextually. The following chapter therefore discusses the influence of social protection in different country contexts.
POTENTIAL OF SOCIAL PROTECTION IN DIFFERENT COUNTRY CONTEXTS
4. POTENTIAL OF SOCIAL PROTECTION IN DIFFERENT COUNTRY CONTEXTS

The role that social protection can play in influencing migration decisions is context-specific. To better gauge the potential of social protection, we need a better understanding of the various causes of migration and flight and these are presented in the first section of this chapter. The following sections analyze the interplay of social protection and migration decisions in four different country contexts – Albania, Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan – representing the different patterns of structural factors causing flight to Germany. Each country exemplifies one of the primary regions from which asylum seekers have originated in recent years: many of the underlining push factors in Albania are present throughout southern Europe; Iraq offers insights into the vast outflow of refugees fleeing Arab, Levantine, and north African countries which are ravaged by intra-Muslim confessional conflicts; Nigeria embodies the socio-economic and demographic challenges faced by many West and East African countries as a consequence of regional terrorist threats that also affect their northern neighbors such as Somalia; Pakistan typifies a region with orthodox Islamic beliefs that is also threatened by the onslaught of climate change. The historical context and the causes of migration and flight in all four countries are analyzed. Special attention is given to Germany as a target country.

4.1 Typology of the causes of migration

A variety of individual reasons can lead one to leave one’s home country. These can broadly be divided into economic, social or cultural, and political issues. Recently, factors related to the environment and demographic changes have also come to be considered distinct fields
of interest (Koven & Götzke, 2010, p. 19–34; Piesse, 2014; Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 6f.). In their analysis, Emmer, Richter and Kunst (2016) identify three dimensions of migration and flight: an existential threat, including civil war or environmental issues; political or social instability, such as the existence of religious extremism; and the pursuit of prosperity.

Commonly, migration causes are analyzed as push and pull factors. Push factors are linked to the country or region of origin and cover all conditions that might lead people to leave. On the other hand, people might be attracted by the opportunities or living conditions in other regions or countries. Thus, pull factors are dependent factors in the (potential) country of destination (Castles, de Haas and Miller, 2014, p. 27f.; Skeldon, 2014, p. 20; Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 6).

For a better analysis, a distinction between different types of migration can be helpful as well. There are multiple migration typologies, most of which are based on dichotomies. The differentiation between internal and international migration focuses on the spatial aspect of movement. Requiring greater effort and cost, cross-border migration usually implies a much stronger motivation and can thus be expected to be driven by more considerable causes (Weeks, 1999). The same may be supposed of illegal or irregular migration, which is often distinguished from its legal counterpart and describes all forms of undocumented immigration (King, 2002).

Voluntary versus forced migration is another commonly-used distinction. As King (2002) points out, this categorization is in many cases equivocal. While extreme examples, such as retirement migration or migration due to ethnic differences, are easily attributed, others, such as migration out of poverty, are not. For this reason King proposes the concept of a continuum containing at least four stages: migrants driven by free-will to “satisfy largely non-economic life-choice ambitions”, migrants “encouraged or ‘pushed’ by life circumstances”, migrants “compelled by circumstances which are largely beyond their
control” including “extreme poverty, famine, environmental crisis, political chaos, inter-ethnic tension” and “people who are forced to migrate by others”, which includes slavery or refugees fleeing for their lives (King, 2002, p. 92f.).

Similarly, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development makes a distinction between urgent and structural causes. Cited examples of urgent causes are war, violence, human rights abuses and persecution. Structural causes include poor governance, poverty, inequality and a lack of resources (BMZ, 2016).

Even temporary migration commonly requires a stay of at least one year in the host country but it can still be clearly distinguished from permanent migration (King, 2012, p. 7). While the period of migration might be important for a migrant’s integration into the society of the host country, the distinction does not seem to offer an unequivocal indicator for certain causes of migration. Although there is a relationship between temporary migration and flight, the basic concepts are different.

Given the fact that the chances of successful migration depend strongly on recognition as a refugee, it is important to outline the definition of flight. According to Article 1, A (2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 & 1967), a person who is in “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” is considered a refugee. This limits the causes of flight to persecution; poverty and environmental crises do not confer refugee status.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) In Germany, the approval of asylum depends on confirmation of refugee status. If an asylum claim is rejected, subsidiary protection can be granted when serious harm, such as torture or the death penalty, are threatened by governmental or non-governmental players if the asylum-seeker were to return to his country of origin. Subsidiary protection includes a temporary residence permit and unrestricted access to the labor market (BAMF, 2016a).
4.2 Case study: Albania

4.2.1 Background information

Poverty in Albania is widespread in rural and urban areas alike (Table 4.1) (INSTAT, 2015). The national poverty line is set at 4,891 leks per month per capita (approximately US $ 40) (UNDP, 2016). Though poverty numbers have decreased, non-monetary disadvantages remain a major challenge for many. In 2012, 14 % of the population did not have access to running water and over 30 % suffered regular interruptions to their electricity supply (UNDP, 2016). High rates of unemployment further intensify poverty deprivation, especially amongst the young (INSTAT, 2015). Furthermore, the percentage of people working in the informal economy is estimated to range between 30 % and 60 % of the employed population, presenting a major challenge for the collection of taxes and social insurance contributions (Mihes, Popova & Roch, 2011).

Table 4.1 Albania country statistics in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty headcount (total)*</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty headcount (rural)*</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty headcount (urban)*</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty gap*</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty severity*</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor participation rate (Age 15–64)</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (Age 15–64)</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (Age 15–29)</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* According to national poverty line
4.2.2 Causes of migration

After withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact in 1968, Albania faced a long period of international isolation. It was not until the political transformation of the early 1990s that the country joined both the OSCE and the Council of Europe (Bartl, 1995). Albania has subsequently pursued a course of European integration. The stabilization and association agreement with the EU was signed in 2006 and ratified in early 2009. Albania has been an official candidate for EU accession since June of 2014. The country joined NATO in 2009.

A substantial economic gap between Albania and the members of the EU persists nonetheless. With a GDP per capita adjusted to purchasing power parity of roughly $11,900, Albania is one of Europe’s poorest countries (CIA, 2017a). Unemployment and poverty are considered to be primary push factors for migration (IOM, 2014; Bicoku, Memaj & Dragoshi, 2016). Over the past 12 months, indicators have pointed towards a positive trend in this area, though (Trading Economics, 2017). High levels of corruption remain a problem nonetheless: the 2016 “Corruption Perceptions Index” lists Albania in 83rd place, well below countries such as India, China, and Brazil (Transparency International, 2016).

The United Nation's Human Development Index ranks Albania 75th, trailing most other European countries by a significant margin. A report by Caritas revealed inadequate provision in rural regions of basic services such as running water, electricity and medical care. Problems such as child poverty and homelessness have also increased recently (Caritas International, 2015) as a substantial share of housing, in particular of the social or public variety, fails to “meet international standards for adequate housing [according to Amnesty International]” (Amnesty International, 2015).

The country, which during the conflict in neighboring Kosovo itself sheltered tens of thousands of refugees (Bartl, 1995), has only in recent years become one of the major countries of origin of asylum seekers in
Germany. Nonetheless, Albania has a long tradition of emigration (Barjaba & Barjaba, 2015). Ever since the end of communism in 1990, there has been a steady migratory movement, mainly to Greece and Italy (IOA, 2014). Already in fifth place in 2014, the number of Albanian asylum seekers in Germany was only surpassed by applicants from Syria in 2015. In light of the country’s population of only around 2.9 million, the number of 54,000 applications submitted that year is remarkable (BAMF, 2016b). While asylum claims had already been on the rise since the liberalization of visa requirements in December of 2010 (Vullnetari, 2013), the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) sees the decision of previously wavering prospective emigrants to take advantage of the large stream of refugees on the Balkan Route as one of the key reasons behind the recent spike. Kosta and Joniada Barjaba state that “Albanian asylum seekers [...] were encouraged by signals that the German government was revisiting its migration policies, looking to attract new foreign labor.” (Barjaba & Barjaba, 2015)

A BAMF report cited by the weekly newspaper “Die Welt” additionally attributes this influx to, firstly, the perceived organizational incapability of the EU to properly deal with the migrant crisis, secondly, rumors that Albanian migrants were highly likely to receive residence permits, thirdly, generous welfare payments, and lastly, the increasing professionalization of trafficking gangs (Bewarder, 2015). A report by the daily “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” also reached the conclusion that a significant share of those who decided to emigrate during the period were not “extremely poor [...] people” (Prizkau, 2015). This impression is supported by findings that few of the asylum seekers had been unemployed before leaving (Hackaj, Shehaj & Zeneli, 2016, p. 12).

In 2016, Albanians made up the sixth-largest group of asylum claimants in Germany, with 15,000 applications (BAMF, 2016b). Halfway through 2017, Albania is no longer even among the first ten countries in this table. This substantial decrease in asylum claims, both in absolute and relative numbers, appears to indicate that the 2015 numbers were a major exception. The relatively low rate of approved asylum applications
may also have contributed to the drop in applications. In 2016, just 19 of the approximately 38,000 asylum claims were approved – another 0.4 percent received subsidiary protection (ibid.). Data from 2015 paint a similar picture, in terms of both the share of applications approved (below 0.1 percent) and the share of applicants receiving subsidiary protection (around 0.2 percent) (BAMF, 2015).

While the socio-economic considerations described above undoubtedly constitute the primary catalyst behind the decision to flee the country, cultural and political reasons also need to be factored in. There are regular allegations of minorities being persecuted, particularly Roma and Balkan Egyptians, and of “impunity [...] for allegations of ill-treatment by law enforcement officers” (Amnesty International, 2015). Another potentially lethal reason to flee the country is the set of traditional laws known as “Kanun” and its “honor-bound duty” of vendetta or blood feuds, a practice particularly widespread in the country’s northern regions. The centuries-old code, with its tradition of blood feuds, began to re-emerge after the end of Communist rule. Estimates place the total number of such feud-related deaths at up to 10,000, occurring primarily during the 1990s. Recent years have seen a decrease in the official fatality count, but local NGOs estimate that there are still around 150 murders related to blood feuds annually (BAMF, 2014).

It can thus be seen that a balanced mix of push and pull factors drives migration in Albania. Albanian asylum seekers in Germany are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Comparatively high levels of poverty and proximity to the EU play a major role, although not all migrants coming to Germany are necessarily poor or unemployed. In terms of actual numbers, discrimination against minorities and the tradition of blood feuds are less significant motives for leaving this small Balkan nation.

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9  Country-specific data for 2017 is not yet available.
4.2.3 Social protection

In the early 1990s, the Albanian system of governance entered a phase of reform which also had an impact on the social protection system (World Bank, 2017). The system, which had previously focused on contributory measures, specifically social insurance, needed to adapt to societal changes. Unemployment and internal and external migration caused changes in the composition of the labor force, which made individual households more vulnerable to the risk of poverty.

The focus in Albanian’s social protection system then shifted, with more emphasis being placed on contributory social insurance, rather than a balanced mix of social insurance, social assistance and labor market interventions. An overview of the current system is given in Figure 4.1 below.

**Figure 4.1 Overview of the Albanian social protection system**

- **Social Insurance**
  - Pensions (Urban/Rural)
  - Maternity Benefits
  - Sickness Benefits
  - Work accidents and illness
  - Unemployment Insurance

- **Social Assistance**
  - Cash Benefits
  - Social Care Services
    - Ndihma Ekonomike
    - Monthly allowance for disabled
    - Price compensation

- **Employment Programs**
  - Labor Market Programs
    - Employment Promotion Program
    - Professional Training
  - Unemployment Benefits

Albania’s second National Strategy for Development and Integration (NSDI II) describes how the government intends to improve the country’s social and economic development in the period between 2014 and 2020. Unlike the first National Strategy for Development and Integration (NSDI), which contained a specific strategy on social protection, the second strategy (NSDI II) embeds the concept of social protection within a broader category covering the wealth and well-being of its citizens. Improved social cohesion, access to quality health care services, an expansion of social insurance coverage, stronger financial and strategic plans at the local level and an increase in the level of social assistance benefits are the aspects of social protection emphasized in the NSDI II. In addition, further emphasis is placed on involving the private sector and non-governmental organizations in the process of planning and implementation at the local level (Council of Ministers, 2013).

The 67.73% of the total population covered by social protection in Albania in 2008 had by 2012 fallen to 54.89%. Table 4.2 below shows that most schemes, and particularly social insurance, do not even cover the poorest quintile sufficiently. The high coverage rate of pensions, 37.5% in rural and 35.4% in urban areas, is exceptional and can be attributed to the character of pensions in Albania, which, due to high levels of state subsidy, have developed more into a form of social assistance than a contributory insurance. This contrasts with the coverage of social insurance, 2.2% in rural and 2.4% in urban areas, which is not subsidized by the state.
The role of social protection in migration decisions

The social protection system in Albania has many gaps in terms of the coverage, effectiveness and efficiency of its schemes. These hardly address, never mind alleviate, such broader dimensions of poverty as education, employment, housing and social care. As discussed in Chapter 3 above, unemployment is considered the main push factor for migration.

Most striking is that for many Albanians corruption is a pervasive theme in everyday life. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the current image of social protection in Albania is blighted by encounters with corruption at all levels. Social services in education, employment and health care, all areas which are driving factors for migration, especially for the young, are of very poor quality. Both individuals and households thus often see no other option than to migrate to places with better education and work opportunities. All Albanian interviewees in our study saw migration as their only way to escape from deteriorating
living conditions. Examples included no longer being able to afford to bribe doctors and nurses to provide medical treatment, to bribe teachers in school to provide education, or to bribe employers to offer them a job. The experience of social protection measures reported by our interviewees thus confirmed the findings of our conceptual framework, that the absence of social protection impedes social and economic development and thus promotes migration.

Moreover, the evidence of our interviews not only indicates the lack of adequate social protection in Albania, but also how much it is desired by society. Experiencing how social protection functions and supports people in Germany had mixed effects on the decision of whether to return. Some interviewees (Interview partners 2, 3, 4, 8 and 10) saw a possibility of returning if decent jobs and educational opportunities were available, corruption eliminated and the social protection system improved; others could no longer imagine a change in the system and therefore did not consider returning.

At the program level, in addition to the limited coverage of the poor, the low level of benefits received by households, as in the case of Ndihme Ekonomike\(^\text{10}\), appear to have no significant effect on poverty, deprivation or household consumption (World Bank, 2017). In interviews, several people stated that they were officially eligible, and registered in the program, yet corruption at the local level prevented them from ever receiving a transfer. The poor quality of social services is deeply rooted in all areas. One interviewee stated that, despite having health insurance, bribes had to be paid for an ambulance to be called, and once at the hospital, each nurse had to be paid off for him even to receive treatment. Similar situations were described by other interviewees.

\(^{10}\) A means tested social assistance program.
Moreover, labor market policies and social insurance are predominantly contributory and designed to capture workers in the formal economy. Neglecting the large share of people working in the informal economy undermines working standards and conditions. Risks prevail in both informal and formal employment. The formal sector is characterized by a lack of transparency and a lack of trust in employers and the state to pay workers’ contributions (Grossmann, 2015; Proda, 2016). Interviewees indicated that especially the young are pressured by their families to obtain decent work abroad to improve their prospects and to support other family members back home (Interview partners 1, 5, 6, 7 and 9).

In contrast to assisted return programs for Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan, Albanians in Germany do not receive any travel support or initial financial assistance for returning to Albania, only a reimbursement of their travel costs (IOM, 2017). Organizations supporting migrants and refugees report that most Albanians come to Germany and return to Albania more than once, a phenomenon confirmed in interviews with Albanians. Income-generating opportunities are perceived to be more easily procurable in Germany in general, and better living conditions, the availability of informal jobs in the construction sector and a reliance on social networks encourage such behavior.

The Albanian case demonstrates that social protection, and specifically the quality and ease of access to services in health care and employment, is an indicator for trust in the state and the effectiveness of its implementing institutions. Social protection in Albania has failed to achieve even its basic potential to relieve social and economic constraints, to improve social cohesion and to increase citizens’ trust in government. Consequently, social protection, and particularly the quality of social protection services, can be considered a decisive factor in the decision to migrate and to return and should therefore receive more attention.
4.2.5 Priority measures

Corruption can be regarded both in theory and in practice as the most problematic issue in Albania. For this reason, it should be considered a priority target for German development cooperation. Corruption instills a lack of trust in public institutions and public sector workers. In addition, employers in general are less inclined to pay contributions due to perceived abuse and mistrust by government and social security organisations. Institutional reforms, the introduction of accountability and grievance mechanisms, for example, in health care services would help to uncover system deficiencies and prevent corruption. Tackling corruption could be combined with improving the quality of services in social protection, for instance by training workers and conducting awareness-raising campaigns.

Increasing institutional transparency, for example by capacity development and training of government workers and establishing grievance mechanisms, would constitute a first step. Allowing civil society and the private sector to participate in shaping policies would enhance transparency. Steering investments in this direction would provide disincentives to Albanians who are dissatisfied with public services and institutions in their own country to migrate to countries where these things are more reliable and transparent. Since many households rely on economic gains through migration, improving targeting to vulnerable groups and increasing the level of benefits would alleviate poverty and render migration unnecessary. Increasing the level of social protection benefits has the further potential to lift people out of poverty and allow them to accrue savings and make productive investments.
Increased institutional transparency might also encourage workers and employers to shift to the formal sector, as the benefits of social security and health insurance, for example, became more valuable and usable. Aside from promoting employment, raising awareness of social security benefits and investing in training and education which specifically match those skills and qualifications in demand on the job market can both help to alleviate unemployment and dissuade potential migrants from leaving the country in search of better work opportunities.

In addition to corruption and nepotism, interviewees reported continuing friction between groups in society, such as the social exclusion of Sinti and Roma, and the tension between Christian and Muslim groups, which affected their access to formal and informal means of social protection. Since families are the main system of support in Albania, vulnerable and separated families are more prone to homelessness and other risks. State support is insufficient to cover basic needs. Increasing benefit levels, especially for poor and vulnerable families should be a focus area for German development cooperation. Our interviewees emphasized the potential positive role of maternity, child and employment schemes and services, including return-to-work programs and accident insurance, which may be considered an option when social protection is expanded.

The interviews confirmed that Sinti and Roma are often excluded from formal means of social protection. Exclusion is attributed to administrative barriers and eligibility requirements being too difficult to meet due to bureaucratic procedures and because most Sinti and Roma are not officially registered or have no permanent residence.

At an institutional level, more reliable commitments to budgeting and strategic planning at both national and local levels in the Albanian case would help to guarantee the effectiveness and extend the coverage of social protection schemes, as well as allowing for monitoring and evaluation. Enhanced collaboration and coordination between the
state and local levels and with third partners is recommended. This is becoming increasingly important for the sustainability of schemes, since most are implemented by local government units and private institutions and lack coordination. Furthermore, more data is needed to determine the eligibility of beneficiaries, simultaneously ensuring transparency to avoid misappropriation of funds (European Commission, 2008; Proda, 2016).

In view of all the points made above, German development efforts should focus on bolstering social protection institutions, increasing institutional and financial capacities to expand coverage, and increasing investments in education and employment-generating activities.
Box 3 The components of social protection in Albania

Social Assistance
Social assistance in Albania comprises three cash transfer programs and social care services, as shown in the overview of the Albanian social protection system provided in Figure 4.1. The first means-tested program, “Ndihma Ekonomike” (NE), was created in 1993 for poor households and is delivered in cash and distributed monthly. Despite low inclusion errors in targeting NE, the accuracy of the program coverage is very low, with data suggesting that only 0.4% of those receiving a benefit were actually lifted out of poverty (World Bank, 2010). The second transfer is a cash transfer for people with a disability (Hirose, 2015). The third is the income support provided to pensioners and their dependents. Initially designed as a form of old age insurance, this scheme has developed into what is more a form of social assistance due to the government’s supplementary contribution. This decreased the correlation between the contributions made by pensioners and the benefits they subsequently received (World Bank, 2010), a distortion which is also reflected in the large share of public spending on pensions (see Table 4.3 below). 2015 saw the introduction of a new law on social insurance, which entitled those above the age of 70 who had previously been ineligible and unable to pay contributions to receive a social pension (Erebara, 2015). In addition to cash transfer programs, in-kind social care services are provided to vulnerable groups (orphans, the elderly and the disabled) at the local level through residential centers (European Commission, 2008).

Table 4.3 Public spending on social assistance in % of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All social assistance</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash transfers</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Pension</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own illustration, ASPIRE database, World Bank.

Social insurance
The Social Insurance Institute is responsible for the management of the benefits of the mandatory, voluntary and supplementary social insurance schemes in Albania. Social insurance covers “unemployment, maternity, accident at work/professional illness, older age, disability or loss of the family keeper or other economically active people”, as well as those employed and at risk of disease. The system is designed on a “pay-as-you-go” basis (Proda, 2016, p. 238). The voluntary and supplementary schemes were added during the reform phase of the early 1990s. Those in formal employment automatically participate in the mandatory social insurance scheme, whereas the unemployed can be included through the voluntary scheme.
Health insurance is compulsory, with the contributions of those unable to pay being funded by the state. Primary health care services are provided free of charge to those unable to contribute to the scheme. However, in practice these rights to services and benefits are poorly implemented and prone to corruption (Mano & Selita, 2015; Proda, 2016).  

**Labor market policies**

In combination with employment promotion programs, vocational training centers in Albania aim to reduce unemployment and bridge the gap between education and employment expectations. Though social insurance also protects against unemployment, benefits and support are only available to those previously in formal employment who paid full contributions during their last year of employment and do not receive any other type of social benefit. A consensus exists within the government that there is a need to tackle informal employment and increase working standards by different means, such as awareness raising and labor inspections. There is no program specifically addressing women, despite the fact that they are more likely to be unemployed or work in the informal sector (Council of Ministers, 2013; Hirose, 2015; Proda, 2016).

### 4.3 Case study: Iraq

#### 4.3.1 Background information

The current situation of conflict in Iraq is believed to be further intensifying the different dimensions of poverty and vulnerability, especially in the northern Kurdish region, where the influx of Syrian refugees and internally displaced people has strained the capacity of social protection programs (Rohwerder, 2015; World Bank, 2015). The over 4 million Iraqis who have had to relocate due to the conflict since 2014 are covered by interventions by the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (Alzobaidee, 2015; IOM, 2017). Young people, representing almost half of the population and households living in rural areas, are particularly vulnerable and more likely to fall into poverty. There are also considerable and persistent discrepancies between men and women, particularly in terms of education, unemployment and poverty (World Bank, 2017). Moreover, the level of inequality is estimated to have increased due to the conflict (World Bank, 2011).
4.3.2 Causes of migration

Home to a variety of ethnic groups, religions and denominations, one of the country’s primary challenges since its establishment in 1921 (the country did not gain full independence from Britain until 1932) has been to forge a common national identity out of such a heterogeneous population. Today Arabs make up around 80 percent of Iraq’s population, 17 percent are Kurds, while various other ethnic minorities, such as Turkmen, Mandaeans, Yazidis and Jews, make up the rest (Savelsberg, 2016, p. 165). Islam is Iraq’s official religion and 95 percent of the country’s population adhere to the Muslim faith. Iraq’s population reflects Islam’s predominant schism: 60 percent of the population are Shia Muslims while 35 percent are Sunnis (Auswärtiges Amt, 2017a).

Both the violent suppression of the country’s domestic opposition under Saddam Hussein – dominated by Kurds and Shias – that culminated in genocidal acts against the Kurdish minority and the conflict with neighboring Shia-led Iran served to exacerbate existing internal divisions (Lemke, 2016, p. 263; Fürtit, 2016, p. 107–110). Along with the ethnic and religious divisions, Iraq is home to a strong tribal culture. Allegiances of tribal members tend to lie with their own organized group (numbering between a few hundred and half a million) rather than with the Iraqi state (Büssow, 2016a, p. 202).

Table 5.4 Iraq poverty statistics in 2012 in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>total</th>
<th>rural</th>
<th>urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty headcount (%)</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty gap</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty severity</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first free elections held in 2005 brought victory for Nouri al-Maliki, a Shia Muslim whose time in office as prime minister between 2006 and 2014 only served to aggravate religious tensions. Sunni Arabs in particular were subject to systematic discrimination and oppression (Rohde, 2015). The refusal to incorporate Sunni militias into the country’s armed forces drove many militiamen to join or ally with the Jihadist forces of Al-Qaida and subsequently the Islamic State (IS). Mistrust towards both the state and western occupying forces gave additional credence to the Sunni Jihadists' self-portrayal as the protectors of their own people against the Shia majority (Büssow, 2016a, p. 207f.).

The political system installed in 2003 proved highly dysfunctional. Governmental structures and institutions eroded, and the political class is even day seen as corrupt and divided. The previously exemplary Iraqi education system remains in a disastrous state. Frequent assassination attempts and attacks continue to shake the country. Between 2003 and 2011, more than 160,000 people fell victim to the continued fighting and bomb attacks (Rohde, 2015). Except for a short stretch between 1988 and 1990, the Iraqi people have not been able to enjoy a continued period of peace since 1980.

The reasons behind the ongoing exodus of refugees are therefore numerous. The different parties to the armed conflicts commit war crimes and human rights violations that primarily target Sunni Arabs. They are subject to extrajudicial executions, unlawful killings, and torture at the hands of the authorities. Frequent accusations of human rights violations are also leveled at the government. Males aged 15 to 65 that have fled IS-controlled areas are frequently detained for months on end in makeshift prisons or temporary shelters, often in extremely harsh conditions. The freedom of movement of expelled Sunni Arabs has sometimes been restricted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. Access to the labor market, basic care and services and even returning to their homes is all but impossible due to
the government’s frequent refusal to issue papers (Amnesty International, 2017).

On top of this, suicide attacks and other terrorist acts perpetrated by the IS claim civilian victims on a regular basis. Attacks are indiscriminate and sometimes deliberately target the civilian population, complicating attempts to establish peaceful coexistence. One gender-specific reason to flee the country can be found in the daily – sometimes legally enshrined – discrimination endured by women and girls and the (associated) inadequate protection against sexual and other violence (ibid.).

Gender-specific patterns are also apparent in the activities of IS. While women are primarily enslaved, tortured and raped – around 3,500 Yazidi women and children are still being held hostage by IS – men are usually forced to join the combat (ibid.). These reasons for women in particular to seek refuge abroad may also help to explain the comparatively high share of female asylum seekers among Iraqis (38.5 percent). However, gender-specific persecution has been only a subordinate factor in the approval of asylum claims. A more important, and often decisive, factor has been persecution by non-state agents (BAMF, 2016b) which includes the terrorist threat posed by IS.

This threat is directed against members of all religious groups but non-Muslims are usually the main targets. This is reflected in the composition of Iraqi asylum seekers in Germany, of whom Christians (3.3 percent in 2016) and Yazidis (38.8 percent in 2016) represent a disproportionate share, given that each group makes up less than one percent of Iraq’s population (CIA, 2017b).

Iraq has been one of the primary sources of asylum seekers in Germany for over a decade now. There was very little change in the number of applications between 2007 and 2014, which fluctuated between 4,000
and 7,000 annually. However, in 2015 this figure rose exponentially, with 29,784 Iraqi citizens applying for asylum in Germany that year and, at 96,116, more than triple that number in 2016. Iraqis therefore comprised the third largest group of asylum seekers in Germany last year (BAMF, 2016b). The 2017 asylum application figures have shown the number of Iraqi claims to be roughly equal to those filed by Afghans – both only eclipsed by Syrian applications – as the country is once again among the top three countries of origin (BAMF, 2017).

The 2016 recognition rate was around 54 percent, with another 16.5 percent receiving subsidiary protection, while 21 percent of all applicants were judged not to merit asylum. A further nine percent were rejected on formal grounds – usually because according to the Dublin Regulation another European country was responsible for handling the asylum claim (BAMF, 2016b).

The context of Iraq shows the existence not only of strong push factors but also of conditions of forced migration and internal displacement. Still, the key areas of concern vary significantly. Along with terrorist attacks, persecution at the hands of both state and non-state actors as a result of ethnic and religious conflicts can be seen as the main motive for fleeing Iraq. Certain minority groups face a variety of associated economic and social obstacles that engender a general lack of opportunities and prospects.

4.3.3 Social protection

The social protection system in Iraq is very fragmented and decentralized: It is implemented by both government and non-governmental institutions which provide a range of different schemes. Most of the state-driven programs, and particularly the social assistance programs, are conspicuously ineffective in targeting poor households, with most support going to specific groups regardless of their wealth or poverty. Furthermore, coverage rates are in general
very low, despite public expenditures having increased over time. On average, public spending on social protection represented approximately 13% of GDP between 2005 and 2010, constituting almost 20% of total public expenditures. In addition to public provision of social protection, faith-based institutions and systems such as the Waqf\(^{11}\), Zakat\(^{12}\) and Khums\(^{13}\) also play a significant role in Iraq. Particularly worthy of note is the deterioration in health care since 1990, reflected in the decreasing coverage and quality of basic health services. Private health insurance exists for those who can afford it (Alzobaidee, 2015, World Bank, 2017).

4.3.4 The role of social protection in migration decisions

Armed conflict, followed by insecurity, state instability and population displacement have had an extremely detrimental impact on economic growth and living conditions, increasing the need for peace-building processes. At the same time, the conflict places a great burden on the state and on other actors delivering basic social protection services (ibid.). People’s experience of the provision of public services in Iraq has affected the social role of the state at an individual level, increasing mistrust and alienation among its citizens, who now see migration as their only way out and have no intention of returning unless the system and living conditions improve (World Bank, 2017).

The Iraqi case confirms the minor role of social protection in fragile contexts, noted in the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 3 above, where national and international interventions prioritize humanitarian needs. In the long term, however, there is a need for critical thinking on how short-term approaches can be converted into medium- and long-term strategies. A survey conducted in 2009

\[^{11}\] Waqf is a form of religious endowment given in cash or in kind that is redistributed to poor and vulnerable groups (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2013). The Sunni Endowments Diwan in Iraq is well-known (Alzobaidee, 2015).

\[^{12}\] Zakat is a tax payable by all Muslims of sufficient means which is redistributed to poor and vulnerable groups (Alzobaidee, 2015).

\[^{13}\] Once mandatory, Khums are now a form of voluntary religious tax (Alzobaidee, 2015).
revealed that Iraqi citizens “felt that social protection programs had not led to an improvement in their living conditions” (Alzobaidee, 2015, p. 40). Dissatisfaction with public services coupled with unemployment and deteriorating living conditions can have dangerous effects, particularly for the young, who subsequently become more susceptible to the lure of extremist groups and the call of rebellion (World Bank, 2017). The causes of flight in Iraq have little to do with access to social services and transfers and much more to do with escaping violence and conflict arising from social tensions and perpetuated by armed groups and militias. All four interview partners from Iraq confirmed that especially young men in Iraq find themselves forced to either join militia groups or leave the country for security reasons.

Moreover, three of the interviewees do not see a future in Iraq due to the conflict and are thus not considering returning. One interviewee stated that if he had the means to maintain a basic standard of living he would prefer to return and be reunited with his family. According to the limited evidence on the effects of social protection in situations of fragility, and due to different levels of fragility, it can be assumed that, along with other interventions, social services and transfers in Iraq could contribute to state-building and social cohesion in the long-term if basic needs are met. Social protection in Iraq is therefore currently more important for delivering immediate access to basic social services and transfers to provide a minimum standard of living, especially for persecuted groups and internally displaced people. However, this need not exclude the adoption of medium- and long-term approaches, which could build upon current short-term measures. Interviewees commented that this might prevent the older generation from taking the risk of fleeing Iraq, but would be unlikely to deter the young, who make up almost half of the population. In this context, social protection therefore plays little to no role in migration decisions. Yet it has the potential to gradually form a basis for enhancing livelihoods and improving living conditions in the long run, thus weakening the causes of flight for the future. Social protection might also prevent further radicalization by providing potential extremist
groups with an alternative. This in turn might have its own long-term effects on migration decisions.

Assisted voluntary programs for returnees from Germany to Iraq offer a travel stipend (200 € per person over 12 years of age) and initial aid (500 € per person over 12 years of age) (REAG/GARP). 5,660 Iraqis are estimated to have taken advantage of these programs in 2016, a comparatively low figure considering the 96,116 Iraqis who sought asylum in 2016 (BAMF, 2017). Many Iraqis originating from regions of conflict do not consider returning an option and consequently seek asylum in neighboring countries.

4.3.5 Priority measures

The situation of conflict, political instability and internal displacement in Iraq focuses German and national efforts on the provision of basic social services and transfers. The wide-spread cash-for-work program in Iraq (Beschäftigungsoffensive Nahost), supported by German development cooperation, is a first step towards smoothing consumption and alleviating poverty in the short-term. However, cash-for-work programs in German development cooperation should not be treated as the main solution for the long run, because they predominantly address short-term poverty reduction and have only weak effects on long-term growth and productivity. Any mitigating effects in situations of violent conflict should therefore not be overestimated. Since program outcomes may be influenced by several factors, it is essential to clearly define their objectives and design (Beazley, Morris and Vitali, 2016).

Beyond these measures it is important to regain citizens’ trust in the public system and to create a functional mechanism which avoids stimulating social tensions and conflict and which specifically addresses young men who might otherwise join extremist groups or migrate.

A strategic vision and common goals in social protection and poverty reduction can play an important role in combining civil, national and
international efforts. Though such attempts have been made in Iraq, they do not appear to have fruited in the actual implementation of programs, which is why continued investments need to be made. The fragmented structure of social protection in Iraq is costly and does little to address poverty deprivation and meet basic needs. Improved and means-tested targeting is important, since beneficiaries are mostly selected by geographic poverty mapping and categorical targeting by groups. This can be attributed to the lack of available and shared data on beneficiaries, with information gaps also differing from institution to institution. The result is high inclusion errors which undermine attempts to alleviate poverty. The public distribution system, which is administered by the Ministry of Trade, nearly achieves full coverage, but is considered highly inefficient since “it costs $6 to transfer $1 worth of food” (Alzobaidee, 2015, p. 27). In addition, this system creates great distortions in the local food market system, affecting poor farmers. Measures to reform the design and targeting of this program have recently been introduced and are ongoing (World Bank, 2017).

In terms of the financial sustainability of public funds, it is recommended that a diversification of investments replace the current reliance on the oil sector, which is highly prone to price fluctuations that have decreased past public social security and pension budgets. Coordinating long-term efforts at the institutional level, improving program mechanisms for targeting those in need, increasing the level of benefits and improving the quality of services in Iraq can help to alleviate poverty, to restore confidence in the state, and to foster social cohesion in the long run. Reallocating efficiency gains, for example by investing in institutional capacity development and employment-generating activities which go beyond cash-for-work programs, can increase the system’s long-term effectiveness and sustainability. Current efforts to compile a unified registry of beneficiaries are first steps towards improving the system’s targeting, reducing inclusion and exclusion, and cutting high administrative costs, but still need further refinement. These measures are also proving rather difficult to implement due to internal migration (ibid.).
Box 4  Social protection components in Iraq

Social Assistance

The most prominent program in Iraq is the food ration card system, also called public distribution system, which provides monthly food allowances and targets the entire Iraqi population. It was developed in 1990 as a temporary emergency food program in response to sanctions, but has since established itself as a political instrument. Achieving almost full coverage, this program accounted for 35% of total food consumption in 2012 (Alzobaidee, 2015). However, the costs of this program are high (See Table 4.5) (World Bank, 2014 in Alzobaidee, 2015). The “Social Protection Network” is a mix of different programs mostly in the form of cash transfers which target groups considered to be vulnerable, such as widows, children and the disabled (Alzobaidee, 2015; Rohwerder, 2015). Additionally, a range of other programs, subsidies and fee waivers exist (World Bank, 2014; Alzobaidee, 2015, p. 21).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.5  Public Spending in Iraq in 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditures (in ID Billions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health (% of total budget in 2011)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of total budget</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty severity</td>
<td>7.3 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public distribution system*</td>
<td>11.2 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies</td>
<td>1.7 0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*According to MTFF Data 2013–15

Social insurance

Social insurance, including pensions and social security, is based on employer and employee contributions in the formal sector. As such, coverage is low, with only 17% of the working population covered. In addition, it is primarily available to civil servants and those working in the formal economy. The pension system is currently being revised with advice from the World Bank.

Labor market policies

Though employment is a major issue in Iraq, little effort has been made to generate educational and employment opportunities, despite the fact that the majority of the working population works in the private and informal sector (World Bank, 2017).
4.4 Case study: Nigeria

4.4.1 Background information

Despite the economic strides Nigeria has made since 2002, a host of socio-economic problems plagues the nation. Poverty line estimates range between 54 and 69 percent (Holmes et al., 2012a). The population is surging, with a growth rate of 2.44 percent and over 60 percent of the population under the age of 25 (See table 4.6). Unemployment, especially among the young, has intensified the nation’s ubiquitous poverty (Nwagwu, 2014). Malnutrition resulting in “stunted” and “wasted” children afflicts all regions of Nigeria, with rates above average for the western and central region of Africa (Holmes et al., 2012b). Nigeria’s Gini-coefficient stands at 48.8, with poverty incidence being greater in northern regions and rural areas (Sule, 2015). In particular, the under-five mortality rate, which averages 157 out of 1,000 births, tends to be higher in rural than in urban areas (Holmes et al., 2012b). There is also severe inequality between the genders. As of 2005, 56 percent of boys were enrolled in school compared with only 44 percent of girls (Save The Children, 2012). 52 percent of rural women live below the poverty line. Another study conducted in an urban area showed that female-headed households were more food-insecure than male-headed ones (Ajani, 2008). Moreover, HIV and AIDS rates are the second highest in Africa (Samuels et al., 2012). The disease disproportionately affects the poor, women, girls, orphans and other vulnerable children (OVC), and the elderly (Samuels et al., 2012).

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14 Save the Children (2012) states that 68% live in poverty. Indicators from UNDP put the poverty rate in Nigeria at 62.6%.
15 The richest 20% of the population controls 65% of the nation’s wealth (Holmes et al., 2012a). Nigeria ranks 152 out of 187 countries. See: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient.
16 Although Nigeria has a low HIV prevalence rate, the size of its population means that the 3.3 million people living with HIV comprise 10% of the global population affected by HIV and AIDS (Samuels et al., 2012).
17 Women are exposed to HIV and AIDS due to their social status and lack of education, which results in a dependency on men. Only 38% of women engage in household decision making. Furthermore, women are more exposed to HIV and AID due to high levels of gender inequality that cause more instances of abuse, sexual exploitation and trafficking (Samuels et al., 2012).
Poverty has been a constant affliction in Nigeria, with rates rising from 28.1 to 65.5 percent between 1980 and 1996 (Obadan, 2002). Poverty and inequality are more prevalent in the northern regions and rural areas of Nigeria (Sule, 2015). The development of pro-poor policies has occurred alongside that of economic and social sector strategies (Holmes et al., 2012). After the end of dictatorship in 1999, the nation began moving forward in addressing its poverty profile. The creation of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) in 2001 and the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) in 2004 initiated steps towards tackling poverty and concerted poverty-reduction efforts by various ministries within the government (Obadan, 2003). Myriad social protection policies and strategies were ushered in after the debt relief deal made with the Paris Club in 2005 (Akinola, 2014). Social protection programming is bifurcated between those in the formal sector and those in the informal sector, with

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.6 Nigeria poverty Statistics</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Poverty headcount (total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty headcount (rural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty headcount (urban)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poverty gap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty severity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gini Coefficient</td>
</tr>
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18 NAPEP is still a prominent organization working with COPE CCT program. From the onset, the organization was to take on four major schemes to tackle poverty: Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES), Rural Infrastructure Development Scheme (RIDS), Social Welfare Service Scheme (SOWESS), and Natural Resource Development and Conservation Scheme (NRDCS) (Obadan, 2003, p. 18).

19 Nigeria has a three-tier government system: federal, state, and local. NEEDS was combined with SEEDS and LEEDS operating at the state and local levels respectively. https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/1971_2199.html.

20 Nigeria owed creditors more than $30 billion. The agreement cancelled $18 billion of debt and left Nigeria with only $12 billion to pay to creditor countries (IOB and SEO, 2011).
greater coverage for those in the formal sector (Holmes et al., 2012a). Additionally, spending on social protection is the least among even the poorest African nations, with most of it going towards pensions and schemes for civil servants (Hagen-Zanker and Holmes, 2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.7 Nigeria Labor Statistics</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Labor participation rate (Age 15–64)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (Age 15–64)</td>
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<td>Underemployment rate (Age 15–64)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (Age 15–24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underemployment rate (Age 15–24)</td>
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4.4.2 Causes of migration
As the most populous country on the African continent with 186 million people (CIA, 2017c), Nigeria has had to contend with a conflict between its Muslim majority in the north and Christian majority in the south from the moment it gained independence in 1960. Internal divisions, driven by religious and tribal affiliations in a distinctly heterogeneous nation, continue to pervade Nigeria’s political and social spheres (Eckert, 2016). Having started as an insurgency in 2009, the ongoing conflict in the north of the country between the Nigerian army and the Jihadist rebels of Boko Haram, recruited primarily from the Kanuri people, is arguably the most prominent example of this schism. It gained international attention in April of 2014 when members of the terror group abducted 276 schoolgirls from a secondary school in Chibok (Bauer, 2015). Thousands of civilians have died since 2009 as a result of clashes and attacks. In the course of the conflict both Boko Haram and the Nigerian army have committed severe human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2016). Around 1.82 million internally displaced people who have fled the clashes are being sheltered in
Nigeria while another 200,000 people have sought refuge in neighboring countries (UNHCR, 2017).

Nigeria’s history was defined by military rule until well into the 1990s. It was not until 1998, after the death of military strongman Sani Abacha, that the country finally embarked on a path towards democracy and the so called “fourth republic” under the leadership of former military ruler Olusegun Obasanjo. The peaceful transfer of power from Obasanjo’s successor Goodluck Jonathan to the former opposition leader Muhammadu Buhari, the first democratic change of government in Nigeria’s history, was widely hailed as a momentous achievement for the country’s democracy. Promising developments like these are nonetheless tempered by continued ethnic tensions, political instability, and the terrorist threat (Mösch, 2015).

Having recently surpassed South Africa, Nigeria is now Africa’s largest economy. Extraction of the country’s vast oil and natural gas reserves has led to virtually unabated strong economic growth since 1990 (IMF, 2017b). Nigeria’s economy is, however, highly dependent on its oil export revenues and in 2016 the country experienced a recession as its economy contracted by 1.5 percent due to the low oil price (Auswärtiges Amt, 2017b). High unemployment and poor access to education represent the primary economic and social challenges, which affect young Nigerians in particular: 51 percent of 15-to-34-year-olds are under- or unemployed (Abiola-Costello, 2016), a problem that is only set to get worse in future decades. Demographic models estimate that the West African country’s population will have doubled by the year 2050 (CIA, 2017c). Such trends are expected to drastically exacerbate the job shortage. In the long term, the resulting lack of future prospects will likely spark massive migratory movements involving many African nations – including Nigeria (Asche, 2017).

Two thirds of all Nigerians currently live in extreme poverty (BMZ, 2017). Nigeria’s generally low level of development – the country is ranked 152nd in the United Nation’s “Human Development Index” (UN, 2016) –
is flanked by an extremely unequal distribution of wealth (Draper, 2015). Moreover, improvements are hampered by widespread corruption present in both the public and private sectors. Transparency International’s corruption index ranks Nigeria 136th out of 176 countries (Transparency International, 2016).

While most Nigerian refugees stay in the country or make their way to neighboring states, some have sought refuge in Europe – including Germany. Between 2007 and 2009, the West African state could already be found among the top ten countries of origin of asylum seekers in Germany. Last year, the country once again found itself on this list as 12,709 asylum applications were filed by Nigerians, placing them ninth overall among countries of origin in 2016 (BAMF, 2016b). With another 2,929 claims in 2017 already (as of May), Nigerians once again represent one of the largest groups, with Nigerian Christians in particular (91.6 percent of all Nigerian asylum seekers) trying to obtain asylum in Germany. At 3.7 percent, the recognition rate in 2016 was relatively low. Another 6.5 percent received subsidiary protection while 47.2 percent of all applications were rejected outright. Rejections on a formal basis were disproportionately high at 42.9 percent (BAMF, 2016b).

Economic despondency coupled with great inequality in society constitute key factors behind emigration from Nigeria. The expected population growth is set to exacerbate this trend, especially for the country’s sizable younger population. Nigerian Christians attempting to escape Boko Haram’s Islamist terror are the principal group of migrants.

4.4.3 Social protection

Social protection policies have existed in Nigeria since before its independence. From 1962 to 1985, a series of development plans appeared, but these were punctuated by oil price fluctuations and other political crises (Sule, 2015; Aideye et al., 2015). Nigeria’s first social protection legislation was the Workmen’s Act of 1942, followed by the Pension Decree No. 102 and the Armed Forces Pension Decree No. 103
in 1979 (Aiyede et al., 2015). The new millennium has seen reform of the pension scheme in 2004 and the official launch of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2005 (Holmes et al., 2012a). However, both schemes were for those in the formal sector, including the self-employed. As a result of the Paris Club Debt Relief agreement in 2005, the virtual poverty fund (VPF) was established to monitor expenditure on Millennium Development Goals (MDG)-related projects (IOB and SEO, 2011). Funding from this pool finances the In Care of the People (COPE) program, which was introduced in 2007, and the Community-Based Health Insurance Scheme (CBHIS) launched in 2011 (Holmes et al., 2012a). These two social protection schemes were the first to target those in the informal sector. The following section provides an overview of the social protection instruments used in Nigeria and the known programs falling under each category.

4.4.4 The role of social protection in migration decisions

The state of social protection in Nigeria is characterized by a lack of coverage, poor financing and administration, lack of trust in government, and corruption. Social, economic and political ills bedevil the entire country, leaving people with few options for securing a dignified future. If fully tapped, social protection could ensure that basic needs are met and subsequently also reduce the high levels of inequality. This in turn might lead to greater satisfaction and reduce the need and inclination to migrate. Currently, it can be argued that deteriorating living conditions have created a “migration culture”, whereby people regard the malfunctioning social protection system as incapable of solving their overwhelming and ubiquitous problems and see in migration the only solution.

Two salient points conveyed by interviewees were the presence of corruption at all levels of society and lack of trust in the government. Several interviewees stated that corruption exists at all levels of society – from bribing nurses at the hospitals to misappropriating funds allocated to social protection schemes by federal ministries. One interviewee asked, “If I had trust in my government, why would I
leave?”. Another two interviewees criticized social protection programs for not having effective follow-up or evaluations, deeming them “ineffective”. Trust in the government to fairly deliver social protection programs feeds into the idea of procedural justice (Hickey, 2007). The failure to assess program impacts compounded with corruptive acts committed with impunity erodes the effectiveness of social protection systems. Regular evaluations of existing schemes, and adjusting deficiencies to improve the system, would build trust and make people feel more socially protected by government. Migration might then become less appealing.

All interviewees expressed the view that migration was a purely economic decision as people lacked money and means to support their families, a shortcoming which social protection could address if fully tapped. Given the sprawling Nigerian diaspora and the success that many have had in their host communities, remittances have become a dependable source of income for those in-country. Those working abroad can thus increase their families’ consumption levels, broaden educational opportunities for their siblings, and maintain their parents’ standard of living (Awojobi, Tetteh, and Opoku, 2017). If social protection covered families left behind, remittances could have the potential to instead be used for direct investments into social and economic projects in Nigeria, giving migrants abroad a prospect of returning. Communicating and advocating for the integration of a migrant’s family into schemes and potentially also relevant insurances, such as accident or drought insurance can be beneficial to families left behind and can ease the burden for migrant’s abroad.

That social protection covers only a small percentage of the population is largely attributed to the lack of awareness of existing programs. The N-Power program is a labor market intervention targeted at young people between the ages of 18 and 35, which is slowly starting to show signs of success. In fact, two interviewees praised the program for being unlike any other social protection scheme they had previously encountered. One interviewee asserted, “the mere fact that there is a
customer service hotline sets it apart from other programming”. Additionally, the program uses social media to inform people about application deadlines and program achievements. The customer service hotline and the use of social media evidence a commitment not only to ensuring the efficient delivery of services and the satisfaction of beneficiaries, but also, and most importantly, to raising awareness of the N-Power program. This way of raising awareness could easily be transferred to other social protection programs, to improve coverage, meet basic needs and foster state-citizen relations.

4.4.5 Priority measures

Nigeria faces many barriers that militate against effective social protection programming. Many of the programs have been criticized for their slow progress, narrowness and ad hoc nature. Both national and state programs are still in pilot stages and coverage has been limited (Aideye et al., 2015 and Holmes et al., 2012a). The ILO and the Nigerian government (2011) highlighted the “deficits of social protection” in Nigeria, including a lack of social security for the elderly, the disabled and those in the informal economy, and the continued prevalence of child labor, HIV/AIDS prejudices in the workplace and human trafficking.

Decentralized government impedes the adoption of national social protection policies where sub-national officials lack the political will to implement them (Holmes et al., 2012b). Local and state government tend to be limited in capacity as most staff are under-qualified and unskilled. This leaves development partners as the main supportive body for designing and delivering conditional cash transfers (CCTs) (ibid). However, all levels of government are inclined to de-prioritize the poor across the areas of health, education and social welfare (Holmes et al., 2012a). The primary mechanisms for alleviating poverty and vulnerability in Nigeria are social assistance and labor market interventions. Funding for social assistance is tax-financed; thus when taxes are collected and levied progressively, this instrument can redistribute wealth and resources to those in most need. The demographic trends in Nigeria point to an ever-growing stock of
human resources that needs to be applied effectively to improving the nation’s poverty profile and economic growth while taking care to include those less well-off.

Table 4.8 Nigeria government expenditure in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 2006/07</th>
<th>Year 2007/08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>of Government Expenditure</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of GDP</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Government Expenditure (excluding civil servants)</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of GDP (excluding civil servants)</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Lack of funding is also a recurrent threat to the state of social protection. The coverage and benefit levels of existing programs are very low and they do not penetrate the communities in most need of social protection (Holmes et al., 2012a). Adjustments therefore need to be made. Yet in Nigeria, the view is pervasive that the private sector is the driving force behind economic growth, which in turn offers the best hope of reducing poverty (Aideye et al., 2014). This viewpoint limits the willingness of society to adopt social protection measures.

Instead, more effort needs to be devoted to supporting inclusive economic growth, a first attempt at which can be seen in the N-Power program. Strong labor market interventions require contributions to a social insurance scheme and adequate wages that enable a higher quality of life. Development agencies need to assist Nigeria in formalizing its economy and improving government institutions, especially the tax collection authorities. If this happens, social insurance schemes can expand, and increased funding will be available to finance
more social assistance programs. By improving government efficiency and the potential for economic prosperity, Nigerians abroad could be motivated to repatriate the skills they have acquired in their host countries.

A final issue that was repeatedly addressed in the interviews is conflict. One interviewee commented that, “Poverty creates conflict in Nigeria”. Worries about Boko Haram, and ethnic tensions and divisions between Muslims and Christians have threatened the cohesiveness of the state and driven people to emigrate. Legislation buttressing equal opportunities and proportional representation at the federal level for all groups should be high on the agenda. Expanding social protection coverage, especially in the form of social assistance, would immediately address the economic woes, food insecurity and inequality which are some of the driving factors of conflict. The current system in Nigeria provides all local government with the same amount of funding, but those areas that are more deprived than others (i.e. the northern regions and rural areas) will require additional financial support to address their poverty profiles and reduce inequality, as these are the driving forces behind emigration from Nigeria.

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21 “Adamawa SUBEB (ADSUBEB), for instance, distributes free uniforms to female children in primary schools across the state at the commencement of the academic year” (Holmes et al., 2012a)

22 The scheme was initially a PAYGO program, but the reform evolved it into a defined benefit plan with contribution rates increasing from 15% to 18%. However, states are not obliged to join and some have opted to maintain the old PAYGO scheme instead (Pwc, 2004; Aideye et al., 2015 and Holmes et al., 2012).
A final issue that was repeatedly addressed in the interviews is conflict. One interviewee commented that, “Poverty creates conflict in Nigeria”. Worries about Boko Haram, and ethnic tensions and divisions between Muslims and Christians have threatened the cohesiveness of the state and driven people to emigrate. Legislation buttressing equal opportunities and proportional representation at the federal level for all groups should be high on the agenda. Expanding social protection coverage, especially in the form of social assistance, would immediately address the economic woes, food insecurity and inequality which are some of the driving factors of conflict. The current system in Nigeria provides all local government with the same amount of funding, but those areas that are more deprived than others (i.e. the northern regions and rural areas) will require additional financial support to address their poverty profiles and reduce inequality, as these are the driving forces behind emigration from Nigeria.

**Box 5 Social protection components in Nigeria**

**Social Assistance**

Since the establishment of ‘In Care of the People’ (COPE) in 2007 a plethora of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have sprung up throughout Nigeria. Modeled on Latin America’s Bolsa Familia and Oportunidades, COPE targets the extreme poor with the aim of breaking the cycle of poverty, alleviating vulnerability and enhancing the population’s contribution to economic development (Holmes et al., 2012 and Aideye et al., 2015). The program covers only 0.001 percent of the 54 percent of Nigerians living in poverty (Holmes et al., 2012a). At the state level, there are a host of subsidies, fee waivers and in-kind benefits for vulnerable populations, including covering school related fees for girls and those orphaned as a result of HIV/AIDS (ibid.)\(^{21}\). The Maternal and Child Health Care (MCH) program offers primary care for children under five as well as maternal and child care up to six weeks after childbirth for pregnant women (ibid.). The program is not targeted at the poor, but only public health facilities accept the fee waiver (ibid.). Some states also have social pension schemes for those over 65, but there is still no national program for the elderly (Aideye et al., 2015).

**Social insurance**

The social insurance schemes in Nigeria are for pensions and health care. The 2004 pension reform expanded coverage to the self-employed and employers with less than 3 employees (PwC, 2015)\(^{22}\). Despite these changes, coverage remains at a mere 4–5 percent of the formal sector (Holmes et al., 2012a). The National Health Insurance (NHIS) scheme has existed since 1999 to cover those in the formal sector, the urban self-employed and rural communities (Aideye et al., 2015 and Holmes et al., 2012a). Although the scheme is mandatory, the provision of benefits differs according to location and/or type of employment (Holmes et al., 2012a). The Community Health-Based Insurance Scheme (CBHIS) is part of NHIS and varies across regions with no specified care package (Holmes et al., 2012a).

**Table 4.9 Social Protection Coverage in Nigeria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>% Coverage in Poorest Quintile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contributory Pensions (urban)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributory Pension (rural)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Kind (rural)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Kind (urban)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Feeding (rural)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Feeding (urban)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.5 Case Study: Pakistan

4.5.1 Background information

Pakistan has a population of 188.9 million, of whom some 50 million are estimated to be living in poverty, mostly in rural areas (ILO, 2014). Those most affected by poverty include women, children, people with disabilities and the elderly, who lack basic human, physical and productive assets and have limited access to essential services. Amongst South Asian countries, Pakistan ranks low in human development outcomes such as education and physical stature. There are also gender disparities which continue to characterize socio-economic development in areas such as health, education and all economic sectors. In other words, labor participation amongst women is also very low in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{23} In Pakistan, the net migration rate, which calculates the number of people who enter or leave the country per 1,000 people during a period of a year, was -1.8 in 2012.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{23} The challenge is that, at around 3\% of gross domestic product (GDP), spending on health, nutrition and education remains very low compared with other countries in South Asia.

A new poverty line adopted in 2016 indicated that the poverty headcount had declined from 64.3% in 2001/2 to 29.5 in 2014/15. The reasons cited for the decrease in poverty include GDP growth, a strong growth in remittances and rapid and hidden urbanization, which have led to a very vibrant informal economy. However, the World Bank (2014) argues that some of the reasons for the decline remain unknown.

The World Bank (2017) reports that Pakistan spends 0.3% of GDP on cash transfers. The statistics (Table 4.11) show low coverage for contributory pensions amongst those in the poorest quintile in both urban and rural areas (1.6% and 2.5% respectively). For access to cash transfers, rural area coverage is double that of urban areas (21.2% and 10.4% respectively).25

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In response to the high levels of poverty, the Poverty Reduction Strategy and Pakistan Vision 2030, which were developed as part of a sectoral framework for poverty alleviation, focused on three areas: increasing access to economic opportunities among the poor; preventing households and individuals from falling into poverty due to income shocks; and providing for the basic needs of the chronically poor and those unable to work (Jamal, 2010; Hasan, 2015).

### 4.5.2 Causes of migration

Having emerged out of the two Muslim-majority areas of the British Raj in 1947 (the eastern area seceded in 1971 to become Bangladesh, leaving the western area as today’s Pakistan), Pakistan became the world’s first Islamic republic nine years later. Although military rule has dominated the country’s politics since 1958, Pakistan’s self-conception as an Islamic nation was nonetheless reiterated in the constitutional reforms of 1973, 1979 and 2002 and the role of Islam has been further strengthened by integrating parts of Sharia law into the country’s legal system. After the 1999 military coup, mostly free democratic elections were first held again in 2008 (Shah, 2014). 96 percent of the country’s approximately 196 million citizens identify as Muslim. Along with a Sunni majority, Pakistan is home to a Shia minority comprising around 15 to 20 percent of the country’s population (Auswärtiges Amt, 2017c).

Religious minorities – Hindus, for example – are subject to persecution and not allowed to display their faith in public. Accusations of blasphemy are a particularly dangerous charge as they can incur life
imprisonment or the death penalty. Initially introduced to protect religious sites, the statute is today frequently used as a “universal accusation” for all kinds of conflicts (Hansen, 2017) – and, for example, to discredit political opponents (Kazim, 2014). Since the re-introduction of capital punishment in 2014, the south Asian country has earned the distinction of having the largest number of prison inmates awaiting execution: 6,016 at the end of 2015 (Brennan, 2015). Mob justice and vigilantism are also relatively common phenomena (Deutsche Welle, 2017). Further egregious violence includes more than 1,000 annual honor killings, of which women are the primary victims (Tagesschau, 2017).

Pakistan’s geographic location has played a special role in its development. As Afghanistan’s eastern neighbor, the country’s border region has in recent years become something of a safe haven for the Taliban and other Jihadist groups. Only minimal state structures exist in these areas, meaning that Islamists are often able to act with little outside interference (BAMF, 2011). Recent years have seen several major terrorist attacks, some of which have targeted religious minorities (Böge, 2016). Governmental institutions and such symbols of the country’s traditionally, the United States, as educational institutions and security forces are also frequently in the crosshairs of Islamist terrorists (Shah, 2014).

Exhibiting a low level of development – Pakistan is ranked 147th out of 188 countries in the UN’s Human Development Index (UN, 2016) - the country is frequently hit by major natural disasters. Indeed, based on the number of fatalities and the extent of the economic impact of weather-related disasters, Pakistan is widely regarded as one of the countries most affected by climate change (Frankfurter Rundschau, 2011). Heat waves and droughts, on the one hand, torrential downpours and the associated flooding, on the other, have in recent years frequently threatened both the availability of water and food security. The high level of pollution – particularly in areas beside the Indus River – represents a danger to the economic survival of small
subsistence farmers (Welthungerhilfe, 2015). Soil erosion caused by logging and overgrazing constitutes another problem (Schwengsbier, 2010). Environmental problems, climate conditions, and high levels of population growth (CIA, 2014) have precipitated a major migration from the country to the cities and, together with the terrorist threat and religious persecution, constitute the primary reasons for fleeing Pakistan.

Since 2011, Pakistanis have continuously been among the ten largest communities of asylum applicants in Germany. 14,484 claims were filed in 2016, placing them eighth among countries of origin. 95 percent of asylum seekers have been Muslims, roughly in line with their population share back home. Given the existence of gender-related causes of flight such as domestic violence (Brot für die Welt, 2017), it is remarkable that 91.9 percent of all applicants have been men (BAMF, 2016a). Of the four countries selected for special attention in this study Pakistan is the furthest away from Germany, suggesting that a classic assumption of migration theory might be applicable, namely that long-distance migration is dominated by men (King, 2002; University of Minnesota, 2015). Although there is evidence for a “feminization” of migration since the 1960s, the specific dangers of migration for women are regularly emphasized (Gabaccia, 2016). In Pakistan, overseas migration of women is often prevented based on the view that “women are essentially vulnerable and that their respectability is likely to be compromised by the very fact that they migrate alone” (Momsen, 2005). The recognition rate (2.2 percent) and the share of Pakistanis receiving subsidiary protection (1.2 percent) are comparatively small, with 63.4 percent of claims being rejected. However, over 50 percent of rejected applications are contested in court, 17 percent of them successfully (BAMF, 2016b).

Along with the persecution of religious minorities and the widespread usage of blasphemy charges, the primary catalyst for citizens of Pakistan to seek refuge abroad can be found in the country’s climate conditions. Further economic considerations related to persistent population growth also play a central role.
4.5.3 Social protection

Social protection schemes are not new to Pakistan. In fact, the first social protection scheme in Pakistan was introduced in 1967. Jamal (2010) notes that the scheme was initiated to cover contingencies of sickness, maternity, work-related injury, invalidity and death. The 1970s saw legislation for three additional social protection schemes, namely the Workers’ Welfare Fund Ordinance (1971), the Workers’ Children (Education) Ordinance 1972, and, in 1976, the Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, which established the Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) to provide old-age benefits, old-age grants and survivors’ pensions. The 80s and 90s also saw an expansion in social protection schemes in Pakistan, and these were largely targeted at the poor. The programs mandated by the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance were for poor and marginalized segments of society, whilst the Bait-ul-Mal was introduced to target those who were not benefiting from Zakat by providing financial and in-kind support (Sayeed, 2004; Hasan, 2010). In 2007, the Pakistan government recognized the need to modernize its social protection system through the National Social Protection Strategy (2007). It would be fair to argue that, to a certain extent, the global crisis expedited the number of social protection interventions and increased coverage as more people were affected.

4.5.4 The role of social protection in migration decisions

The extent of the challenges facing Pakistan’s approach to providing social protection can be seen in the fragmentary implementation of its schemes (Khan, 2013; Hasan, 2015). Different federal, provincial and autonomous bodies are responsible for the execution of social protection schemes. Their tendency to operate in silos leads to disjointed, ad-hoc approaches and duplication of roles and activities (Network, 2012 in Hasan, 2015; Jamal, 2010). In addition, social security benefits are restricted to those formally employed, which gives an incentive to those in informal employment to migrate for better earning.

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26 Provincial Employees Social Security Scheme or Employees Social Security Institutions: This scheme provided cash allowances and medical services to public sector employees.
opportunities, where no benefits are lost. A unified vision of social protection could, on the one hand, expand coverage by instilling a sense of entitlement for everyone, including vulnerable groups such as the elderly, women and children, and, on the other hand, increase the demand for social services. Furthermore, particularly flexible social protection systems can also be an instrument of response to climate-related risks, which will become increasingly important in the future as the climate changes. Risks associated with climate change are expected to have a significant effect on increasing patterns of internal and external migration and resettlement. Looking forward and addressing future risks now in the design and planning of social protection systems is likely to mitigate negative impacts when an extreme climate event occurs.

With regard to employment, Figure 4.12 provides details of the skills composition of those in Pakistan who went overseas through formal channels in the first ten months of 2015. Migrant workers are divided into skills levels based on their qualifications and occupational skills. For instance, ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled’ workers make up 42% and 39% respectively of those who went overseas in 2015, followed by semi-skilled at 16%. The ‘highly’ skilled include those with specialized skills, such as technicians and nurses, but whose formal educational qualifications are lower than those of the ‘highly qualified’. Occupations that require some training, formal or informal, such as drivers, masons and carpenters, are included in the ‘skilled’ category. Those who operate in the informal economy would fall under ‘skilled’ or ‘unskilled’, and the incentive to migrate for increased earnings is higher for them than for those who may already have formal jobs with such social security benefits as old age or retirement pensions, maternity leave and work injury compensation.

Income shocks within households are largely associated with sickness of the primary breadwinner. As a result, households commonly send their oldest sons to balance off losses and increase income through internal and external migration. Expanding social protection measures
to the informal sector in Pakistan would go a long way to ensuring that workers are protected and have less incentive to migrate to areas where working conditions might be dangerous or risky. Social protection therefore plays a protective role, especially for employees who would greatly benefit from accident insurance. In circumstances where workers view migration as the only option, this could be facilitated by bilateral agreements. However, ensuring that workers are not exploited in the destination country, making benefits portable and creating legal pathways for migration should form part of the bilateral agreement.

Similar to the role of social protection in Iraq, social protection in Pakistan further takes on a preventive role in the context of conflict and terrorism. Meeting basic needs and guaranteeing employment security and decent work conditions, can prevent radicalization and participation in extremist groups and hence also indirectly counteract terrorism. For example, increased investments are directed towards improving poor working conditions in Pakistan’s large textile industry and facilitating dialogue and platforms between trade unions, employers and government. Such efforts were also supported by German development policy in Punjab.
4.5.5 Priority measures

There is a social security gap in Pakistan, and increasing coverage is of paramount importance. The current cash transfer schemes suffer from targeting problems, with benefits failing to reach the intended beneficiaries. In addition to such challenges, corruption and a lack of implementation capacity impact negatively on the outcomes of social protection interventions. The resulting failure of cash transfers to positively influence such areas as health and education will have a knock-on effect in the reduced earning capacity of future generations. With a poverty rate of about 25\% of the total population, there is a desperate need to increase the current social protection coverage of 2–3\%.

Extending social protection coverage will require finding innovative solutions that resonate with the capacities and needs of those who operate in the informal economy. The challenge is that most social protection schemes are designed to cater for those who operate in the formal sector, whereas in countries where the informal economy is...
dominant, they should be tailored to the realities of those employed in it. Customized schemes for those who operate in the informal economy should form part of the policy approach for addressing the social security gap.

Priority needs to be given to increasing the budgetary commitment to social protection as a total percentage of GDP. In comparison to other countries in the region, including countries of similar economic status, at 0.5% of GDP Pakistan’s budgetary commitment is very low and fails to provide the safety net required. Increasing the budgetary commitment to social protection, either through increased financial support or promotion of progressive realisation of social protection over time, should be a key measure of success in this area for development partners.

Coordinating the work of departments and regions should be prioritised at the national and regional levels. Further, the capacity of institutions mandated to deliver social protection interventions, including monitoring and evaluations, needs to be increased. This is important for improving the targeting of potential beneficiaries, especially of low income families at risk of falling further into poverty and of those living in chronic poverty in urban and rural areas. Critical to better targeting is the ability to reach previously marginalised groups, not least women, children and those in the informal economy. Capacity building should include all relevant stakeholders, such as religious organisations, community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Public awareness and advocacy around the human rights framework should also form part of the capacity building process.
Social Assistance

There are three main cash transfer programs in Pakistan, namely Zakat, Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal (PBM) and Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). The PBM and BISP provide unconditional cash transfers, whilst Zakat cash transfers are linked to religious affiliation. These three programs target the same vulnerable groups, including the chronic poor and vulnerable households, and have the same objective, to reduce the level of poverty. Zakat is mainly funded by contributions from private individuals, whilst the PBM and BISP are financed from the federal budget (Jamal, 2010; Gazdar, 2011; Khan, 2013; Hasan, 2015).

Social insurance

Contributory insurance forms part of the main component of social security in Pakistan and covers those who are employed in the formal sector. The main programs are: (1) the Employees’ Old-Age Benefit Institution (EOBI), (2) the Workers’ Welfare Fund (WWF), and (3) the Employees’ Social Security Institution (ESSI). The contributory social insurance schemes cover lifecycle risks such as old age, work-related injuries, maternity and sickness. (Jamal, 2010; Khan, 2013; Hasan, 2015).

Labor market policies

A large proportion of the Pakistan labour force operates in the informal economy with inadequate social protection cover. As a labour market intervention, the Public Works program provides work for those not employed in either the formal or the informal sectors. The program, which organises activities that enable ordinary people to earn a living, forms part of the poverty alleviation strategy (Hasan, 2015). A further labour market intervention is the Rozgar Program, which aims to spark entrepreneurial activity amongst the young by granting interest-free loans (Jamal, 2010; Khan, 2013; Hasan, 2015).
Box 6 Social protection components in Pakistan

Social Assistance

There are three main cash transfer programs in Pakistan, namely Zakat, Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal (PBM) and Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). The PBM and BISP provide unconditional cash transfers, whilst Zakat cash transfers are linked to religious affiliation. These three programs target the same vulnerable groups, including the chronic poor and vulnerable households, and have the same objective, to reduce the level of poverty. Zakat is mainly funded by contributions from private individuals, whilst the PBM and BISP are financed from the federal budget (Jamal, 2010; Gazdar, 2011; Khan, 2013; Hasan, 2015).

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5. GERMAN INITIATIVES
Having outlined the potential role of social protection in migration decisions in Albania, Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan, this chapter analyzes the role currently played by social protection in both national and international approaches to migration management. First, the chapter highlights international efforts to reduce the causes of migration while pointing out established approaches and common practice among international organizations and regional institutions. Second, the current German strategies and priorities in reducing the causes of migration and forced displacement are discussed, followed by an overview of different actors and programs in this field. In addition to assessing the relative weight accorded to social protection in Germany's current development activities, this chapter also reviews some of the existing approaches that Germany is pursuing to improve social protection in countries of origin.

5.1 International activity

International attempts to manage migration range from border controls to promoting economic and political development in countries of origin through aid, trade, investment, and tackling climate-related challenges. Regardless of the tool or channel used, measures to reduce migration require cooperation between nations and institutions (UNHRC, 2002; European Committee on Migration, 2002) and the discussion around managing migration pressures and the coordination and harmonization between countries' immigration policies are key success factors (UNHCR, 2002; European Migration Network, 2012; European Union, 2014). The following section outlines the international strategies in order of their frequency of use. All strategies analyzed were aimed at mitigating irregular migration. While development aid in
general is an important strategy, second to security and border controls, social protection is yet to receive more attention.

**Security and border controls**

Emerging in the 1970s, restrictive immigration policies have been the primary strategy for managing and reducing immigration (de Haas, 2006). Strengthening national borders has been seen as a tool for combating irregular migration. Border controls focus on the improvement of security systems for managing migration and strategies that increase the monitoring of cross-border flows. The propensity to control borders more strictly is based on notions of national security and regulating criminal activity (European Union, 2014; Home Office, 2007). Discourse on loss of national identity and a decrease in social cohesion leading to stifled public trust, lack of support for public interests and goods, and a corrosion of social welfare are all arguments which have been put forward in support of securing borders (World Bank, 2016a).

Throughout Europe methods for securing borders to reduce irregular migration have centered on improving visa processing procedures, enhancing information systems and educating border patrol officers about immigration requirements (European Migration Network, 2012; European Union, 2014). Using advanced technology to incorporate a biometrics system and IT systems for visa processing, the Netherlands, Finland, and Lithuania have implemented programs to support stronger border controls (European Migration Network, 2012). EU nations in the Schengen area use the Visa Information System (VIS) to hinder irregular migration by matching fingerprints and identifying fraudulent documents (European Union, 2014). Schengen Agreement members are also required to create policy and legislation pertaining to irregular

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27 See also: https://www.state.gov/j/inl/c/crime/c44640.htm
28 The Visa Information System is used by all Schengen states. It has a central database linking national systems and a biometric system for identifying individuals by fingerprints. See: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-information-system_en
migration and obstruct avenues enabling its occurrence (European Migration Network, 2012).

Additionally, the EU has proposed monitoring migration routes taken by smugglers in order to prevent them reaching destination countries (ibid.). Prevention of organized crime, cybercrime, terrorism and human trafficking are some of the priorities articulated in the EU Internal Security Strategy, which formulates the security standards EU member states must implement and enforce (European Union, 2014). The EU’s External Border Fund is used to train border guards on effective ways to detect irregular migration (European Migration Network, 2012). In 2014, the Internal Security Fund received over a billion euros to reinforce police cooperation in combating and preventing crime and managing crises in EU Member States up to 2020 (European Union, 2014). A UN working group called Border Management and Law Enforcement related to Counter-Terrorism, under the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), promotes an agenda similar to the EU’s.  

**Development aid**

Another primary strategy, second only to securing borders, is to use development aid to reduce migration pressures. Aid is provided between governments to foster and accelerate economic development. The notion of aid being used to reduce migration is grounded in the belief, subscribed to by the U.S and Western Europe, that poverty and lack of development culminates in migration (Gamso and Yuldashev, 2017). In 2008, The French Foreign Aid Agency partnered with the French Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Inclusive Development (MINDS) to strategize support given to partner governments to help them improve the standard of living and quality of life in their countries, thus weakening the attraction of migration as a method of survival (Bermeo and Leblang, 2014). Other European

countries, such as the UK and Denmark, have promoted and linked similar assistance that reduces poverty and stems the influx of migrants into European countries (ibid.). In this regard, aid is a tool deemed necessary for solving the lack of social, governmental and physical structures which leads to poverty and vulnerability.

While multilateral and bilateral development aid improves living standards, aid could be used more strategically to thwart migration pressures. Both the UNHRC and ILO support overseas development aid spent on addressing the needs and concerns of the countries of origin as a means of reducing the necessity to migrate (Böhring and Schoelter-Paredes, 1993). Aid can enable nations to create institutions that protect their citizens while providing economic opportunities that curtail the drivers of migration. Particularly, government aid, which promotes the development of political institutions, has been considered the most effective form of aid for reducing migration pressures (Gamso and Yuldashev, 2017). Figure 6.1 shows that as governance aid is increased, emigration rates decrease with, however, a widening variance that deserves attention.

30 The example of Spain’s admission to the EU serves as a model for how assistance can be used to reduce emigration. In order to improve social, economic and physical infrastructures to meet EU standards, the EU granted Spain $59 billion in structural adjustment funds. The result was an influx of Spaniards returning to their country. See: https://unchronicle.un.org/article/migration-restriction-migration-management.
With climate change a matter of grave concern for both countries of origin and countries of destination, efforts have been made to use aid to ease climate-induced migration pressures. The UN's Cancun Adaptation Framework recognizes that climate-related migrants mostly move internally. However, strategies promoting synergetic efforts on environmentally induced migration, displacement and planned relocation need to be enhanced as those under threat may find it necessary to migrate internationally and destination countries will need to act accordingly (Martin, 2013). By offering technical assistance and advisory services, the World Bank (2016a) supports climate-related social protection programs that deter migration. Also participating in providing climate change-related services, the UNFCC has been working with governments to build capacity programming to address climate change, specifically focusing on vulnerability induced by the phenomenon in poor countries (Chen and He, 2013). Governments have attempted to minimize pressures on feeble ecosystems by changing agricultural practices, managing pastoral lands and

**Figure 6.1 Governance Aid and Emigration Rate**

![Graph showing the relationship between governance aid and emigration rate.](image)


Note: “The trend line illustrates the average relationship between governance aid (as a share of GDP) and emigration rate (95 percent confidence intervals in gray); independent and control variables are lagged one year; control variables are held at median values.”
infrastructures, including dykes and coastal barriers, and monitoring fishing patterns (Martin, 2013). The National Adaptation Program for Action (NAPA) formulated by the Bangladeshi government describes climate change plans, such as tree-planting, offering reliable sources of drinking water, improving agricultural methods in regions afflicted by salinization and flash flooding (Population Action International, 2010).

Trade

Better trade agreements reduce emigration. Trade policies impact the competition between countries’ products and employment in import and export sectors (Martin and Straubhaar, 2002). NAFTA was created with the intent of advancing economic growth in Mexico by creating jobs and raising wages, which would subsequently reduce emigration from Mexico to the U.S. (Wainer, 2010; Martin and Zürcher, 2008). An absence or shortage of economic opportunities in Mexico has been one of the primary drivers of immigration into America and NAFTA was intended to be a springboard for activating the labor market in Mexico, leading to equal opportunities for jobs with wages that provided a quality standard of living. Failed EU trade agreements with North African countries have led to the recent revamping of trade deals between the two regions that directly promote greater access to markets. Most recently, the EU established the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) with Tunisia and Morocco to open markets, harmonize laws and standards, and align important sectors with EU standards (Dadush, Demertzis, & Wolff, 2017). Trade has long been perceived as a driver of economic productivity (ibid.); however, improving the human aspects of free trade (i.e. ensuring equity in the import and export labor market) also decreases the pressure on potential migrants and thus deters migration.
**Investment**

Investment has often been coupled with trade strategies to reduce migration. There have been two types of investment: foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment. The World Bank, through which most long-term development financing is channeled, has been a proponent of both types of investment (Martin and Straubhaar, 2002). Both the U.S. and other multilateral institutions support development projects in areas heavily affected by emigration (e.g. rural areas of Mexico) as being likely to improve livelihoods in countries of origin (Wainer, 2010). Akin to this approach, the IMF and World Bank work with bilateral, commercial, and donor creditors to support the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative launched in 1996. With an understanding that debt interest diminishes government revenues, the HIPC initiative used a combination of policies, debt relief and aid to lower debt to sustainable levels, thus freeing governments to work on poverty reduction and boosting economic growth (IMF, 2000; Martin and Zürcher, 2008). These packages, benefiting 30 countries, including Nigeria, were released between 1996 and 2006 (Martin and Zürcher, 2008).

More recently, initiatives have been taken to invest in nations heavily impacted by the inflow of Syrian refugees and to improve investment partnerships that can reduce migration. The World Bank, UN agencies and the Islamic Development Bank have created the MENA Financing Initiative, which offers grants from supporting countries and loans from multilateral organizations to middle-income nations, specifically Lebanon and Jordan, sheltering large numbers of Syrian refugees (World Bank, 2016a; World Bank, 2016b). The funding will provide better services for both Syrians and citizens of Jordan and Lebanon, by rehabilitating infrastructure, creating jobs, and improving health
outcomes and the quality of education (World Bank, 2016b). The New European External Investment Plan aims to consolidate partnerships in Africa and tackle the fundamental causes of migration (European Union, 2016). The plan is designed to mobilize investments, offer technical assistance and boost economic governance in more fragile nations to enable them to attain sustainable development goals (ibid).

5.2 Germany’s engagement in combating the causes of flight and irregular migration

In Germany, political attention has in recent years increasingly focused on tackling the causes of migration and flight. In 2016 alone, the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development allocated funds totaling three billion euros for the mitigation of the structural causes behind migration, assistance for refugees, and the stabilization of regions sheltering displaced people.

The German strategy for fighting the causes of displacement and irregular migration

The German government has for several years now sought to combat the root causes behind forced displacement, migration and flight at multiple levels – bilaterally and in concert with other countries, the EU and international organizations. Depending on the context, this can require immediate humanitarian assistance and/or long-term development, diplomatic and military cooperation (Bundesregierung, 2017a). It is thus more important than ever to employ transitional development assistance as a means of building bridges between these different approaches.

Germany’s underlying objective is to manage the global movement of migrants and refugees while always keeping an eye on its own capacity to take in those in need of shelter. As a consequence of increasing migration inflows, domestic and foreign policy interests have converged and are no longer dealt with in isolation. In its migration and refugee
policies, the German government now pursues a coherent general approach. It combines domestic, foreign, development, economic and security policies while also considering factors related to the labor market and the domestic system of social protection (Bundesregierung, 2016). The four central objectives of Germany’s migration policy are:

1. Reducing the causes behind forced displacement and irregular migration
2. Improving protection and assistance for refugees in the primary host countries
3. Using the potential of legal migration and an active planning and management of migratory processes
4. Returning people without the prospect of obtaining a residence permit and supporting their reintegration in their countries of origin (ibid.).

Central to any attempt to successfully plan and manage migration and prevent displacement is increased cooperation with the countries involved: the countries of origin, the transit and the host countries. While direct support is only provided to partner countries and regions that are the focus of German development cooperation, Germany may indirectly contribute to other countries and regions for reasons of political interest and through international partners. German engagement in this field is focused on the conflict zones in the western Sahel, on Afghanistan and Pakistan and places along the primary African migration routes. Special attention is given to civil war-torn Syria and its neighbors, in particular Turkey (Bundesregierung, 2017).

Support for the EU strategy
As is the case in other political fields, Germany’s migration and refugee policies are embedded within an overarching European strategy (ibid.). Germany supports the initiatives and missions of both the European Commission and the EU while taking an active role in the relevant councils of ministers. A key element of the overall European strategy is the work on EU migration partnerships with countries of origin and
transit countries. These include: Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal (“Valletta-Process”). The objective of these partnerships is to jointly prevent irregular migration, achieve a better readmission process, and combat the local root causes of migration and displacement. As a partner, Germany – along with France, Italy and others – has taken on a special responsibility for the EU partnership with Mali and Niger (ibid.). The EU has placed 1.8 billion euros in a trust fund for Africa into which EU Member States can add contributions of their own. Last year, the EU set aside four billion euros for humanitarian support for Syrian refugees in adjacent countries.

In March of 2016, the EU and Turkey agreed on a deal to readmit refugees from Greece. Turkey is receiving three billion euros for their humanitarian care. A further three billion euros have been set aside for specific refugee projects to provide education and health care up to the end of 2018 (Bundesregierung, 2017b). Germany contributed 428 million euros to these EU payments (Bundesregierung, 2016). The EU has, moreover, tripled its funds for the Mediterranean naval missions Triton and Poseidon. Since June of 2015, EUNAVFOR Med (Operation Sophia) has conducted operations to combat refugee smuggling and trafficking in the Mediterranean. Germany’s armed forces are taking part in this mission with two ships (Bundesregierung, 2017b). In early 2017, in an effort to stem the flow of refugees across the Mediterranean, EU heads of state and government further agreed on a 10-point plan to coordinate the bloc’s refugee policy more closely with Libya. A central pillar of this plan is to train and equip the Libyan coast guard in an effort to raise its capabilities for preventing the perilous passage organized by gangs of smugglers (Tagesschau, 2017).

The measures taken by the EU and supported by the German federal government regarding the agreement with the Turkish government and cooperation with Libya have been harshly criticized by German and international NGOs and human rights organizations. In the case of Turkey, these critics stress Turkey’s evolution into an increasingly authoritarian regime under the rule of the Islamic conservative AKP
party and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the gradual lowering of democratic standards (Pro Asyl, 2016). The EU deal with Turkey to stop the flow of migrants to Greece can be seen, as many experts do indeed see it, as a consequence of the failure to find a coherent inner-European solution aimed at a fair distribution of refugees among the EU member states. However, a coalition of eastern European states led by Hungary and its right-wing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán strongly opposes a common European migration and asylum policy.

The deal with Libya is considered by human rights activists to be even worse. Libya can be seen as a “failed state” in which for years rival governments and several armed groups have been fighting for influence (Amnesty, 2016). The EU collaboration with the Libyan coastguard, as NGOs such as Amnesty International emphasize, is an ulterior threat to refugees who are held back in, or brought back to, Libya – a state where their safety cannot be guaranteed and whence cases of abuse, human rights violations and torture are reported (Amnesty, 2017). Human rights activists demand that the EU and its member states rethink their strategy for solving the global refugee crisis (Tagesschau, 2017).

**Support for international initiatives**

At the global level, Germany is cooperating with international organizations to address the causes behind migration and displacement from several angles. Here military cooperation – for example, in the fight against international terrorism – plays a key role. It includes operational measures at the international level to combat terrorism and the financing of terrorism coordinated within the United Nations, the OSCE, the G7, the G20, the EU and the anti-ISIS coalition. The German army’s mission to equip and train groups fighting IS in northern Iraq and its contribution to the air campaign of the multinational military intervention against the Islamic State (“Operation Inherent Resolve”) are examples of this. Germany’s international engagement is, however, not limited to military means of combating terrorism but also seeks to erase its socio-economic breeding ground.
Crisis prevention and conflict management are the cornerstones of Germany’s foreign and security policy. Around 3,000 German soldiers are currently taking part in 14 foreign deployments while another 200 police officers are engaged in seven United Nations peace-keeping missions, nine EU missions, an OSCE mission and bilateral police projects (Bundesregierung, 2016).

Yet military missions are just one tool in the resolution of acute conflicts. Over the long term, development cooperation – with the aim of bolstering a region’s economic and structural foundations – makes a vital contribution to the prevention of flight and migration. The objective is to provide the population in countries of origin with brighter prospects at home while also supporting their governments and those of transit and host countries in their task of managing migratory movements (ibid.). The key actors in this area are the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Foreign Ministry, both of which collaborate in the coordination of humanitarian assistance with the longer-term objectives of development cooperation. In order to be able to address the changing environments of protracted crises, the German government has established a transitional assistance unit within BMZ, which coordinates its activities with the Foreign Ministry’s humanitarian interventions.

*Special initiatives against hunger, poverty and destabilization*

In 2014 the BMZ established three special initiatives to combat hunger, poverty and destabilization with a total budget of 685 million euros (Bundeshaushaltsplan, 2017). The first of these is “One World, No Hunger”, which is primarily intended to address hunger and malnutrition as the drivers behind displacement and persecution but has the additional purpose of helping to ensure that an ever-growing world population can continue to be fed. As part of this initiative, measures that promote employment and income in rural regions, ensure fair access to land, and protect natural resources are receiving support (BMZ, 2017a).
The second special initiative, “Tackling the root causes of migration and displacement, reintegrating refugees”, intends to provide immediate help to both refugees and the communities that have welcomed them while seeking to eliminate the structural causes driving migration, such as poverty, inequality and food insecurity, that have built up over time (ibid.).

The third initiative, “Stability and development in the MENA Region”, plans to set up projects aimed at facilitating peace-building, economic stabilization and the promotion of democracy in a part of the world characterized by political upheaval. In Egypt and Tunisia, for example, the central focus is on creating jobs and vocational training opportunities for young people in order to ensure that this group can see the potential for prosperity at home (ibid.).

A further important scheme is “Beschäftigungsoffensive Nahost”, an employment campaign initiated by the German government at the 2016 Supporting Syria and the Region Conference in London. By providing a minimum wage income, it gives both refugees and local residents in host countries the opportunity to work and to earn enough to cover their own housing, health and clothing expenses. The cash-for-work activities promoted by the scheme include everything from waste management and rebuilding schools to teaching. According to the BMZ’s own data, in 2016 the program’s funds of around 200 million euros were able to finance twelve projects which provided 61,000 people with work (BMZ, 2017b).

Flexible and comprehensive approaches

Germany’s bilateral engagement with individual countries of origin, transit and host countries demonstrates that the best approach is when different instruments and measures – political, economic and military – interlock seamlessly. Iraq, for example, currently faces a number of challenges: the war against ISIS, more than three million internally displaced people, around 250,000 refugees from Syria, and a lack of tax revenues due to the falling oil price. Germany is supporting...
the Iraqi government’s reconstruction efforts and its protection of internally displaced people and refugees while also backing the military and political fight against ISIS. Since August 2014, the German government has contributed more than 550 million euros for humanitarian and development policy measures to support internally displaced people and Syrian refugees and to assist in the stabilization of communities sheltering refugees, in particular in the Kurdish region in the north of the country. Measures include the construction and expansion of both emergency shelters and basic social infrastructure, ensuring a supply of water, the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, provision of mobile clinics to help alleviate medical shortfalls, psychosocial counselling, bolstering the labor market, advancing educational attainments, and encouraging social cohesion (Bundesregierung, 2016).

Today few migrants and refugees use Albania as a transit country to enter Europe. Until the second half of 2015, however, Albania was the country of origin of the second largest group of asylum seekers in Germany. Following its declaration as a safe country of origin in October 2015, the number of asylum claims dropped sharply. For many Albanians, economic prospects nonetheless remain grim. The state of the economy continues to be well below the average European level and youth unemployment is particularly high. German development cooperation pursues the objective of tackling the structural causes of migration by improving access to utilities while offering the population, and especially the younger segments of the population, brighter economic prospects. A further aim is to counteract discrimination against minorities in Albania, since marginalization and racism can also provide impetus for emigration (ibid.).

In other countries this impetus is provided by violence and terror. In Nigeria, 2.2 million people have been displaced by Boko Haram’s attacks and almost 200,000 Nigerians have sought refuge in neighboring countries. Germany is supporting internally displaced people, refugees, and the communities hosting them in the country’s north and northeast.
Internally displaced people are receiving medical care and psychosocial counseling from mobile units. Additional care and counseling, a forum for discussing their experiences, and the opportunity to engage in manual labor or a craft are provided in refugee camps. Germany is involved in a variety of regional projects through the UNHCR, supporting a program and measures to improve targeting and combat the spread of polio. By cooperating with the country’s military forces, Germany is enhancing cross-border cooperation, while contributions to the expansion of Nigeria’s criminal investigation department help improve its security policy. Another important factor in the prevention of flight and migration is sustainable economic development, a goal to be reached in Nigeria, for example, by providing small farmers with skills and financial support and innovative projects in the microfinance sector (ibid.).

Pakistan is one of the primary host countries of Afghan refugees and there are currently around 1.5 million registered and more than a million unregistered Afghan refugees in the country. Pakistan is also home to a million internally displaced people. Germany is helping Pakistan meet this challenge through a UNHCR program with funds totaling 17.5 million euros. Moreover, for the period between 2015 and 2020, the German government has set aside ten million euros to facilitate the return of internally displaced people and allocated 4.3 million euros to the UNHCR program for the voluntary and sustained return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan to their homeland up to 2019. Various additional infrastructure projects to provide access to health care and water have been initiated. Germany’s (foreign) policy has the long-term goal of stabilizing Pakistan as a central actor in Southeast Asia (ibid.).

The role of social protection
Social protection is woven into the very fabric of German society and its political culture. In foreign affairs and development cooperation, however, social protection receives far less attention (Interview partners 26, 27, 28 & 29). Around the world countries have come up with different approaches to addressing the different causes of
displacement and migration, and found different solutions and instruments for mitigating them. Germany has contributed significantly to international cooperation and plans such as the ILO Social Protection Floor Initiative, the Vision Zero Fund and the Global Partnership for Universal Social Protection. German efforts encompass short-, medium- and long-term approaches to reducing migration, all largely motivated by internal political concerns requiring a response to, and mitigation of, migration pressures. From a German perspective, social protection is primarily associated with longer-term development measures. Though certain instruments are labeled as components of social protection, such as cash transfers and cash-for-work programs, which are widely used in short-term humanitarian and medium-term transitional development assistance, they do not integrate the long-term perspective and understanding of social protection. This being said, although the pressure on governments to quickly deliver results remains the same, the German response to migration movements in terms of interventions and programs continues to be rather late. In practice, then, the ideal of meeting humanitarian needs while also promoting longer-term development approaches, weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of a certain set of instruments in a specific country while also bearing in mind German country objectives, proves rather challenging. International cooperation needs to further combine and align efforts with national country plans.
Box 7  DGUV in Bangladesh: Employer liability system

The Bangladeshi employer accident liability system, first introduced by the 2006 Labor Act, was most recently amended in 2013. The program offers a lump-sum disbursement in the event of death or permanent loss of earning capacity due to injury, and for temporary losses monthly amounts for up to a year, or two years in the case of occupational disease. For temporary losses, 100% of wages are provided in the first two months, 2/3 in the subsequent two months, and half during the remaining time. In addition to wages, medical services are provided to the incapacitated individual. The scheme is currently funded by employers. The Labor Act stipulates that all employers with a minimum of 10 employees must provide this form of insurance for their staff. Companies with fewer than 10 employees must insure them through a group policy.

In partnership with the ILO, BMZ and GIZ, the German Social Accident Insurance DGUV assists Bangladesh in building a sustainable social accident insurance scheme. The partnership began in 2010 with BMZ disbursing 16 million euros to Bangladesh to improve the social and environmental standards in the textile industry. More recent activities have sought to enhance the partnership through the transfer of ideas, expertise and information. Delegates from Bangladesh visited Germany and representatives of companies from the Bangladeshi textile industry between 2015 and 2016 and also attended seminars on the German statutory accident insurance system. In 2015, one medium-term component of the partnership’s assistance offered three scholarships for students from Bangladesh to study social insurance science at the Bonn-Rhein-Sieg University of Applied Sciences.

Countries that are in a similar socio-economic situation to Bangladesh can profit from the establishment of the G7 Vision Zero Fund, which was advocated by the DGUV to “create sustainable global supply chains and prevent injuries or deaths in the workplace” (DGUV, 2016, p. 20).

While Germany has committed to supporting the international community in investing in addressing the structural and acute causes of migration and displacement, this commitment contrasts starkly with those made in the field of social protection, which has so far only played a minor role in the easing of migration pressures. Although social protection has gained recognition at both national and international levels and its effectiveness is well-established, it is not considered to be a standalone sector in German development policy, nor a particular priority. The secondary role of social protection is also reflected in the limited number of bilateral programs and portfolios in partnering countries. The German presidency in the G20 incorporated social protection within topics such as sustainable global supply chains and future of work. Yet, social protection as a subject of discussion needs to go beyond topics of employment in the formal sector. The focus on inclusive economic development fails to sufficiently address sustainable social development and the integration of the informal sector.

Discussions in the G20 also did not adequately shed light on the new approach to future economic and development cooperation with Africa promoted by the Marshall Plan with Africa in 2016. The Plan refers to social protection as a founding pillar, even suggesting that it might be an appropriate instrument in crisis regions, and clearly states the need to “[r]ecognise more clearly within the G20 the importance of social protection systems as instruments to cushion the effects of crises in developing countries (economy, migration, climate) and implement the recommendations of the G20 on that issue” (BMZ, 2016, p. 32). In general, efforts appear to be focused more on employment-generating measures. This shifts the state’s responsibility for social protection to the individual, thus further intensifying the burden on individuals to provide support for their families. Economic interventions insufficiently address the social aspects of employment, including ensuring working standards and providing accident insurance and access to social security benefits.
The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has a multitude of ongoing social protection-related projects in Albania. Official German engagement in the region focuses on economic development through job creation, vocational training, and the improvement of water quality and management.

ProSME: Increasing the Competitiveness of Micro-, Small & Medium-sized Enterprises by Promoting Innovation and Entrepreneurship

In collaboration with the GIZ and MEDTTE, the BMZ aspires through ProSME to create more competitiveness in micro-, small & medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in selected sectors. By enhancing business services, knowledge and products, the project plans to bring MSMEs and farmers up to EU standards so that they can begin to benefit from free trade agreements. The program’s approach involves “(1) improving entrepreneurial capacities entrepreneurship and innovation of existing MSMEs and start-ups; (2) offering demand-driven business services to strengthen entrepreneurial competences and innovation capabilities for MSMEs; (3) improving organizational and operational capacities in implementing MSME support strategies” (GIZ, 2015, p. 24).

SARD: Support to Agriculture and Rural Development

Agriculture accounts for 20% of GDP in Albania and is showing continuous growth. With the agricultural sector employing roughly half of Albania’s rural population, sustainable growth is a major priority for the government. Under the auspices of the Albanian Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Water Administration, the Albanian Ministry of Finance and the GIZ, working on behalf of the BMZ, the SARD project aimed to create more competitiveness in the agricultural industry as a tool for enhancing the quality of life in rural areas. The GIZ spearheaded raising awareness of, and expanding capacity to implement EU standards for rural development structural fund management.

The grant scheme was a pilot project working with farmers and agro-food processors in “an innovative and effective approach that combines capacity development and practical application of grants” (GIZ, 2015, p. 26). The program increased understanding of EU-compliant institutional frameworks, access to grants of up to 8.27 million euros for business expansion and competitiveness, and best practice references. The program developed data processing software to improve transparency and the management of grants, contracted recipients and increased their success rate by to up 49%. The program also raised awareness of business regulations for obtaining EU grants and loans for expanding business activity and competitiveness. 10 staff members at the Albanian Ministry of Finance firmed up their skills in the areas of EU financial, budgetary and anti-corruption requirements. The program ran from July 2012 to April 2017.

SARED: Support to Agriculture and Rural Economic Development in Disadvantaged Mountainous Areas

In response to the poverty profile of rural mountain areas and the inability of farmers there to access the market, the Albanian government has established the Cross-Sector Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development (ISARD) under the Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Water Administration (MARDWA) with support from the German and
Danish governments. The program supports the following value-chain areas as being pivotal to the region’s economic development: small livestock, fruit trees and nuts, medicinal and aromatic plants, and rural tourism. The anticipated overall results include reducing unemployment and improving the income of value chain actors by 20%. Other expectations include increasing the capacity and involvement of women to ensure that they constitute at least 15% of beneficiaries. The program began in June 2014 and is scheduled to be completed by May 2018.

VET: Vocational Education and Training Program

Working with the Albanian Ministry of Social Welfare and Youth (MoSWY) and the GIZ, the BMZ commissioned a reform of the VET sector in Albania to match the changing demands of the labor market in the fields of health care, information technology and social care. Since the launch of the program in January 2010, it has achieved: the introduction of the VET Board model to vocational schools in Northeast Albania (the board acts as a liaison between VET institutions and companies); the compilation of a handbook and training manual for VET providers; the establishment of a VET center; and an overhaul of legal structures in Albania to comply with EU standards. Reforms of VET have included creating a labor market information system that enables VET providers to gain more knowledge of labor market demands, companies to seek out the help they need, and young people (and their parents) to find the right educational track. Further, labor offices have been reorganized by training 120 staff to equip them with the technical skills required to manage the labor management information systems; in the northeast region of Albania over 130 students obtained internships with private companies during the 2014/2015 academic year; and 20% more girls graduated from VE schools due to new targeting mechanisms. The program ran until December 2016.

WSR: Water Sector Reform

As a result of ageing infrastructure, poor maintenance of water management facilities, and a lack of human capacity Albania still lacks a safe and reliable drinking water supply. The aim of the Water Sector Reform Program (GIZ, 2015, p. 32) was therefore “safe drinking water for all at all times, collection and treatment of all waste water, protection of the environment and development of efficient, cost-effective and sustainable management”. Partnering with the GIZ and the Albanian Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure (MIT), the BMZ intended to promote positive environmental effects by improving water supply and waste-water management. The program aided the MIT in drafting public service laws for the roles and functions of local and central government units in establishing effective water management structures, policies and strategies. One major accomplishment at the policy level was the publication of the Water Sector Strategy 2011-2017, which adopts a EU framework for monitoring, evaluating and promoting a customer-oriented water sector. In terms of regulation, the project has helped 56 out of 58 utilities to obtain a license or have their license processed, use more data from improved institutional relations, and draft customer-services contracts for utilities. At the operational level, 21 cities have experienced an improvement in their water utility’s operating efficiency, a wetland system has been constructed in Tirana, 45% less energy is needed for the pumping of water in Patos, and a gravity supply system in Erseka has replaced the pumping system, which will save 30,000 Euro annually in electricity costs. The program ran from January 2011 to December 2015.

Source: GIZ, 2015.
5.3 Germany’s social protection initiatives in migration contexts

5.3.1 Germany’s commitment to social protection at the international level

Social protection and the principles of solidarity are an integral part of German society (BMAS, 2017). Moreover, social protection is prominently placed in several of the Sustainable Development Goals of the Agenda 2030 that Germany has committed itself to. However, Germany has yet to focus its efforts on the actual practice and implementation of measures (Scholz, Keijzer and Richerzhagen, 2016). Germany’s great commitment to social protection at the national level is not mirrored by its development policy priorities. So far, social protection has been considered a cross-cutting topic in German development policy, rather than a stand-alone field, as can be observed in various social protection projects linked to areas that focus on economic development, good governance, health and rural development. While a cross-sectoral approach helps link topics such as good governance and economic development, it nonetheless undermines social protection’s increasing potential as a sustainable and beneficial policy option. This implies that effort is being spent on finding links that would be better devoted to developing a coherent social protection strategy and portfolio (Interview partner 28).

In addition, most efforts to address migration and displacement focus on predominantly economic interventions, such as cash-for-work approaches, that fail to sufficiently address social factors, for example working standards and occupational safety in employment-generating programs. This may be attributed to the relatively rapid and easily perceptible effects of employment, as opposed to the long-term, overarching effects of social protection, which may be difficult to anticipate (Interview partners 26, 27, 28 & 29).

Nevertheless, social protection has gained momentum over the last few decades and come to be considered a critical tool in alleviating
poverty and reducing inequality by enhancing livelihoods in partnering countries (BMZ, 2017).

Germany’s social protection activities abroad are carried out by state initiatives or by NGOs (BMZ). The main actors representing German social protection internationally are the BMZ and the Foreign Ministry, which both collaborate with German development organizations (e.g. GIZ and CIM), financial cooperation institutions (e.g. KFW and DEG) and several research institutes (e.g. DIE) in advising countries and regions on designing, implementing and monitoring measures to build, improve and modify social protection systems. Upon the initiative and request of foreign governments or their ministries, Germany provides support through policy dialogue, technical consultancy, the training of national employees and financial contributions. This multiplicity of institutions is a characteristic specific to German development policy and reflects the different areas of expertise they have developed, such as the transitional development assistance units of the BMZ, which coordinate activities with the Foreign Ministry (BMZ, 2017).

Furthermore, German social security institutions have expanded in response to international demands. They are increasingly aware of the world’s changing environment and are becoming more flexible in how they think and act towards newly emerging challenges in social protection. This is reflected, for example, in the international activities of the German Social Accident Insurance (DGUV), which promotes an exchange of knowledge and good practices in social security on an international level, specifically in the areas of prevention, rehabilitation and sustainable financing of social security systems.

The German government assists 15 countries (2016) all over the world in implementing social protection for the poorest and most vulnerable groups in society, such as children, women, the disabled and elderly. Germany takes a systems approach and supports social protection in partner countries by facilitating policy dialogue and by providing technical advice, financial support and professional consultancy and
training. According to the BMZ, such activities should respect national and local needs and capacities, while also considering historical, economic, social and cultural factors. Such factors need to be determined in advance in consultation with the cooperating country. The main objectives of German development policy in the field of social protection are the provision of social protection for all, especially people living in poverty and the most vulnerable, the coverage of all relevant risks, the creation of comprehensive and inclusive systems of social protection and an increase in the efficiency, quality and financial sustainability of such systems, which should, moreover, establish a balance that enhances social justice (BMZ, 2009). Examples of German social protection projects are given in Textboxes 7 and 8.

Overall, German development policy supports few bilateral programs in partner countries which contain social protection as a larger component of the country portfolio (among them are, for instance, GIZ activities in Malawi, Indonesia and Cambodia). This could be considered an indicator of the level of priority accorded to social protection in German development policy, which despite its far-reaching promises still has not managed to translate ideas and initiatives into investments and practice. However, other programs and projects in social protection have been implemented by Germany’s KfW Development Bank. The KfW has supported over 60 social protection projects in 18 countries at a cost of over 717 million euros. 24 of these projects cover issues related to basic social protection and social health protection, of which the most prominent are cash-for-work programs, such as those implemented in Namibia and Jordan, for example. These generate income while simultaneously improving infrastructure. In the field of social health protection, voucher programs increasing access to health facilities for people living in poverty are supported in Cambodia, Kenya and Yemen (Rudolph & Dietrich, 2017). Some of these programs, such as those in Jordan and Yemen, contribute to easing migration pressures by supporting receiving communities and regions, similar to approaches applied by German development partners.
5.3.2 Social protection interventions aimed at migration

The German government has three separate approaches to reducing the causes of displacement and migration, represented by the three initiatives outlined in section 5.2 above. The first initiative addresses the acute and structural causes of displacement and migration; the second aims to strengthen receiving countries and regions; and the third initiative facilitates the integration and reintegration of migrants, refugees and internally displaced people (Bundesregierung, 2016).

Initiative addressing the acute and structural causes of displacement

Within the first initiative, interventions containing a social protection component that address the acute and structural causes of migration aim to alleviate poverty and improve living conditions. This implies increasing access to basic social services, education and employment, as well as providing food security and basic infrastructure. Such interventions are mainly targeted towards countries of origin and their neighbors and aim to improve their beneficiaries’ prospects if they remain within the country and to encourage others to return. The most prominent of these are the employment campaigns in North Africa and the Middle East (“Beschäftigungsoffensive Nahost”) (Bundesregierung, 2016).

In Egypt, for example, high unemployment rates limit the prospects of the younger generation, who thus contemplate emigrating in search of better work opportunities. The BMZ works with an Egyptian partner organization in a youth employment program to modernize and improve job placement services, provide training and bridge the gap between education and employment. The program addresses not only unemployment, but also the supply side, by advising employers and encouraging them to create better and more skilled jobs with decent working conditions, such as social security benefits and a safe working environment (BMZ, 2017).
At the beginning of 2016, in response to the Syrian crisis, several employment campaigns were launched in the Middle East, specifically in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon (see Table 5.1) with an initial investment of 200 million euros. The programs are open to refugees, other migrants and those in the local receiving communities who are able to work. The measures quickly generate disposable income for those in need while simultaneously assisting in reconstruction and integration. In total, approximately 61,000 jobs were created in the region in 2016. Further, over 30,000 children were enabled to attend school and an estimated 7,000 vocational training courses were completed (BMZ, 2017a). However, as explained in the case analyses in Chapter 5 above, cash-for-work programs supported by German development cooperation should not be treated as a universal remedy, since they focus on short-term assistance and poverty alleviation. There is little evidence that such programs have any long-term effects on sustainable growth, sustainable employment and productivity. There is therefore a danger of overestimating their mitigating effects in situations of violent conflict. Since many factors may influence their outcomes, clearly defined objectives and appropriate design are essential for such programs (Beazley, Morris and Vitali, 2016).
### Table 6.1 Overview of Cash-for-work programs in the Middle East (»Beschäftigungsoffensive Nahost«)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Cash-for-work program</th>
<th>Job placements</th>
<th>Investment in Million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jordan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste disposal and Recycling</td>
<td>9500 (2016)</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of teachers and</td>
<td>5000 (2016)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrative staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and construction of infrastructure</td>
<td>3000 (expected by end of 2017)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lebanon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction of housing</td>
<td>5500 (2016)</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Training</td>
<td>available to over 7000</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational support through Syrian teachers</td>
<td>8400</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and marketing of craftwork</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste disposal and repair of communal infrastructure</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Iraq</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair and improvement of infrastructure</td>
<td>25000</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own illustration, source: BMZ, 2017a.
**Initiative on strengthening host communities**

The second initiative specifically focuses on strengthening receiving communities and regions using a primarily humanitarian approach, which specifically addresses their immediate and basic needs. In northern Iraq, for example, basic social protection is offered to the internally displaced living in camps in Dohuk by the Kurdish local government in collaboration with GIZ cooperation and international donors. Basic services include the development of local schools and health care centers and the provision of psychosocial support. Delivering these services to all groups is expected to decrease social tensions. Given that for many the prospects of returning may be slim, there is a clear need for additional sustainable long-term approaches. It might be beneficial in the long run to envision longer-term strategies that encourage national and regional ownership within short-term interventions.

A further case in point is the BMZ support for informal social protection mechanisms in Jordan by enabling digital financial transactions. By facilitating payment via cellphones, the transaction costs of remittances are reduced and migrants’ and refugees’ awareness of the use of financial markets is raised (BMZ, 2017b). On the one hand, this can stimulate savings and productive investments for recipients in the country of origin, and, on the other, the investments made there potentially stimulate a comfortable return. Only a small percentage of migrants who remit are likely to return permanently to their country of origin. A study investigating the remittance behavior of migrants abroad found that returnees had previously invested higher levels and more regular payments in business projects in the country of origin. This had softened the conditions they returned to and thus no doubt made them more likely to return (Collier, Piracha and Randazzo, 2011). The development impacts of remittances are beyond dispute. That encouraging remittances, for example an investment in local small- and medium-scale businesses, may also have an impact on the decision to, and conditions of, return, might be worth considering in future policy-making.
**Initiative supporting integration and reintegration**

The third initiative supports the integration and reintegration of migrants, refugees and internally displaced people by creating opportunities in the country or region of destination and assisting return. By coordinating efforts in the country of destination and the country of return, returnees and potential returnees can be given information on possible support programs ensuring their basic needs. In Somalia, for example, limited resources are available for residents, returnees and displaced people, increasing the likelihood of social tensions and conflict. A German development approach in Kismaayo supports all groups by ensuring food security and providing a set of services which range from vocational training programs to business promotion and the improvement of local infrastructures (BMZ, 2017b).

The topic of return migration and reintegration has so far received little research attention. Learning more about the preferences and needs of migrants, refugees and returnees will help to provide a broader picture of the most appropriate kinds of intervention (Koser and Kuschminder, 2016).

**Return programs with social protection components**

Aside from these initiatives, assisted voluntary return programs have existed in Germany for nearly 40 years. Known as the “Reintegration and Emigration Programme for Asylum-Seekers in Germany” (REAG) and the “Government Assisted Repatriation Programme (GARP)” they are operated in collaboration with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM Germany). They are regularly adjusted to current migration movements and financed by the federal and state governments. A top-up assisted return program named “StarthilfePlus” was established in Germany in February 2017. This adds financial start-up support in the country of origin to the reimbursement of travel costs and the provision of a travel grant. Different levels of support are available depending on the country of origin (ibid.).

In addition, the BMZ is phasing in a new 150-million-euro return program called “Perspektive Heimat”, which specifically targets
asylum-seekers less likely to be granted asylum in Germany, such as Albanians, Bosnians and Kosovars. This program aims to advise asylum-seekers in Germany and deliver a set of services in the country of origin to improve the reintegration of returnees, such as training courses, job placement services and the granting of credit for business start-ups (BMZ, 2017; Pohl, 9.12.2016). Despite these different systems of support, returnees are stigmatized and returning home is seen as unattractive. Of course, return is not an appropriate option for those from conflict regions or in fear of persecution, such as Iraqis, Afghans and Eritreans. Re-conceptualizing return, for example by considering options of circular migration, establishing legal migration pathways with long-term incentives to return, may not only remove the stigma of return migration, but potentially also address shortcomings in countries of destination. In addition, it is advisable to re-evaluate the security situation in countries of origin.

Initiatives by social security providers

Further initiatives carried out by German social security institutions abroad may affect migration indirectly. For example, the DGUV’s project in Bangladesh potentially encourages its beneficiaries to search for work that complies to basic working standards and occupational safety through the provision of domestic accident insurance, rather than migrating to uncertain working conditions abroad.

The way forward

There is a large body of evidence on the positive impact of both conditional and unconditional cash transfers. The same does not apply to cash-for-work programs. Little evidence exists that cash-for-work programs go beyond short-term poverty reduction by contributing to long-term poverty reduction, productivity or economic growth. Over time German development policy needs to think of ways to combine short-term measures with a long-term perspective. This will assist in addressing immediate humanitarian needs, while also preventing future causes of migration and displacement.
Furthermore, there is a great need to create a better understanding of return migration and reintegration. Continued investment needs to be made in advancing research, monitoring and evaluation of these issues in order to produce effective evidence-based solutions and approaches. Existing structures provided by NGOs and civil society groups in countries of origin could help to give psychosocial and medical support to returnees and their families. Encouraging the emergence of social support groups and information centers by allowing governments and donors to financially assist such initiatives, may help to put return migration into perspective for families, reduce the stigmatization of returnees and stimulate prospects of a better life in the country of origin. In addition, placing greater emphasis on families in the country of origin prior to emigrants' return by integrating them into the return process could facilitate comfortable and sustainable reintegration.

The variety of programs and approaches integrated into German migration strategies excludes long-term notions of social protection. Evaluating and rethinking approaches to social protection in countries which are subject to migration pressures could be a first step in long-term investment in these countries. If sustainably embedded into national contexts and aligned with short- and medium-term measures, social protection and specific social protection instruments have the potential to play an integral part in easing and possibly preventing future migration pressures. Social protection approaches have thus by no means exhausted their full potential.
6. OUTLOOK
The role of social protection in migration decisions

Results emerging from this review show that the potential of social protection with respect to migration management strategies has not been fully tapped. There is consensus among German and international development actors that providing migrants, refugees and potential returnees with better prospects is a key element in managing and coping with migration pressures. Social protection has not been given its due role in providing those prospects, a process which requires multi-level interventions that go beyond educational opportunities and functional labor markets to explore more promising and sustainable options. Citizens need protection in unproductive phases of their lives and a guarantee that they will not fall below a certain minimum standard of living. Social protection can play a significant role in that regard. However, in practice, there appears to be a limited understanding of the connection between migration and social protection and what responses and interventions are appropriate.

Conceptual and empirical evidence discussed in this review suggests that social protection can facilitate or impede both emigration and return migration and may thus be conceived of as a considerable driving factor in migration movements. Public services and transfers received in cash or in kind can widen the options for coping with risks and diversifying livelihood strategies, thereby reducing the attraction of the decision to migrate. With the help of such transfers, households can better manage risks and ultimately decide against migration. The mitigation of risk reduces psychological stress and enables households to plan future investments and possibly accrue savings, especially if transfers are regular and predictable. That families and individuals compare coping strategies and weigh up costs and benefits among a
pool of options not only explains the link between social protection and migration, but also suggests how social protection may have an impact on migration decisions. If transfers are not reliable or not delivered on time, or only sporadically, then this can create mistrust in the state and government officials. Access and legal entitlement to social protection and the portability of benefits can have an impact on both the decision to emigrate and the decision to return.

In general, factors in the country of origin are considered more relevant to the decision to emigrate, whereas factors in the country of destination are more relevant to the decision to return. This implies a need for increased development activity in the country of origin. The importance of social protection in the decision to migrate depends on a number of factors; and how social protection systems are designed in the country of origin determines and differentiates the effect it can have on the decision to migrate. The adequacy, frequency and reliability of benefits influences whether individuals and households consider migration to be an option. With higher benefit levels, reliable and predictable payments, individuals are less inclined to migrate, especially when basic needs are met. In addition, most cash transfer programs are the first point of contact between citizens and the state. Ensuring reliable and predictable payments can help to reestablish trust and reinforce the social contract between the individual and the administration, especially in countries with weak institutions.

The accessibility and quality of social protection within a country can influence how individuals and households choose from among different livelihood sources, including migration. The study has found that a lack of access to good health care services encourages people to migrate and also has a negative effect on their decision to return. Individuals are less likely to return to their country of origin if they lose benefits accrued in the country of destination. Furthermore, the project found that with higher investments in social protection expenditure, people are less likely to migrate and also more likely to return.
Access and legal entitlement to social protection and the portability of benefits for migrants, and especially migrant workers, has a considerable impact both on the decision to migrate and also on the decision to return. International and bilateral labor and social security agreements and the portability of pension benefits can allow migrants to better address the risks they face. Germany could assume a more strategic role in facilitating the portability of benefits by fostering relations with migrant-sending countries and arranging bilateral agreements. Ensuring the portability of social pension benefits and the provision of basic social protection guarantees, can facilitate and ease the decision to emigrate from the home country while also easing return.

The role of social protection in migration decisions depends on the country context and the prevalent causes of migration. In countries like Albania, poor quality social services in the fields of education, employment and health care are driving factors for migration, especially for young people. Here, the current image of social protection is scarred by encounters with corruption at all levels and poor-quality institutions and services. Individuals and households often see no other option than to migrate to places with better education and work opportunities. The absence of social protection in Albania impedes social and economic progress and thus presumably promotes migration. In countries like Albania social protection should be used more holistically to optimize the existing system. The Albanian case further exemplifies how social protection can be an indicator of citizens’ trust in the state and its implementing institutions. More attention should be given to steering investments towards social protection and quality assurance, including monitoring, evaluation and grievance mechanisms. This way, it may assuage Albanians who are dissatisfied with public services and institutions and prevent them from migrating to countries where public institutions are more reliable and transparent. Furthermore, improving targeting and increasing the level of social protection benefits has the potential to lift people out of poverty and allow them to accrue savings and make productive investments, obviating the
need to migrate. In countries like Albania, German development cooperation should focus on improving social protection institutions, increasing institutional and financial capacities with a view to expanding coverage, for example by facilitating portable benefits and increasing investment in education and employment-generating activities.

The case is similar in Nigeria, where citizens are faced with corruption and poor quality social services. In countries like Albania and Nigeria, where corruption, poverty and a lack of prospects are push factors driving migration, institutional reforms, accountability and grievance mechanisms in social protection could contribute to tackling corruption while simultaneously improving the quality of services. This could be combined with capacity development measures, such as training workers and conducting awareness raising campaigns.

Poverty and a lack of economic opportunities are additional key factors driving migration in Nigeria. Here too, social protection can be perceived as an indicator for state-citizen relations, yet plays an even more vital role in delivering basic social services and guaranteeing a certain minimum standard of living.

A large informal sector contributes to migration decisions in countries like Pakistan, where social protection needs to take a more protective role by strategically tackling gender inequalities and by addressing the risks faced by workers abroad. Accident insurance, for example, can ensure safe working conditions while portable benefits mean better prospects upon return. Strategic planning in social protection can counteract the potential effect of climate change on internal displacement and external migration. Addressing climate-related risks through flexible schemes that can be quickly scaled up to deliver support can have far reaching effects on affected groups. A careful consideration of the set of instruments and approaches can in turn have a significant impact on migration outcomes.
The opposite applies to the role of social protection in Iraq, where the current conflict situation is thought to be further intensifying poverty and vulnerability, especially in the northern Kurdish region. Here social protection plays a minor role in current migration decisions. In Iraq, it is certainly more important for social protection to deliver immediate access to basic social services and transfers, thus slowly providing a basis from which to enhance livelihoods and improve future living conditions. The causes of flight in Iraq have much more to do with escaping violence and conflict arising from social tensions, armed groups and militias. In such contexts, where social protection provides a long-term prospect of securing peace-keeping, especially for the young, social protection can be used more strategically. Though social protection may not contribute to migration decision-making in Iraq at present, investments in social protection are considered to have an impact on long-term peace-building processes and social cohesion and thus potentially on future migration decisions. Dissatisfaction with public services, coupled with unemployment and deteriorating living conditions, can have dangerous consequences, particularly for the youthful majority who subsequently become more susceptible to the lure of extremist groups and rebellion.

**Return migration**

The decision to return to the country of origin is influenced by factors similar to those affecting the decision to emigrate. They include the importance of family and social networks, the individual level of education and a comparison of advantages, benefits and prospects in both the country of origin and the country of destination. Often, the intention to return is embedded in the initial migration strategy of saving earnings made abroad for later use in the country of origin. Return programs appear to have little influence on those still in the decision-making process, especially since they primarily consist of one-off payments and travel stipends. For those considering, intending or needing to return, however, policy interventions such as portability of
social security benefits, advisory centers and knowledge exchange platforms may be very helpful.

In addition, more information is needed not only about immigration to a country but also about return movements. National registries need to be equipped with appropriate means for properly assessing these movements and providing reliable statistics. This would contribute to an understanding of migration behaviors and thus in turn to improving the effectiveness of the relevant policy measures. Research gaps persist on the role and impact of returnees and how values and norms in the country of destination may indirectly affect the country of origin when returnees transfer these norms and their corresponding expectations back home. By doing so, returnees may help to increase the value and quality of social protection services. To evaluate these processes in more detail and design effective social protection systems accordingly, more research is needed.

**Policy implications**

The growing international evidence for, and recognition of, the potential of social protection systems embedded within short-, medium- and long-term interventions to provide relief in situations of crisis and shock has not translated into their widespread implementation. Similarly, Germany is a strong proponent of social protection, yet its advocacy has not been translated into programs and investments. Social protection is considered a cross-cutting topic in German development policy, rather than a stand-alone field, as can be observed in various social protection projects linked to areas that focus on economic development, good governance, health and rural development. While a cross-sectoral approach helps to link different fields, it nonetheless undermines social protection’s increasing potential as a sustainable and beneficial policy tool, especially in the context of migration. Increased efforts should therefore be directed
towards advocating social protection as an independent field that fosters and enhances links and collaboration.

The Marshall Plan with Africa is no more than a first step in laying the foundations for social protection and sustainable development. The plan acknowledges the role social protection can play in responding to crises in developing countries faced with challenges associated with migration and climate change. However, the fact that few programs incorporate social protection as a main component in bilateral programs or wider country portfolios indicates the low priority accorded to social protection in German development cooperation, where it is often subordinated to topics such as health and economic development. Social protection is not used very strategically in countries that push citizens into emigration by denying them reasonable prospects at home. Individual instruments of social protection, such as cash-for-work and cash transfers, are considered effective in easing migration pressures but they also often lack a long-term perspective.

**Policy recommendations**

1. Increased efforts should be directed towards prioritizing and advocating social protection as an independent field in German development cooperation that fosters and enhances links and collaboration with other fields. This implies increasing the number of bilateral programs which contain social protection as a larger component within their portfolio.

2. Increased investment in social expenditure and social protection policies correlates positively with return migration. It is desirable for international and national efforts to steer finance towards social protection policies, not only because the long-term effects on human capital increase economic growth and productivity but also because they signal to the population that they are valued, and this is a signal which will encourage emigrants to return. As a strong advocate for
social protection, Germany needs to take on a more leading role in developing strategies to increase social protection funding at the national level.

3. Europe and Germany should be more open to negotiating agreements which address the portability of social security benefits from destination countries. Portability facilitates the decision to return and eases reintegration into the society and economy of the country of origin. Portability also promotes employment mobility which may at least temporarily fill the skills gap in countries of destination in sectors such as old age care which present less a risk of brain-drain in the countries of origin. In addition, allowing legal pathways for migration can reduce exploitation and abuse. Portability agreements require the support of effective institutions in the country of origin to ensure service delivery.

4. During situations of crises, the priority of the international and German community can shift to meet immediate basic humanitarian needs, which do not always allow for coordinated efforts and align with the national agenda. It is important to bear in mind that such programs are only a temporary measure and do not provide a long-term solution. The current German portfolio of social protection approaches in migration contexts should be broadened and not limited to cash-for-work programs. Cash-for-work programs in German development cooperation should not be treated as a universal remedy in cases of crisis, since they predominantly focus on short-term poverty reduction and are not necessarily followed by sustainable economic growth or higher productivity. Medium- and long-term measures are essential for a country’s future development and have the additional benefit of encouraging national and regional ownership in the long run. In this sense, it is important for the German government to see how short-term measures such as cash for-work programs can either be embedded in social protection systems or how some of the resulting lessons learned can inform the further development of social protection systems.
5. As this study has amply demonstrated, the priorities, constraints and needs of social protection vary according to the country context and require appropriately adapted solutions. In Albania for example, challenges associated with poor management and corruption in the social protection system call for institutional reform, whereas challenges in Nigeria and Pakistan are more related to the lack of coverage, which calls for more effective targeting of the system. The situation in Iraq, demands a more humanitarian approach in need of more basic delivery of social protection.

6. Pro-active policy-making and support have the potential to prevent the emergence of conflicts before they break out. Social protection in situations of fragility and protracted crises can improve state-citizen relations and neutralize underlying social tensions through the delivery of social protection services to all. This requires active collaboration with all countries, not only those Germany is partnering with.

7. Social protection programs and policy should ideally be comprehensive in nature and designed and implemented according to the country-specific context and together with national governments. In this manner, it can not only ensure the longevity and effectiveness of programs, but also encourage national and regional ownership. The approaches adopted should include several actors, tap into the expertise of the BMZ, BMAS and German social security providers such as the DGUV, and cover multiple risks spanning poverty, work accidents, old age, ill health and disability, caring obligations and under- as well as unemployment.

8. Too little evidence is available of the long-term effects of social protection programs in the context of migration to paint a clear picture. There is equally a lack of evidence on how to best link strategies that increase resilience in situations of fragility and enhance livelihoods in the long run. Supporting research that fills this information gap should become a priority of German development cooperation, particularly evidence which explains how a smooth transition from short- to medium- and long-term strategies can occur.


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Interview guideline with migrants and refugees

Part 1: Introduction

1. Age:
2. Occupation:
3. Length of stay in Germany:

Part 2: Information before and during Migration

4. What was it like growing up in (country)? / What was your life like in (country)?
5. How many members are/were in your household?
6. What is/was the main source of income for your household in (country)? / How did you maintain your lifestyle back home?
7. Earnings/Social benefits (Cash transfers)/Remittances/other
8. When was the decision made to migrate?
   a. How was it made?
   b. By whom was it made?
   c. How long did the decision take?
   d. Are you the first in your family to migrate?
   e. How old were you when you migrated?
9. Did you migrate alone or with family/friends?
10. What did you know about Germany before coming here?

Part 3: Thoughts on return migration

11. How do you see the future of your place of living?
12. When did you last return home?
   a. Why did you return?
13. Do you consider returning?
   a. Why?
   b. Why not?
14. Do you know of return programs?
   a. Would you consider them?
15. What would have to change in your country of origin for you to comfortably return?
16. If you returned, how do you think your life back home would be different compared to how you lived before you migrated?
Part 4 – Role of Social Protection

17. How important would you rate the following measures for you and your family/household? (0 Not at all important very important – 5 Very important/no opinion)
   a. General cash transfers
   b. Child cash transfers
   c. Old age cash transfer
   d. Health Insurance
   e. Employment Accident Insurance
   f. Pension plans
   g. Other

18. In general, who do people trust in your country
   a. public administration
   b. committees
   c. NGOs
   d. Churches
   e. Other

19. Does your family/household receive any social benefits?
   a. What kind?

20. Is any of the cash transfer received used for migration?
   a. Please tell us more about how?

21. Does your family/household have insurance?

22. When households in your neighborhood/country experience something unfortunate, such as a bad harvest, ill health, or loss of a job or income source, how do they cope?
   a. How does the household decide what action to take under such circumstances?

23. Please tell us about social protection programs/social benefits/social insurance in your country
   a. What do people in your country think about these programs?
   b. How do you learn about these programs?

24. Which efforts does government undertake to ensure that people can meet their needs?

25. What do young people in your country hope to do in the future

26. How important do you think it is for government to invest in social protection?

27. Do you think that if you felt better socially protected in your country, you still would have migrated?
28. Do you think that if government invested more in social protection, you would decide to return?
29. If you were sent back to your country, what kind of help would you require?
   a. What measures would you prioritize?
30. Would the payment of social benefits for a certain period of time ease your return?
31. Have the institutions and organizations in your country taken any type of action to address the consequences of migration or to harness their advantages?
   a. Which institutions and what type of action?
   b. Are you familiar with programs / projects that link people from here and others abroad?

Part 5 – Conclusion
32. Is there anything you would like to add? Did I miss anything?
33. Do you have any final remarks?
Interview guideline for experts and policy-makers

Part 1: Introduction
34. How does your professional background affiliate you with (country)?
35. Describe the role you have played in establishing and/or promoting policy related to social protection and/or social policy in (country), whether it is directly or indirectly.

Part 2: Social Protection Schemes
36. How familiar are you with the topic of social protection?
37. How are social protection and/or social policy conceived in (country)?
38. Which factor(s) have influenced the role social protection plays in (country)?
   a. Considering the previously asked question, how would you rate the political level of priority for adopting SP policies?
   b. What challenges exist at the policy level that could affect SP?
39. Thinking about a specific SP program(s), can you describe how effective it has been, in terms of coverage, awareness within the target population, expected outcomes, etc?
40. What has made it effective?
41. Which factors explain why it has not been effective?
42. How well do you think the social protection system in (country) is/was implemented?
   a. Which programs do you think have a significant positive effect?
   b. Where did/do the challenges exist during the implementation process? (and where do they exist currently within the programming?)
43. How is social protection perceived by civil society?
44. Can you explain any informal forms of SP that exist and how it is perceived?

Part 3: Migration
45. What role does migration play in (country)?
   a. Who do you think migrates and why do you these individuals are migrating?
   b. Is it temporary/seasonal/permanent?
46. How does migration affect those remaining in the country?
47. What links do you see between social protection and the decision to migrate?
   a. How and in what ways can social protection be improved to change an individual’s decision to migrate?
48. How has migration influenced social protection policy?
49. In what ways could social protection influence the decision to return?
50. Are you aware of specific policies targeting those who are about to migrate, those who have migrated or, more specifically a return migrant policy? If so, can you describe these policies and its provisions?

Part 5: Conclusion

51. Are there any final remarks you would like to make regarding policymaking and/or the connection between social protection and migration?
Interview guideline for volunteers and civil society organizations

Part 1: Introduction

52. What is your professional background?
53. Can you describe your role and tasks in your work in ________?
54. How long have you been working for ________?
55. What is the objective of ________?
   a. Are there linkages to social protection?

Part 2: Migration

56. Who do you work with in your organisation? / What is your target group?
57. Where do people come from?
58. What is your impression of why people left or fled their country?
59. What are your experiences in your work with migrants and refugees?
60. Among these, are there individuals that would like to return to their home country?
61. What are your experiences with returnees or potential returnees?
62. Are you aware of specific return programs?
   a. Can you describe them?
63. What are the main challenges for migrants and refugees in Germany in your opinion?
64. Are there networks migrants and refugees can rely on?

Part 3: Concluding remarks

65. Does your organisation / institution receive state support?
   a. What kind of support?
   b. To what extent does this support your work?
66. What have you noticed in your work in general?
   a. Possible bottlenecks or gaps?
67. Do you have anything to add or to share?
ANNEX 2

LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTNERS (ANONYMIZED)
## Annex 2  List of Interview partners (anonymized)

### Refugees and Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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### Volunteers and Organisations

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### Experts and policy-makers (name of institution)

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Since its foundation in 1947, it has been the principal forum for discussion of the further development of social security in theory and practice. GVG offers its members a forum for discussing challenges in social security and for exchanging information about current reform projects. GVG members benefit from interdisciplinary and cross-cutting debates. In direct contact with politicians, researchers and practitioners, GVG’s members play an active part in shaping Germany’s social security system.

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This study, “Social Protection as an Alternative to Migration? An assessment of the role of social protection in reducing push factors for migration in different country contexts”, aims to highlight the significance of social protection as an autonomous strategy for migration policies and research. It focuses particularly on the German strategies for combating the causes of flight and migration. By managing migration flows, stabilizing societies and encouraging economic development, social protection can play an important role in reducing migration flows. At the same time, social protection can act as a stabilizer in the countries of origin and accelerate economic growth as well as supporting individual decisions to return to the countries of origin.

This study was jointly conducted by the Bonn-Rhein-Sieg University of Applied Sciences, and the Institute for Political Science and Sociology at the University of Bonn. The Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung e.V., (DGUV) funded and contributed to the study, while the GVG – Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissenschaft und -gestaltung e.V. provided further input and has been responsible for its publication – as Volume 78 in its publication series – and distribution.